Original Article
Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects
Bradley Rettler,
Corresponding Author
Bradley Rettler
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Wyoming
Correspondence: Bradley Rettler, Fordham University, Department of Philosophy. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorBradley Rettler,
Corresponding Author
Bradley Rettler
Department of Philosophy, Fordham University
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, University of Wyoming
Correspondence: Bradley Rettler, Fordham University, Department of Philosophy. Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter-intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the new puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist.
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