Original Article
Quo Vadis? Career paths of Brazilian regulators
Alketa Peci,
Aline de Menezes Santos,
Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo,
Corresponding Author
Alketa Peci
Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, FGV EBAPE, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Correspondence: Alketa Peci, Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30, Sala 242, 22231-010 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorAline de Menezes Santos
Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, FGV EBAPE, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Search for more papers by this authorBruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo
Institute for Applied Economic Research, Ipea - DF, Brasília, Brazil
Search for more papers by this authorAlketa Peci,
Aline de Menezes Santos,
Bruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo,
Corresponding Author
Alketa Peci
Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, FGV EBAPE, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Correspondence: Alketa Peci, Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Rua Jornalista Orlando Dantas, 30, Sala 242, 22231-010 Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorAline de Menezes Santos
Brazilian School of Business and Public Administration, Getulio Vargas Foundation, FGV EBAPE, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Search for more papers by this authorBruno César Pino Oliveira de Araújo
Institute for Applied Economic Research, Ipea - DF, Brasília, Brazil
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Research about professional trajectories of regulators highlights the exchange of personnel from independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) to the private sector, mainly based on US evidence. However, current studies indicate that revolving doors in different contexts may share more nuances, reflecting the role of different political institutions. Here we rely on sequence analysis to explore the trajectories of 117 Brazilian board members of IRAs, investigating: What are their typical professional trajectories? Which career path receives most of the benefits in postterm positions? The analysis uncovers five clusters of career paths in which most regulators do not transition between the public and private sectors but still benefit in direct and indirect ways from serving terms in IRAs. A different mix of market/bureaucratic/political incentives plays a role in the patterns of professional trajectories we uncover in Brazil. Depending on the context, regulators' trajectories might be driven by either market or state forces.
Supporting Information
| Filename | Description |
|---|---|
| rego12348-sup-0001-AppendixS1.docxWord 2007 document , 120.2 KB | Appendix S1. Supporting information. |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
References
- Abbott A, Hrycak A (1990) Measuring Resemblance in Sequence Data: An Optimal Matching Analysis of Musicians' Careers. American Journal of Sociology 96, 144–185.
- Abbott A, Tsay A (2000) Sequence Analysis and Optimal Matching Methods in Sociology: Review and Prospect. Sociological Methods & Research 29, 3–33.
- Aisenbrey S, Fasang AE (2010) New Life for Old Ideas: The “Second Wave” of Sequence Analysis Bringing the “Course” Back into the Life Course. Sociological Methods & Research 38, 420–462.
- Barbosa K, Straub S (2017) The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement. TSE Working Paper. Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse.
- Beblavy M (2001) Understanding the Waves of Agencification and the Governance Problems they have Raised in Central and Eastern European Countries. OECD Journal on Budgeting 2, 121–139.
10.1787/budget-v2-art6-en Google Scholar
- Bertrand M, Bombardini M, Trebbi F (2014) Is it Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process. The American Economic Review 104, 3885–3920.
- Biemann T, Datta DK (2014) Analyzing Sequence Data: Optimal Matching in Management Research. Organizational Research Methods 17, 51–76.
- Blanchard P, Fillieule O (2011) Sequence Analysis for Political Science. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, September 1–4, 2011.
- Blanes i Vidal J, Draca M, Fons-Rosen C (2012) Revolving Door Lobbyists. The American Economic Review 102, 3731–3748.
- Brazilian Federal Government (2019) List of Current Remuneration of. Available from URL: https://siorg.planejamento.gov.br/siorg-cidadao-webapp/pages/listar_cargos_funcoes/listar_cargos_funcoes.jsf. Accessed May 14, 2019.
- Carpenter D, Moss DA (2013) Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit it. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
10.1017/CBO9781139565875 Google Scholar
- Che YK (1995) Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion. The Rand Journal of Economics 26, 378–397.
- Christensen T, Lægreid P (2005) Regulatory Reforms and Agencification. Working Paper 6. Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies, Oslo.
- Coen D, Vannoni M (2016) Sliding Doors in Brussels: A Career Path Analysis of EU Affairs Managers. European Journal of Political Research 55, 811–826.
- Coen D, Vannoni M (2018) The Strategic Management of Government Affairs in Brussels. Business & Society 59(4), 612–641. https://doi.org/10.1177/0007650318755083.
- Coen D, Vannoni M (2020) Where are the Revolving Doors in Brussels? Sector Switching and Career Progression in EU Business–Government Affairs. The American Review of Public Administration 50, 3–17.
- Cohen JE (1986) The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC. American Journal of Political Science 30, 689–708.
- Dlouhy K, Biemann T (2015) Optimal Matching Analysis in Career Research: A Review and Some Best-Practice Recommendations. Journal of Vocational Behavior 90, 163–173.
