Anatomy of a Stalemate: Making Sense of the EU–UK Youth Mobility Controversy

Introduction

Controversy over a proposed UK–EU youth mobility scheme (YMS) has made headlines, representing yet another flashpoint in the complex post-Brexit relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK). The British government had been engaging in behind-the-scenes discussions about establishing a YMS with the EU since 2022, initially seeking a comprehensive multilateral agreement. When those talks with the European Commission stalled, the United Kingdom shifted its focus to bilateral agreements with some individual EU member states, hoping to secure bilateral, country-to-country arrangements. These efforts, however, prompted the European Commission to intervene and, in April 2024, it unveiled a proposal for a comprehensive EU-wide youth mobility scheme (European Commission, 2024b). The proposal envisioned granting EU citizens aged 18 to 30 the right to live, work or study in the United Kingdom for up to 4 years, with equivalent rights extended to young Britons in the EU; it also included provisions for parity in university tuition fees (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024). Rishi Sunak's Conservative government rapidly rejected the proposal, asserting that the era of EU free movement had ended, a view also stated by the opposition Labour Party, led by Keir Starmer (Consterdine, 2024; Garfield, 2024).

The United Kingdom maintained its firm opposition, a change of government following the Labour Party's landslide victory in July 2024 notwithstanding. Indeed, the positions of the two main parties appeared virtually indistinguishable. The incoming government stated that there were ‘no plans’ to pursue a youth mobility scheme and in the same breath asserted that not returning to ‘free movement’ was a ‘red line’, even though youth mobility and free movement are not synonymous (Courea, Rankin, and Crerar 2024; House of Lords, 2025; Stacey and O'Carroll, 2024; Walker and O'Carroll, 2024). For the EU, however, the scheme remained a priority. It represented ‘a test of goodwill’ (Williams, 2024), ‘a token of good faith’ (Courea, Rankin, Stacey, and O'Carroll, 2024) and ‘an indispensable element of negotiations with London’ (Stone and Di Sario, 2024). It was also ‘the price of entry for talks on Starmer's own priorities’ (Stone, 2024a) such as a veterinary agreement, emissions trading systems or the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (Blewett and Stone, 2024; Courea, Rankin, Stacey, and O'Carroll, 2024; House of Commons, 2025; Stone and Di Sario, 2024). Member states emphasized its significance (Stone, 2024b), identifying youth mobility as their ‘No. 1 demand’ (Stone and Di Sario, 2024).

The resulting deadlock has led to a protracted stalemate, overshadowing UK–EU relations. Rejection of the Commission's proposals provoked widespread disappointment, and left young people on both sides of the Channel disillusioned and frustrated at the missed opportunity (Consterdine, 2024; Courea, Rankin, Stacey, and O'Carroll, 2024; Mitchell, 2024). On the EU side, expectations raised by Labour in opposition gave way to a growing sense that ‘nice talk is all there is’ (Courea, Rankin, Stacey, and O'Carroll, 2024), exacerbating uncertainty about the future of UK–EU agreements in other areas (Taylor, 2024) and leaving EU officials ‘baffled’ (Stone, 2024b) and ‘dismayed’ (Stacey and O'Carroll, 2024). This deadlock persisted until the first formal UK–EU summit since Brexit, held in May 2025, where both sides acknowledged their ‘mutual interest to deepen our people-to-people ties, particularly for the younger generation’ (European Commission, 2025). While symbolically important, the announcement, which rebranded YMS as a ‘youth experience scheme’, lacked detail and did not resolve the underlying tensions. At the time of writing (June 2025), an agreement appeared distant (Usherwood, 2025).

The youth mobility debate appears counterintuitive for a number of reasons. Four stand out. First, the scheme intuitively seems like a ‘low-hanging fruit’, a measure that is mutually beneficial. Second, it could have been an ideal starting point for Starmer's professed ambition to reset UK–EU relations in a ‘more pragmatic and mature’ direction (GOV UK, 2024). Third and relatedly, adopting the scheme would have the potential to unlock broader areas of co-operation (Courea, Rankin, Stacey, and O'Carroll, 2024; Stone and Di Sario, 2024). Fourth, public opinion apparently supports a YMS, with 71% of Labour voters and 68% of the British general public favouring the initiative (Mitchell, 2024; Williams, 2024).

