Perceptions in an Evolving EU–China Economic Relationship

The Constructivist school of International Relations has extensively examined how perceptions shape foreign policy (Herrmann and Shannon, 2001; Jervis, 1976), including in the context of EU–China relations (Freeman, 2022; Möller, 2002). Building on these studies, this article delves deeper into which specific attributes of China have been adopted by EU policy-makers to justify the creation and redefinition of TDIs. It further examines whether these perceptions are echoed in media narratives that seek to legitimise the instruments in the eyes of the European public. Historically, economic relations have been central to the EU–China relationship, shaping European views of China. Since 2001, however, the European Union has recognised both positive and negative dimensions in its engagement with China, stemming from an imbalance in their economic relationship and China's increasing assertiveness. Beginning in 1995, the European Union pursued a policy of constructive engagement with China, supporting its integration into the global economic system and advocating for its accession to the WTO, based on expectations that China would reciprocate by gradually opening its economy (Freeman, 2022). After 2006, the principles of reciprocity and a level playing field became cornerstones of EU–China policy. Whilst the European Union continued to promote a co-operative relationship, it increasingly emphasised balance and mutual interests, focusing on areas such as sustainable development and regional co-operation, with the belief that engagement would encourage China towards a more liberal economic and political trajectory.

Nevertheless, a perceptible shift began to influence EU policy, as evidenced by the 2016 EU Strategy on China (EC, 2016), which adopted a stance of ‘principled pragmatism’. This marked a more selective approach to economic engagement and indicated a growing mistrust towards China. The 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook (EC, 2019) further exemplified this change, categorising China as a ‘partner, competitor, and rival’, reflecting a perception that China was presenting alternatives to the liberal economic order and its associated values. The Outlook underscored the necessity of enhancing EU unity and competitiveness in response to China. It also conveyed a more critical view of China's domestic reforms and global role, implicitly acknowledging the limited success of the EU's market and normative power in influencing China and advocating for a new approach (EC, 2019).

Scholars have acknowledged that China has been a key factor in shaping the EU's reconceptualisation of its trade policy (De Ville, 2019), noting that political and media discourses have often disproportionately emphasised Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe relative to its actual size (Chan and Meunier, 2021). This disproportionate attention can partly be attributed to the cultural distance between the European Union and China, China's authoritarian political system and its status as a non-security ally (Meunier, 2019). Currently, EU–China relations are characterised by misunderstandings and misperceptions, with both sides often speaking past rather than to each other (Men, 2022). Within the EU, China is perceived as having reneged on implicit expectations of economic liberalisation and political reform – expectations it never explicitly committed to fulfilling (Fox and Godement, 2009). Against this backdrop, this article investigates the connection between shifting EU perceptions of China and changes in policy discourse identified in existing literature. In essence, it seeks to pinpoint the shared narratives, derived from fluid perceptions of China in Europe, that have arguably driven changes in EU trade policy, focusing on the specific case of TDIs.

The Evolution of the EU's Trade Discourse

This article sheds new light on the shift in the EU's trade discourse, as identified in the academic literature, by delving into China as a factor in influencing the perceived shift towards the ‘geopoliticisation’ (Leblond and Viju-Miljusevic, 2019; Meunier and Czesana, 2019; Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2019) and ‘securitisation’ (Roberts et al., 2019) of trade from around 2010, as well as the evolving meaning of the ‘free trade’ narrative, with TDIs serving as a key case in point. Discourse constructs meaning through processes of differentiation or ‘othering’ (De Ville and Orbie, 2013). These ‘othering’ practices encompass both temporal and geographical dimensions (Diez, 2004), and in this analysis, they specifically target China. Specifically, how China is portrayed as a ‘geographical other’ by EU policy-makers or the media to articulate a European identity against it and legitimise the EU's trade and investment agenda (De Ville and Orbie, 2013).