- Eckert RD (1981) The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners. The Journal of Law and Economics 24, 113–120.
- Ennser-Jedenastik L (2015) The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies: Between Partisan Influence and Formal Independence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26, 507–518.
- Fernández-i-Marín X, Jordana J, Bianculli AC (2016) Are Regulatory Agencies Independent in Practice? Evidence from Board Members in Spain. Regulation & Governance 10, 230–247.
- Gabadinho A, Ritschard G, Mueller NS, Studer M (2011) Analyzing and Visualizing State Sequences in R with TraMineR. Journal of Statistical Software 40, 1–37.
- Gilardi F (2002) Policy Credibility and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy 9, 873–893.
- Gilardi F, Jordana J, Levi-Faur D (2006) Regulation in the Age of Globalization: The Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America. In: H Graeme (ed) Privatisation and Market Development: Global Movements in Public Policy Ideas, pp. 127–147. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
10.4337/9781847204288.00016 Google Scholar
- Gormley JR, William T (1979) A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC. American Journal of Political Science 23, 665–683.
- Jordana J, Levi-Faur D (2005) The Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism in Latin America: Sectoral and National Channels in the Making of a New Order. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598, 102–124.
- Jordana J, Levi-Faur D, i Marín XF (2011) The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion. Comparative Political Studies 44, 1343–1369.
- Jordana J, Fernández-i-Marín X, Bianculli AC (2018) Agency proliferation and the globalization of the regulatory state: Introducing a data set on the institutional features of regulatory agencies. Regulation & Governance 12(4), 524–540.
- Laffont JJ, Tirole J (1991) The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1089–1127.
- Law MT, Long CX (2011) Revolving Door Laws and State Public Utility Commissioners. Regulation & Governance 5, 405–424.
- Lazarus J, McKay A (2012) Consequences of the Revolving Door: Evaluating the Lobbying Success of Former Congressional Members and Staff. Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
- Levi-Faur D (2003) The Politics of Liberalisation: Privatisation and Regulation-for-Competition in Europe's and Latin America's Telecoms and Electricity Industries. European Journal of Political Research 42, 705–740.
- Levi-Faur D, Jordana J (2006) Toward a Latin American Regulatory State? The Diffusion of Autonomous Regulatory Agencies across Countries and Sectors. International Journal of Public Administration 29, 335–366.
10.1080/01900690500437212 Google Scholar
- Makkai T, Braithwaite J (1992) In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture. Journal of Public Policy 12, 61–78.
10.1017/S0143814X00005006 Google Scholar
- Meirelles F, Oliva R (2006) Delegation and Political Control of the Regulatory Agencies in Brazil. Revista de Administração Pública 40, 545–565.
10.1590/S0034-76122006000400003 Google Scholar
- Peci A (2016) Regulatory Reform and a Better Regulation Agenda: Traveling from Center to Periphery. In: TR Klassen, D Cepiku, TJ Lah (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Global Public Policy and Administration, pp. 217–225. Taylor & Francis, London, New York.
- Peci A, Sobral F (2011) Regulatory Impact Assessment: How Political and Organizational Forces Influence its Diffusion in a Developing Country. Regulation & Governance 5, 204–220.
- Peltzman S (1976) Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics 19, 211–240.
- Spilerman S (1977) Careers, Labor Market Structure, and Socioeconomic Achievement. American Journal of Sociology 83, 551–593.
- Spiller PT (1990) Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or “Let Them Be Bribed”. The Journal of Law and Economics 33, 65–101.
- Stigler GJ (1971) The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, 3–21.
- Stigler GJ (1975) The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Studer M (2013) WeightedCluster Library Manual: A practical Guide to Creating Typologies of Trajectories in the Social Sciences with R. LIVES Working Papers, 24. University of Geneva Institute for Demographic and Life Course Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.
- Studer M, Ritschard G (2016) What Matters in Differences between Life Trajectories: A Comparative Review of Sequence Dissimilarity Measures. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 179, 481–511.
- Thatcher M (2005) The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe. Governance 18, 347–373.
- Vannoni M, John PCH (2018) Using Sequence Analysis to Understand Career Progression: An Application to the UK House of Commons. Available from URL: https://thepoliticalmethodologist.com/2018/08/14/using-sequence-analysis-to-understand-career-progression-an-application-to-the-uk-house-of-commons/. Accessed May 14, 2019.
- World Bank (2019) Gestão de Pessoas e Folha de Pagamentos no Setor Público Brasileiro: O Que Os Dados Dizem? Vol. 2 (Portuguese). World Bank Group, Washington, DC.
- Wu I (2008) Who Regulates Phones, Television, and the Internet? What Makes a Communications Regulator Independent and Why it Matters. Perspectives on Politics 6, 769–783.
- Zheng W (2014) The Revolving Door. Notre Dame Law Review 90, 1265–1308.
