Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real-world” functions
Funding information: Australian Government
Abstract
A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory-based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.
REFERENCES
- Agrawal, A. (2002). Common resources and institutional sustainability. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. Stern, S. Stonich, & E. Weber (Eds.), The drama of the Commons, National Research Council, Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change (pp. 41–85). Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
- Agrawal, A., & Goyal, S. (2001). Group size and collective action: Third-party monitoring in common pool resources. Comparative Political Studies, 34, 63–93.
- Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35(3), 1320–1346.
- Bauhr, M. (2016). Need or greed? Conditions for collective action against corruption. Governance. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12232
- Bauhr, M., & Grimes, (2013). Indignation or resignation: The implications of transparency for societal accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291–320.
- Bauhr, M., & Nasiritousi, N. (2011). Why pay bribes? Collective action and anti-corruption efforts. Gothenburg, Sweden: QOG Institute.
-
Booth, D., &
Cammack, D. (2013). Governance for development in Africa: Solving collective action problems. New York: Zed Books.
10.5040/9781350220522 Google Scholar
- Brinkerhoff, D. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An analytic framework. Public Administration and Development, 20(3), 239–252.
- Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. P. (1999). Africa works: The political instrumentalization of disorder. Bloomington, IN: International African Institute in Association with James Currey and Indiana University Press.
- Chene, M. (2010). Mobilising broad anti-corruption coalitions (U4 Expert Answer No. 262). Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.
- L. Sousa, B. Hindness, & P. Larmour (Eds.) (2008). Governments, NGOs and anti-corruption: The new integrity warriors. New York: Routledge.
- DFID. (2015). Why corruption matters: Understanding causes, effects and how to address them (DFID Evidence Paper). Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/406346/corruption-evidence-paper-why-corruption-matters.pdf
- Elster, J. (1985). Rationality, morality and collective action. Ethics, 96, 136–155.
- Englebert, P. (2000). Pre-colonial institutions, post-colonial states, and economic development in tropical Africa. Political Research Quarterly, 53(1), 7–36.
- Gauri, V., Woolcock, M., & Desai, D. (2011, June). Intersubjective meaning and collective action in “fragile” societies: Theory, evidence and policy implications (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5707). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Ghura, D. (1998). Tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa: Effects of economic policies and corruption. Washington, DC: IMF.
- Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state. American Ethnologist, 22(2), 375–402.
- A. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston, & V. LeVine (Eds.). (1989). Political corruption: A handbook. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Herbst, J. (2000). States and power in Africa: Comparative lessons in authority and control. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
-
Hickey, S., &
Du Toit, A. (2013). Adverse incorporation, social exclusion, and chronic poverty. In A. Shepard & J. Brunt (Eds.), Chronic poverty: Concepts, causes, and policy [Online Service] (pp. 134–160). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
10.1057/9781137316707_7 Google Scholar
- Hindness, B. (2008). International anti-corruption as a programme of normalization. In L. De Sousa, B. Hindness, & P. Lamour (Eds.), Governments, NGOs and anti-corruption: The new integrity warriors (pp. 19–32). New York, NY: Routledge.
-
Hough, D. (2013). Corruption, anti-corruption and governance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
10.1057/9781137268716 Google Scholar
- Huntington, S. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Johnsøn, J., Taxell, N., & Zaum, D. (2012). Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption. Assessing the state of operationally relevant evidence in donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption (U4 Issues Paper No. 2012:7). Bergen, Norway: U4.
- Johnston, M. (2010). First, do no harm—then, build trust: Anti-corruption strategies in fragile situations (Background paper to the 2011 World Development Report). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Johnston, M., & Kpundeh, S. (2002). Building a clean machine: Anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform (Stock No. 37208). Washington, DC: World Bank Institute. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37208.pdf
- Keefer, P. (2012, August). Why follow the leader? Collective action, credible commitment and conflict (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6179). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Khan, M. (2004). State failure in developing countries and strategies of institutional reform. In B. Tungodden, N. Stern, & I. Kolstad (Eds.), Toward pro-poor policies: Aid institutions and globalization (pp. 165–196). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press and the World Bank.
- Khan, M. (2006). Determinants of corruption in developing countries: The limits of conventional economic analysis. In S. Rose-Ackerman (Ed.), International handbook on the economics of corruption (pp. 216–246). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
-
Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
10.1525/9780520911185 Google Scholar
- Klitgaard, R., & Baser, H. (1998). Working together to fight corruption: State, society and the private sector in partnership. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Kpundeh, S. (1998). Political will in fighting corruption. In S. J. Kpundeh & I. Hors (Eds.), Corruption & integrity improvement initiatives in developing countries (pp. 91–110). New York: UNDP.
-
Leff, N. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8–14.
10.1177/000276426400800303 Google Scholar
- Leys, C. (1965). What is the problem about corruption? Journal of Modern African Studies, 3(2), 215–230.
- Marquette, H. (1999). Corruption eruption: Development and the international community. Third World Quarterly, 20(6), 1215–1220.
- Marquette, H. (2011). Donors, state building and corruption: Lessons from Afghanistan and the implications for aid policy. Third World Quarterly, 32(10), 1871–1890.
-
Marquette, H.,
Pavarala, V., &
Malik, K. K. (2014). Religion and attitudes towards corruption in India: A collective action problem? Development in Practice, 24(7), 8854–8866.
10.1080/09614524.2014.942215 Google Scholar
- McKitrick, E. L. (1957). The study of corruption. Political Science Quarterly, 72(4), 502–514.
