ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Recentralization and the long-lasting effect of campaign-style enforcement: From the perspective of authority allocation
Di Dong,
Rong Ran,
Bingsheng Liu,
Jinfeng Zhang,
Chengcheng Song,
Jing Wang,
Di Dong
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Rong Ran
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Correspondence
Rong Ran, School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400044, China.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorBingsheng Liu
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorJinfeng Zhang
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorChengcheng Song
School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Dingguo Street, Yangpu District, Shanghai, 200000 China
Search for more papers by this authorJing Wang
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorDi Dong,
Rong Ran,
Bingsheng Liu,
Jinfeng Zhang,
Chengcheng Song,
Jing Wang,
Di Dong
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Rong Ran
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Correspondence
Rong Ran, School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing 400044, China.
Email: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorBingsheng Liu
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorJinfeng Zhang
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorChengcheng Song
School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Dingguo Street, Yangpu District, Shanghai, 200000 China
Search for more papers by this authorJing Wang
School of Public Policy and Administration, Chongqing University, Shazheng Street, Shapingba District, Chongqing, 400044 China
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
enThis paper discusses whether the effect of campaign-style enforcement can surpass the short term from the perspective of authority allocation. Based on the theory of authority allocation, we establish an explanatory framework for the impact of authority allocation on the effect of campaign-style enforcement. We argue that, through authority allocation, the central government has both formal authority and real authority, which helps to extend the effect of campaign-style enforcement beyond the short term. We empirically studied the regulatory compliance in China's environmental administrative talk from 2014 to 2016. Statistical findings supported by robustness checks confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Further analysis shows that campaign-style enforcement can be more effective when local officials have longer tenure, higher levels of education, or older age. Our paper shows that authority recentralization on specific issues can bridge the conflict of policy goals between central and local governments, prolonging the effect of campaign-style enforcement.
Resumen
esEste documento analiza si el efecto de la aplicación de estilo de campaña puede superar el corto plazo desde la perspectiva de la asignación de autoridad. Con base en la teoría de la asignación de autoridad, establecemos un marco explicativo para el impacto de la asignación de autoridad en el efecto de la aplicación de estilo de campaña. Argumentamos que, a través de la asignación de autoridad, el gobierno central tiene autoridad formal y autoridad real, lo que ayuda a extender el efecto de la aplicación de estilo de campaña más allá del corto plazo. Estudiamos empíricamente el cumplimiento de la normativa en el discurso administrativo ambiental de China de 2014 a 2016. Los hallazgos estadísticos respaldados por controles de solidez confirman nuestras hipótesis teóricas. Un análisis más detallado muestra que la aplicación del estilo de campaña puede ser más efectiva cuando los funcionarios locales tienen más tiempo en el cargo, niveles más altos de educación o edad avanzada. Nuestro documento muestra que la recentralización de la autoridad en temas específicos puede salvar el conflicto de objetivos de política entre los gobiernos central y local, prolongando el efecto de la aplicación de estilo de campaña.
摘要
zh本文从权力分配的视角探讨了运动式执法能否产生持久的效果。基于权力分配理论，我们就权力分配对运动式执法效果的影响提出了一项解释性框架。我们论证认为，通过权力分配，中央政府既有正式权力也有实际权力，这有助于将运动式执法的效果扩大到短期之外。我们实证研究了2014-2016年中国环境行政约谈中的监管zu。统计结果通过了稳健性检验，证实了我们的理论假设。进一步分析表明，当地方官员任期较长、受教育程度较高或年龄较大时，运动式执法会更有效。我们的论文表明，在具体问题上进行重新集权，能消除中央和地方政府之间政策目标的冲突，延长运动式执法的效果。
CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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