Thus, this article studies how this is captured in the communicative discourse surrounding EU TDIs. Specifically, it examines political discourse as represented in speeches, press releases and media articles, identifying the main narratives that link China to the OSA instruments. Political communication is understood here as a discursive, top-down process by which policy-makers seek to legitimise trade instruments that mark a significant shift in EU trade policy. Whilst the co-ordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2008) – the internal reasons and negotiations behind the creation of these instruments – falls outside the scope of this article, the analysis explores the narratives used by both EU institutions and the media to justify the TDIs. This research does not assume a co-ordinated legitimation effort between political institutions and the media but rather seeks to infer and compare the discursive strategies of both actors, who interact dynamically in shaping policy outcomes (Baum and Potter, 2008). The media plays a critical role in transmitting information from policy-makers to the public whilst simultaneously serving as a source of information for policy-makers themselves, in what has become a ‘mediated society’ (Zhang, 2022). Policy-makers package policy in preferred frames, but the media plays a crucial role in framing and distributing this information, influencing public perceptions of ‘self’ and ‘other’ in EU–China relations (Zhang, 2022). This dual process of legitimation – by policy-makers and the media, according to their singular strategies and interests – forms the basis of the subsequent analysis of narratives used to influence public perceptions and drive further policy development.

The EU's trade discourse has evolved considerably in the last two decades. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union adopted a trade liberalisation agenda aimed at restoring economic growth (Bollen et al., 2016). Scholars have noted the European Commission's discursive efforts to legitimise neoliberal trade policies by subtly rearticulating the relationship between free trade and post-crisis recovery (De Ville and Orbie, 2013). As early as 2006, the Global Europe strategy under Commissioner Mandelson hinted at the need to adapt the EU's TDIs. Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht later adopted a more critical stance towards China, denouncing the EU's previous ‘naïveté’ in the Commission's Trade, Growth, and World Affairs strategy.

A pivotal moment occurred in 2013, when the European Union withdrew from an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese solar panels following retaliatory measures by China. This episode is widely regarded as a diplomatic victory for China (Bollen et al., 2016) and catalysed stronger support for reforming the EU's TDIs. Under Commissioner Malmström, the European Union subsequently strengthened its unilateral trade toolbox, partially due to a shift in Germany's stance (De Ville, 2019). This reflects a broader transformation in the positions of traditionally ‘dovish’ member states, which assumed a more ‘hawkish’ outlook towards China (De Ville, 2019). The shift in member states' attitudes enabled the Commission to move forward with enacting trade instruments under the OSA framework – policy ‘sticks’ designed to enhance the EU's leverage in opening foreign markets, ensuring reciprocity and demonstrating that liberalisation ‘works’ (Siles-Brügge, 2014, p. 50).

This article closely examines the evolution of the EU's trade discourse towards China to understand how protectionist instruments were legitimised in political communication, which opened the door for a shift towards protectionist policies – an idea that had previously faced significant resistance amongst member states in the 2010s. The findings suggest that external geopolitical and geo-economic factors, rather than internal changes, were instrumental in driving this shift. China was portrayed as a pervasive external influence, prompting a rally-around-the-flag effect that mitigated political and social opposition to protectionist policies. This occurred in the context of a paradigm shift towards the securitisation and politicisation of trade (EC, 2021), compounded by social backlash against the CETA and TTIP agreements.

