Volume 103, Issue 2 pp. 417-440
ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Where you are matters: Network position, designed network, and central government agency termination

Liang Ma

Liang Ma

School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China

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Weixing Liu

Weixing Liu

School of Government, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, China

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Sicheng Chen

Corresponding Author

Sicheng Chen

School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Correspondence

Sicheng Chen, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China.

Email: [email protected]

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Tom Christensen

Tom Christensen

Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Distinguished Visiting Professor, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

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First published: 20 August 2024
Citations: 1

Abstract

en

This study synthesizes insights from collaborative network and agency termination theories to investigate how agencies' positions in designed networks impact their survival probability. Using longitudinal data for the central apparatus in China from 2005 to 2020, along with the designed networks derived from 1243 joint tasks arranged by the State Council, we conducted event history analyses to test our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that a centralized network position can significantly reduce an agency's likelihood of termination, while agencies in the periphery of designed networks may be less likely to survive significant restructuring. It is also discovered that stronger agencies, such as larger, economically functioning, or statutorily created ones, benefit more from centralized network positions. These findings underscore the pivotal role played by agencies' positions within designed networks in their survival prospects. As such, agencies should strategically leverage their positions within collaborative networks to mitigate the risk of termination.

Chinese Abstract

zh

本研究综合协作网络理论和机构终止理论的见解, 探讨部委机构在设计合作网络中的位置如何影响其生存概率。通过使用2005年至2020年间中国中央部委机构变迁的数据, 以及由国务院安排的1243个联合任务所衍生的设计网络, 我们进行事件史分析以检验研究的假设。研究结果表明, 若部委机构处于设计网络的中心位置能够显著降低机构被终止的概率, 而处于设计网络边缘的机构在重大机构改革中生存的可能性较低。研究还发现, 较强势的机构(比如规模较大、具有经济职能或者由立法机构法定创建), 更能从中心化的设计网络位置中受益。这些发现突显部委机构在设计网络中的位置对其生存前景的关键影响。因此, 部委机构应战略性地改善它们在国务院任务安排中设计网络的位置, 以降低其被终止的风险。

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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