Original Article
Cartesian Imperativism
Joseph Gottlieb, Saja Parvizian,
Saja Parvizian
Philosophy Department, University of Illinois at Chicago
Search for more papers by this authorJoseph Gottlieb, Saja Parvizian,
Saja Parvizian
Philosophy Department, University of Illinois at Chicago
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
We propose a novel reading of Descartes' views on the nature of pain, thirst, and hunger: imperativism. According to imperativism, rather than (exclusively) having intentional contents individuated by a set of correctness conditions specifying the way the world is, pain thirst, and hunger have contents individuated by satisfaction conditions, which specify the way the world ought to be. Unlike representationalist treatments, the imperativist reading satisfies the unique health-preserving role Descartes sets out for pain, thirst, and hunger, without inflating his austere metaphysics of res extensa.
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