Whilst the trade–security nexus in EU policy has gained increasing academic attention in recent years (Bown, 2024; Meunier and Danzman, 2024; Orbie et al., 2012; Stueber, 2022), the Lisbon Treaty had already expanded the EU's role in foreign and security policies in 2009, aiming to reduce the compartmentalisation of trade and security. However, it was not until the 2021 Trade Policy Review that security considerations were explicitly integrated into trade policy, portraying trade as a tool to advance strategic interests. This shift led to the development of various innovative policy instruments that blend trade and security concerns (Rosén and Meunier, 2023), including the TDIs examined in this article. The EU's emphasis on addressing competitive distortions, ensuring a level playing field and promoting economic fairness can be seen as a direct response to China's trade policies, which ended the notion that trade flows are purely neutral and devoid of security implications (Comerma, 2024). The OSA instruments aim to address specific trade vulnerabilities: the 5G toolbox and FDI SM focus on restricting certain types of investment inflows into Europe, an objective that may soon be shared by an outbound investment screening mechanism currently under discussion (EP, 2023); the FSI is designed to ensure ‘fair’ competition within the EU market; and the IPI and ACI seek to open foreign markets. Whether this diversity in objectives is reflected in the discourse will be explored in the subsequent analysis. The 2023 Economic Security Strategy (EC, 2023a) further reinforces this paradigm shift in EU trade policy.

There is broad academic consensus that a major driver of the EU's shift in trade policy has been policy-makers' perception of an increased threat from rising Chinese investment, which stemmed from China's 1998 ‘Go Out’ policy, the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and the ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy (Chan and Meunier, 2021). This investment primarily targeted three categories of EU firms: financially distressed companies, competitive niche producers and former partners or subcontractors (Nicolas, 2014). Notably, a significant portion of these investments has been made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Hanemann et al., 2019; Nicolas, 2014). These SOEs are seen as potentially engaging in unfair competition due to their access to large state subsidies (Van der Loo and Hahn, 2020) and have raised security concerns because of their close ties to the Chinese government, particularly in sectors involving critical technologies and large infrastructure projects (Grieger, 2019). Another contributing factor has been China's use of economic statecraft (Ferchen and Mattlin, 2023), defined as ‘the use of economic resources by political leaders to exert influence in pursuit of foreign policy objectives’ (Reilly, 2013). China's application of economic statecraft has become more frequent, assertive and diverse, employing a mix of incentives (such as foreign aid, state purchases, generous trade agreements and cross-border infrastructure projects) and coercive measures (such as sanctions, vague threats and leadership-level diplomatic variations) (Reilly, 2013).

Overall, this article argues that there has been a paradigm shift in EU–China relations, moving from an era of economic opportunism to one of more conditional, value-based engagement. This shift is reflected in the EU's trade discourse, which has increasingly sought to legitimise protective measures against China. By identifying and analysing the specific characteristics of China that have been highlighted in EU discourse, this study advances the understanding of the ideational framework behind the EU's approach to China, particularly as the European Union moves towards implementing the OSA instruments and broader strategies of economic security and strategic autonomy.

Data Description

The dataset used for the software-enabled text analysis comprises 810 documents published between 2010 and April 2024. This period was marked by a notable shift in discourse on China amongst European leaders and media outlets, with the various codes employed aiming to capture the essence of this change. Adopting the perspective that crises act as catalysts (Brecher and Yehuda, 1985), the timeframe begins in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis, which heightened China's perceived role as a critical economic player in Europe and underscored the need for the European Union to broaden its trade relations. It concludes with the post-COVID-19 pandemic period (2020–2023), which exposed the risks of overdependence on external actors. Before this period, Chinese investment in Europe and its role in global economic governance were relatively minor (Casaburi, 2017, p. 43). As previously noted, the EU–China relationship was primarily characterised by economic opportunism during this earlier phase (Brown, 2018; Jing, 2018).

This timeframe also provides adequate scope to capture significant changes in European perceptions of China, particularly during key moments such as the transition in Chinese leadership in 2012 and the subsequent shift in foreign trade policy under Xi Jinping. This shift moved away from Deng Xiaoping's policy of ‘keeping a low profile and biding time’ (韜光養晦、有所作為) and the pragmatic philosophy of ‘it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice’. It also includes the official launch of the BRI in September 2013 and the period of substantial growth in Chinese inward FDI in Europe. Whilst these boundaries are inherently fluid, this 14-year timeframe effectively captures the key developments in EU–China trade relations, which have contributed to the increasing politicisation and securitisation of trade policy.