Why has a positive-sum game offering a win–win outcome, a seeming ‘no-brainer’ (Blewett and Stone, 2024), resulted in unnecessarily hardline stances and entrenched positions on both sides thereby producing a lose-lose situation? This policy commentary seeks to shed light on this intriguing question and unravel some of the complexities underlying the impasse. Its significance extends well beyond the immediate controversy over youth mobility. The impasse has also become emblematic of the broader challenges facing post-Brexit UK–EU relations, serving as a cautionary example for other areas where closer co-operation could yield mutual benefits (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024). While the eventual outcome and the path towards it remain uncertain, the more positive mood at the May 2025 EU–UK summit notwithstanding, the delicate nature of the process so far underscores the need for careful analysis. Understanding the lessons of the youth mobility debacle will be indispensable for any meaningful ‘reset’ of UK–EU relations.

Essentially, we conceptualize the YMS controversy as an initial stage of a policy process, as it reflects the agenda-setting dynamics, institutional interactions and negotiation frameworks that typify the early phases of policy development, where problem recognition and stakeholder alignment remain fluid and contested (Brewer and DeLeon, 1983; Colebatch, 1998). We identify three principal sources of the impasse, based on the extant scholarship on (1) bounded rationality, (2) path dependence and (3) bilateralism. These dynamics do not operate in isolation but interweave to form a web of mutually reinforcing constraints and feedback loops, together perpetuating the stalemate.1

I Bounded Rationality

The concept of bounded rationality, widely used across the social sciences, refers to the cognitive and organisational constraints that limit how actors process information and make decisions (Figueira, 2024; Simon, 1955). These constraints manifest themselves in cognitive biases (systematic distortions of rational thinking), heuristics (simplified reasoning strategies) and fixed-sum errors, that is, the mistaken assumption that any gain for one side necessarily implies a loss for the other (Figueira, 2024; Figueira and Martill, 2021). Applied previously to Brexit negotiations (for instance, Figueira and Martill, 2021; Jensen and Kelstrup, 2019), the concept also offers insights into how such distortions have shaped the youth mobility deadlock.

The United Kingdom's approach demonstrated several key manifestations of bounded rationality during the exchanges on the YMS. A key miscalculation was the United Kingdom's underestimation of the EU's commitment to a unified collective response and overestimation of the feasibility of engaging individual member states in bilateral negotiations, which was perceived by the EU as an effort to ‘divide and rule’, creating deep wariness about British intentions (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024). This preferred UK approach had failed during the Brexit negotiations and would fail again over youth mobility.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom persistently displayed a significant cognitive bias in equating youth mobility with free movement (Blewett and Stone, 2024; Garfield, 2024; Stone, 2024a; Stone, 2024b; Stone and Di Sario, 2024). This oversimplification, articulated, for instance, by Home Secretary Yvette Cooper, who said of the EU's proposal that, ‘We don't think this is the right approach. The UK voted to leave free movement. We are not going back into free movement’ (Taylor, 2024). Such a view conflates two fundamentally different arrangements, disregarding the controlled and reciprocal nature of youth mobility schemes (Barnard, 2024; Consterdine, 2024; Williams, 2024). In fact, the United Kingdom already operates more generous reciprocal youth mobility schemes with countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea (Barnard, 2024; House of Commons, 2025; House of Lords, 2025; Taylor, 2024) yet chose not to mention them to dispel misconceptions about the EU's proposal.

The EU's approach to YMS similarly reflected aspects of bounded rationality. The timing of the European Commission's April 2024 proposal, coming during a politically sensitive period in the United Kingdom marked by migration debates and the looming general election, demonstrated a notable insensitivity to the domestic political context.

The proposal seemed to emerge unexpectedly, catching the United Kingdom off guard and complicating the political dynamics further. By pursuing this initiative without adequate groundwork, the European Commission exacerbated mistrust, making it appear less a genuine overture for collaboration and more an attempt to foreclose bilateral arrangements between the United Kingdom and individual EU member states (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024; Walker and O'Carroll, 2024). Furthermore, the EU's insistence on a unified, multilateral approach, with no outward indication of serious consideration of potential compromises – such as setting quotas, tighter eligibility criteria, shortening mobility periods or providing for periodic reviews – removed flexibility from the talks. Such refinements might be introduced at later stages of the negotiations (O'Carroll, 2024; Stacey and O'Carroll, 2024; Stone, 2024c), but their absence impeded the early stages of dialogue as neither side appeared willing to acknowledge that proposals are typically only a starting point for negotiations. Finally, the European Commission advanced its proposal in an attempt to assert its authority and shape the scope of engagement, signalling that it, not the United Kingdom or individual member states, would remain firmly in control of the discussions, reinforcing its institutional dominance and leadership (cf. Barnard, 2024; Jensen and Kelstrup, 2019; Laffan, 2019; Laffan and Telle, 2023).

