Organizational Economics
Social Institutions
Complex Organizations and Bureaucracies
Robert Gibbons,
John Roberts,
Robert Gibbons
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Search for more papers by this authorJohn Roberts
Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
Parts of this essay draw heavily on Gibbons and Roberts ( 2013) and are used with permission.Search for more papers by this authorRobert Gibbons,
John Roberts,
Robert Gibbons
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Search for more papers by this authorJohn Roberts
Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA
Parts of this essay draw heavily on Gibbons and Roberts ( 2013) and are used with permission.Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Organizational economics applies the theoretical and empirical methods of economics to study the nature, roles and performance of organizations, especially managed ones like business firms. In this essay we trace the development of this field, survey the questions it addresses, point to recent work that we find especially germane and offer suggestions for promising future directions.
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