To assess the relevance of China in the communicative discourse surrounding the OSA instruments, particularly in comparison with other external factors identified in the literature, Graph 1 illustrates the frequency with which China appears in general discussions about the instruments. Specifically, it shows the percentage of documents mentioning both ‘China’ and one of the instruments, relative to those mentioning only the instrument, across media outlets and EU institutions. As previously established, quantifying the relative importance of China compared to other countries, entities or issues in driving the shift in EU trade policy presents a methodological challenge. Importantly, this analysis distinguishes between the legitimisation and the application of the TDIs. Whilst previous research has highlighted the utility of these instruments in addressing issues related to Russia and US tariffs on European imports or Trump's challenge to the World Trade Organization (Hopewell, 2021), this article focuses on the role of China in their legitimisation.

The findings indicate that although the instruments can be applied broadly and impartially to address various external factors, China has been a key factor in the legitimisation narratives developed by EU institutions. In fact, China is mentioned in more than 50% of the documents that reference one of the instruments, with the notable exceptions of the Commission (excluding the ACI) and the Council. This discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that Russia is predominantly perceived as a security threat rather than a trade threat, whilst EU trade policy towards the United States has been marked by greater internal discord, especially in response to Trump's attacks on the rules-based trading system and Biden's geopolitical pressure on the EU, exemplified by the Inflation Reduction Act (Herranz-Surrallés et al., 2024). Although both Russia and the United States have served as external drivers of the EU's shift towards the securitisation of trade policy, only China has provided the necessary institutional and popular unity to justify and legitimise the adoption of these instruments.

In-Depth Analysis

Each of the narratives identified through the inductive analysis of the documents is informed by existing academic literature that links the EU's trade agenda with China and illustrate a specific representation of China as ‘other’. The arguments appearing in the data that connect the instruments to each narrative are illustrated through quotes extracted from the dataset. Notably, China is invoked in support of both increased liberalisation – such as during negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment – and trade protection, demonstrating how discourse evolves and adapts to shifting political goals and contexts.

In practical terms, EU trade policy discourse is used strategically by various actors to maximise their preferences (Schimmelfennig, 2001; Van den Hoven, 2004; Siles-Brügge 2011). This instrumental use of discourse underscores the role of narratives in shaping policy outcomes. The primary narratives identified through the in-depth analysis of the dataset are the following:

Text Software Analysis

The six narratives were converted into codes for the software-enabled analysis. This process yielded 760 excerpts, whilst 209 documents showed no connection between the instruments and China – that is, both were mentioned, but without any portrayal of a relationship between them. Amongst EU institutions, the most frequently used narrative was that of unfairness, followed by China's power, which was particularly prominent in communications from the Council (Graph 2).

Across the media outlets analysed, China was uniformly cited as a justification for the TDIs (Graph 3). Notably, in specific instances, high-profile issues – such as China's economic coercion against Lithuania in 2021 or the potential dominance of a Chinese company in the EU's 5G networks – were employed as symbolic examples to reinforce specific narratives. The fact that these were real events made them more tangible and easier to capture public attention and imagination. The narrative surrounding Chinese companies, particularly Huawei and ZTE, is rooted in concerns over the close ties between China's state-business elites and the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the Chinese government's control over transnational corporations, many of which are (or were formerly) SOEs (De Graaff, 2020).

Both the Lithuania incident and the Huawei case were instrumentalised to advocate for the introduction of specific instruments – the 5G toolbox and the ACI – by illustrating how these mechanisms would function in practice. These cases captured public interest at critical moments, helped to popularise the instruments and garnered public support (Graph 4). Consequently, the instruments gained the necessary momentum to be negotiated and approved by EU institutions, thereby advancing the shift in EU trade policy. This also helped to mitigate dissent from those concerned about a drift towards protectionism, the potential erosion of EU values of free trade and openness and the risk of Chinese retaliation. This explains why the ‘Chinese companies’ narrative emerged as the most prevalent, followed by the ‘China threat’ and unfairness narratives.

