ORIGINAL ARTICLE
An (in)effective tax and expenditure limit (TEL): Why county governments do not utilize their maximum allotted property tax rate
John W. Decker Ph.D.,
Corresponding Author
John W. Decker Ph.D.
The Hunt Institute, An Affiliate of the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy, Cary, North Carolina, USA
Correspondence
John W. Decker, The Hunt Institute, An Affiliate of the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy, 4000 Centregreen Way, Suite 301, Cary, NC 27513, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorJohn W. Decker Ph.D.,
Corresponding Author
John W. Decker Ph.D.
The Hunt Institute, An Affiliate of the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy, Cary, North Carolina, USA
Correspondence
John W. Decker, The Hunt Institute, An Affiliate of the Duke University Sanford School of Public Policy, 4000 Centregreen Way, Suite 301, Cary, NC 27513, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Tax and expenditure limits (TELs) are restrictions placed on governments limiting their ability to collect and spend revenue. Residents support these TELs, as they desire lower tax burdens and more government efficiency; yet, residents still desire the same level of public services. Property tax rate limits, a specific type of TEL, are placed upon local governments to limit their ability to collect revenue and expand authority. Rate limits were implemented on the assumption that governments would tax at their highest maximum possible rate, but this is not always the case. This article studies why some local governments choose not to utilize their maximum allotted property tax rate. Using an open systems governance approach, a panel data analysis was conducted using data from 67 Florida counties from 2008 to 2017. Results of the analysis show that the use of special districts and the age of the residential population have significant effects on property tax rate decisions.
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The authors declare no potential conflict of interest.
Open Research
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
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