II Path Dependence

The YMS stalemate can also be partly understood through the lens of path dependence, a concept that illuminates how historical decisions and established practices shape and constrain present and future policy options. Historical choices create entrenched pathways that shape subsequent decision-making, often leading to suboptimal outcomes due to the constraints imposed by these historical choices (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001; Kuipers, 2009; Marx, 2010). In the context of UK–EU relations, the legacy of Brexit negotiations has profoundly influenced the dynamics of mutual trust, severely impacting the post-Brexit relationship (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2023; Wille and Martill, 2023). Despite the improved mood music under Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer, the path-dependent dynamic helps perpetuate a cycle of fragility and tension. Indeed, the ostensibly improved diplomatic ambiance cannot quickly or fully mitigate the deeply ingrained mistrust and structural challenges that have solidified over years of contentious negotiations. Thus, even seemingly well-intentioned initiatives that could serve as building blocks for renewed co-operation remain susceptible to mistrust.

The United Kingdom's approach to youth mobility reflected a path-dependent logic perpetuating strategies that reproduced entrenched patterns originating from the Brexit negotiations. During that period, the United Kingdom's tactics, which were characterized by strategic posturing, cherry-picking and attempts to lobby individual EU member states to secure a better deal, engendered a deep sense of mistrust amongst EU institutions and member states (Martill, 2022; Wille and Martill, 2023), establishing a precedent of cautious engagement that persisted in YMS interactions. The path-dependent behaviour was evident in the persistence of negative framing of all potential migration, prioritisation of appeasing its critics and the fear of backlash, particularly from segments of the population and political figures who view any mobility scheme as a veiled attempt to reintroduce free movement of people and thus a ‘betrayal of Brexit’ (Blewett and Stone, 2024). This entrenched defensiveness reached a level of near hysteria, with political actors prioritizing the avoidance of any perceived backtracking on Brexit commitments, as seen in the mantra of no return to the single market or customs unions, and a lack of openness to migration.

The EU's collective response to these tactics also underscores the enduring impact of past negotiation practices. Brexit negotiations were a significant challenge for the EU, yet by presenting a united front, the EU safeguarded its collective interests and prevented the United Kingdom from exploiting potential divisions within the bloc (Jensen and Kelstrup, 2019; Laffan, 2019; Laffan and Telle, 2023; Smith and Tekin, 2025). The European Commission's swift proposal for an EU-wide YMS, in reaction to the United Kingdom's bilateral overtures, illustrated the lasting impact of these earlier strategies. It reflected a defensive, protective strategy aimed at preventing differential treatment of Union citizens. By placing the youth mobility proposal firmly within a multilateral framework, the Commission signalled its authority and made clear that unity amongst the 27 member states must take precedence over bilateral overtures from the United Kingdom (Barnard, 2024).

This dynamic perpetuates a fragile relationship that remains vulnerable to the reverberations of past decisions, complicating efforts to forge a stable and mutually beneficial partnership.

III Bilateralism

The third analytical lens through which to interpret the sources of the YMS controversy lies in examining the limitations of the United Kingdom's attempted shift towards bilateralism. Having left the multilateral EU forum, the United Kingdom has repeatedly tried to strengthen bilateral relations with individual member states, especially in the area of defence and foreign policy (Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2023; Davies and Kassim, 2023; Smith and Tekin, 2025; Wolff et al., 2024). There are advantages to this strategy: bilateralism enables the United Kingdom to tailor relationships to individual countries, offering flexibility, speed and greater alignment with national interests whilst avoiding the compromises and inertia of multilateralism (Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2023; Reich, 2010; Wolff et al., 2024). Yet, the youth mobility controversy underscores the inherent limits of such ‘promiscuous bilateralism’ (Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2023).

Crucially, bilateral arrangements can vary significantly between countries, leading to inconsistencies in the resultant agreements. These variations might lead to divisions and both perceived and actual inequalities, straining relations if the terms agreed with one country are perceived as more favourable than those agreed with another (Reich, 2010, p. 266). In the YMS case, the United Kingdom's pursuit of bilateral deals was seen as potentially leading to unequal opportunities for young people from different EU countries. This concern was amplified as the United Kingdom sought to negotiate bilateral youth mobility agreements with only a subset of EU countries – reportedly six, including France, Germany, Spain and Sweden, whilst excluding others, such as Bulgaria and Romania (Barnard, 2024; European Commission, 2024a; Walker, 2024). There was no public rationale for how such countries were chosen, and it may have reflected economic priorities, the needs of UK language learners or a desire to find a representative group of countries. Worries about second class treatment were palpable, particularly amongst smaller and less affluent EU member states (Taylor, 2024). The Commission, protective of the EU's political cornerstone of equal treatment, made clear its commitment to avoiding outcomes that might marginalize certain member states or generate perceptions of unfairness (European Commission, 2024a).

