Journal of Public Economic Theory: Vol 27, No 2

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Journal of Public Economic Theory: Volume 27, Issue 2

ISSUE INFORMATION

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Condorcet Was Wrong, Pareto Was Right: Families, Inheritance and Inequality

Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education

Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators

School Segregation and Outside Options

CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies

Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers

Games of Social Interactions With Externalities

Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution

Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation

Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation

Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided?

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Journal of Public Economic Theory

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Journal of Public Economic Theory: Volume 27, Issue 2

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ISSUE INFORMATION

Issue Information

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Condorcet Was Wrong, Pareto Was Right: Families, Inheritance and Inequality

Finding Out Who You Are: A Self-Exploration View of Education

Dynamic Volunteer's Dilemma With Procrastinators

School Segregation and Outside Options

CvdN Equilibrium and Share Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies

Intermediate Condorcet Winners and Losers

Games of Social Interactions With Externalities

Just Lindahl Taxation—A Welfarist Solution

Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation

Leadership in Public Good Games and Private Information on Own Social Value Orientation

Does Equal Income Maximize Social Welfare When Multiple Pure Public Goods Are Privately Provided?

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