Addicted to answers: Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Corresponding Author
Marta Marchlewska
Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Correspondence
Marta Marchlewska, Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Stawki 5/7, 00-183, Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorAleksandra Cichocka
School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
Search for more papers by this authorMałgorzata Kossowska
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Marta Marchlewska
Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Correspondence
Marta Marchlewska, Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, Stawki 5/7, 00-183, Warsaw, Poland.
E-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorAleksandra Cichocka
School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
Search for more papers by this authorMałgorzata Kossowska
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Conspiracy theories offer simple answers to complex problems by providing explanations for uncertain situations. Thus, they should be attractive to individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty and seek cognitive closure. We hypothesized that need for cognitive closure (NFCC) should foster conspiracy beliefs about events that lack clear official explanations, especially when conspiracy theories are temporarily salient. In Experiment 1, NFCC positively predicted the endorsement of a conspiracy theory behind the refugee crisis, especially when conspiratorial explanations were made salient. Experiment 2 showed that when conspiratorial explanations were made salient, NFCC positively predicted beliefs in conspiracies behind a mysterious plane crash. However, the link between NFCC and beliefs in conspiratorial explanations was reversed in the case of a plane crash with an official, non-conspiratorial, explanation for the accident. In conclusion, people high (vs. low) in NFCC seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations are situationally accessible.
Supporting Information
Filename | Description |
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ejsp2308-sup-0001-FigureS1.tifTIFF image, 87.1 KB | Figure S1. Interaction effect of need for cognitive closure and conspiracy-salience (vs. control) condition on conspiracy beliefs. |
ejsp2308-sup-0002-SupInfo.docxWord document, 31.4 KB |
Table S1. Experiment 1 Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs when Controlled for Attitudes Towards the EU. Table S2. Experiment 1 Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs without Participants Excluded Based on the Attention Check Question. Table S3. Experiment 2 Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs without Participants Excluded Based on the Attention Check Question. Table S4. Experiment 2 Predictors of Conspiracy Beliefs without Outliers Exclusion. |
Please note: The publisher is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing content) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
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