Volume 64, Issue S1 pp. 5069-5106
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Non-executive directors and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China

Siyu Zhang

Siyu Zhang

School of Finance, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China

Search for more papers by this author
Chao Lu

Corresponding Author

Chao Lu

School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, China

Correspondence

Chao Lu, School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, 3 Shangyuancun Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100044, China.

Email: [email protected]

Search for more papers by this author
First published: 15 August 2024
Citations: 1

Abstract

This study empirically examines the relationship between non-executive directors and corporate risk-taking. The findings show that non-executive directors could significantly improve the risk-taking level of corporations. Non-executive directors reduce corporate agency costs and alleviate financing constraints, thus promoting a corporation's risk-taking level. Further research shows that the positive impact of non-executive directors on corporate risk-taking is weakened by being state-owned, higher executive incentives, better external supervision, higher ownership concentration, higher management age and greater uncertainty in the external environment. Additionally, non-executive directors appointed by both controlling and non-controlling shareholders play a positive role in promoting corporate risk-taking.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

The full text of this article hosted at iucr.org is unavailable due to technical difficulties.