Another important factor in understanding the limits of bilateralism is the element of self-restraint on the part of EU member states. While member states are legally permitted to pursue bilateral agreements on labour mobility with non-EU countries [as demonstrated as France's ‘Young Professionals’ scheme or specialized programmes for au pairs, teaching assistants and researchers in Germany (Taylor, 2024)], the prospect of closer bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom was met with reluctance in certain quarters, driven by a desire to avoid actions that might undermine collective interests or upset institutional and inter-member state dynamics (Brusenbauch Meislova, 2019; Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2023). This need to prioritize EU solidarity as a higher order preference overrode the potential benefits of deeper bilateral engagement with the United Kingdom (Brusenbauch Meislova, 2019; Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2022; Brusenbauch Meislová and Glencross, 2023).

Conclusion

The youth mobility case exemplifies how initial stages of policy processes can become gridlocked at the intersection of bounded rationality, the limits of bilateralism and path dependence, ultimately stifling progress and reinforcing entrenched stances. This policy commentary underscores the entrenched fragility that characterizes post-Brexit UK–EU relations, demonstrating how attempts to (re)negotiate agreements are steeped in suspicion and cautious engagement. This dynamic persists even amidst the ostensibly conciliatory rhetoric associated with a change in leadership in the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the aspiration to ‘reset’ UK–EU relations must be tempered with a candid acknowledgment of these complexities. Moving forward requires both sides to recognize how bounded rationality has constrained decision-making, how the limits of bilateralism complicate co-operation and how path dependency continues to shape the dynamics of their engagement. These insights illuminate the roots of the current impasse and point to pathways for fostering a more constructive relationship.

The bounded rationality evident in the handling of the YMS underscores the necessity of overcoming entrenched cognitive biases and problematic assumptions that both sides seem to hold. For the United Kingdom, this might mean shifting away from a reductive framing of mobility proposals as akin to the sensitive topic of free movement – a rhetorical stance that has not only misrepresented the nature of the scheme but also foreclosed opportunities for pragmatic compromise; in the United Kingdom's highly charged political climate on migration questions, equating a YMS with free movement risks increasing domestic political hostility rather than harnessing the apparent popularity of such a scheme. Similarly, the EU should recalibrate its approach by demonstrating greater sensitivity to the United Kingdom's febrile political context and a realistic appreciation of its domestic constraints, with proposals timed and framed in ways that minimize political friction (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024).

Second, the enduring influence of path dependency demands a conscious effort to break free from the procedural and rhetorical patterns entrenched during the Brexit negotiations. The United Kingdom's historical reliance on tactics such as ‘divide and rule’ has fostered a legacy of mistrust that continues to shape EU perceptions, whilst the EU's insistence on collective, united approaches has sometimes precluded the flexibility needed to achieve shared objectives. Both sides must actively work to untangle themselves from these patterns. For the United Kingdom, this entails abandoning a zero-sum mentality and adopting a more co-operative posture that seeks mutual gains. For the EU, acknowledging that the Brexit legacy need not define future interactions could open the door to more adaptive and forward-looking policies. Both sides must recognize that the procedural inertia and mistrust born of past decisions are not immutable but can be mitigated through intentional and sustained efforts to rebuild trust.

Finally, equally critical is acknowledging the limits of bilateralism in the post-Brexit context. While bilateral agreements offer the United Kingdom a pathway to tailor its relationships with individual EU member states, this strategy risks fostering perceptions of unequal treatment. The EU's strong preference for multilateral approaches reflects not only its institutional ethos but also the need to preserve solidarity amongst its members. To navigate these challenges, the United Kingdom needs to be careful in choosing which issues to seek to negotiate bilaterally and which to handle multilaterally with the whole EU (Turner and Brusenbauch Meislova, 2024). It is also important to adopt a more inclusive and equitable approach to selective bilateralism, ensuring that its initiatives do not marginalize (or alienate) member states that might perceive themselves as excluded or disadvantaged. For its part, the EU should consider more creative responses to bilateral overtures, exploring ways to accommodate UK interests without compromising the principle of equal treatment. A structured framework for selectively integrating bilateral initiatives into the broader EU–UK relationship could mitigate tensions whilst allowing for incremental trust-building.