- McMullan, M. (1961). A theory of corruption. Sociological Review, 9(2), 132–152.
- Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New York, NY: Free Press.
-
Michael, B. (2004). Explaining organizational change in international development: The role of complexity in anti-corruption work. Journal of International Development, 16, 1067–1088.
10.1002/jid.1126 Google Scholar
- Michael, B., & Bowser, D. (2009, July). The evolution of the anti-corruption industry in the third wave of anti-corruption work. Proceedings from the Konstanz Anti-Corruption Conference. Konstanz, Germany, pp. 1–13.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006). Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3), 86–99.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2011). Contextual choices in fighting corruption: Lessons learned. NORAD. Retrieved from www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/publication?key=383808
-
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The quest for good governance. How societies develop control of corruption. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10.1017/CBO9781316286937 Google Scholar
-
Naidoo, V. (2013). The politics of anti-corruption enforcement in South Africa. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 31(4), 523–542.
10.1080/02589001.2013.839369 Google Scholar
-
Navot, D. (2014). The concept of political corruption: Lessons from a lost epoch. Public Integrity, 16(4), 357–373.
10.2753/PIN1099-9922160403 Google Scholar
- Navot, D. (2015). Real politics and the concept of political corruption. Political Studies Review, 20, 1–11.
- Nye, J. (1967). Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. American Political Science Review, 61(2), 417–427.
-
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
10.4159/9780674041660 Google Scholar
-
Osrecki, F. (2017). A short history of the sociology of corruption: The demise of counter-inductivity and the rise of numerical comparisons. American Sociologist, 48(1), 103–125.
10.1007/s12108-016-9320-2 Google Scholar
-
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
10.1017/CBO9780511807763 Google Scholar
- Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioural approach to the rational choice theory of collection action, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1–22.
- Ostrom, E. (2007). Collective action and local development processes. Sociologica, 3, 1–32.
- Ostrom, E. (2010). Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41, 155–166.
- Peiffer, C. (2012). Reform coalitions: Patterns and hypotheses from a survey of the literature (Developmental Leadership Program Concept Paper No. 3). Birmingham: Developmental Leadership Program.
- Peiffer, C., & Alvarez, L. (2016). Who will be the “principled-principals”? Perceptions of corruption and willingness to engage in anticorruption activism. Governance, 29(3), 351–369.
- Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail–Systemic corruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.
- Rao, S. (2013). Interventions for accountability and collective action (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report No. 904). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- M. Roll (Ed.) (2014). The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of effectiveness in developing countries. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
10.4324/9781315857718 Google Scholar
-
Rose, R., &
Peiffer, C. (2015). Paying bribes for public services: A global guide to grass-roots corruption. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
10.1057/9781137509673 Google Scholar
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1978). Corruption: A study in political economy. New York: Academic Press.
- Rothstein, B. (2011). Anti-corruption: The indirect “big bang” approach. Review of International Political Economy, 18(2), 228–250.
- Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2015). Getting to Sweden, Part II: Breaking with corruption in the nineteenth century. Scandinavian Political Studies, 38(3), 238–254.
-
Rothstein, B., &
Varriach, A. (2017). Making sense of corruption. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10.1017/9781316681596 Google Scholar
-
Sampson, S. (2010). The anti-corruption industry: From movement to institution. Global Crime, 11(2), 261–278.
10.1080/17440571003669258 Google Scholar
- Scott, J. (1969). The analysis of corruption in developing nations. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11(3), 315–341.
- Seabright, P. (1993). Managing local commons: Theoretical issues in incentive design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(4), 113–134.
- Smelser, N. (1971). Stability, instability, and the analysis of political corruption. In B. Barber & A. Inkeles (Eds.), Stability and social chance (pp. 7–29). Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Smith, D. (2007). A culture of corruption: Everyday deception and popular discontent in Nigeria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stotsky, J., & WoldeMariam, A. (1997). Tax effort in sub-Saharan Africa ( IMF Working Papers No. 107). Washington, DC: IMF.
- Teorell, J., & Rothstein, B. (2015). Getting to Sweden, Part I: War and malfeasance, 1720–1850. Scandinavian Political Studies, 38(3), 217–237.
- Torsello, D., & Venard, B. (2016). The anthropology of corruption. Journal of Management Inquiry, 25(1), 34–54.
- Transparency International. (2009). Integrity Pacts. Retrieved from http://archive.transparency.org/layout/set/print/global_priorities/public_contracting/integrity_pacts
- Ugur, M., & Dasgupta, N. (2011). Evidence on the economic growth impacts of corruption in low-income countries and beyond. Retrieved from http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wrCtuggn-IQ%3D&tabid=3108&mid=5787
-
Walton, G. (2013). Is all corruption dysfunctional? Perceptions of corruption and its consequences in Papua New Guinea. Public Administration and Development, (33), 175–190.
10.1002/pad.1636 Google Scholar
- Waterbury, J. (1973). Endemic and planned corruption in a monarchical regime. World Politics, 25(4), 533–555.
- Waterbury, J. (1976). Corruption, political stability, and development: Comparative evidence from Egypt and Morocco. Government and Opposition, 11(4), 426–445.
- Williams, R. (1999). New concepts for old? Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 503–513.
- World Bank Institute. (2008). Fighting corruption through collective action: A guide for business. Retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/antic/Whole_guide_Oct.pdf
- World Bank Institute. (2010). Collective action in the fight against corruption. Retrieved from https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Anti-Corruption/CollectiveAction2010.pdf