The temporal evolution of the use of each narrative in media discourse, as shown by each determinant (Graph 4), highlights how China's role as a justification or target for the OSA toolbox became particularly prominent after 2017, with a notable spike in 2013, shortly after Xi Jinping's accession to power. This spike coincides with the increased prevalence of the ‘China power’ and ‘China threat’ narratives. As China's global influence grew and its behaviour became more assertive, it was increasingly perceived as antagonistic to the EU's values and norms of global governance, thereby positioning it as a systemic threat to the neoliberal international order.

From that point onward, China was progressively used to legitimise the EU's strategic reorientation and re-evaluation of its trade policy. This ultimately led to the development of new trade protection instruments aimed at safeguarding the European Union from actors perceived as not ‘playing by the rules’ (Erixon et al., 2021). When breaking down the temporal evolution by institutional and media discourse (see Appendix A, A1-A12), the ‘dual process of legitimation’ mentioned in The Evolution of the EU's Trade Discourse section is evident, showing that these two actors alternatively act as discourse entrepreneurs to shape the perception of China amongst the European public. In some cases, it is EU institutions who promote a specific narrative that is than taken up and amplified by the media, as is the case with ‘unfairness’, ‘companies’, ‘justification’ and ‘power’, whilst in other cases, it is the media who promotes a narrative that is ultimately embraced by EU institutions as it becomes mainstream, as exemplified by the ‘China threat’ narrative (Rogelja and Tsimonis, 2020), or the ‘coercion’ narrative.

The discourse surrounding China's unfair economic and trade relationship with the European Union is not new and predates the emergence of the ‘China threat’ narrative. Since its resurgence after 2017, and particularly following the publication of the 2019 EU-China Strategic Outlook, both narratives have increasingly converged around the securitisation of Chinese investment in Europe, inevitably tied to the broader geopolitical landscape. Concerns about China's lack of market openness and incomplete economic liberalisation were already present in Europe before its accession to the WTO. However, during this earlier period, there was observable progress, and the prevailing narrative focused on the EU's willingness to ‘work with China to help it with its internal reforms’, as reflected in the 2006 European Parliament Communication ‘EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities’ (Brown, 2018). This narrative shifted dramatically with Xi Jinping's rise to power, as Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of ‘reform and opening up’ was replaced by greater assertiveness both domestically and internationally, with Xi proving to be ‘a very anti-liberal leader’, who chose to ‘suppress rather than embrace reforms’ (Shambaugh, 2016).

The first spike in the ‘unfairness’ narrative is reminiscent of earlier concerns about China's trade practices but occurred within a context of ongoing reform and gradual liberalisation. In contrast, the second spike, observed after 2017, is qualitatively different, reflecting a perceived reform deadlock and China's growing economic assertiveness. This shift contributed to the abrupt rise in the popularity of the ‘China threat’ narrative in media discourse, which has maintained a steady presence since 2017 (Graph 4). The ‘China threat’ narrative encompasses both economic and political dimensions, advocating for the securitisation of China's presence in Europe. It portrays China's actions in Europe as primarily political, driven by a distorted perception of Chinese economic activities abroad – such as the BRI – and a view that frames pluralism as weakness and internal dissent as disagreement (Rogelja and Tsimonis, 2020).

Overall, the widespread presence of China in the communicative discourse surrounding TDIs – particularly in relation to China's status as a global power that rivals the European Union and poses a systemic challenge – demonstrates how China has been instrumentalised to strategically justify and legitimise the TDIs, especially since 2017.

Discursive Framing Analysis

An analysis of the interactions between codes for media outlets and EU institutions uncovers the discursive framing by each institution or media outlet with relation to each instrument and exposes various patterns. This is especially evident in the media outlet results (Graph 5), which clearly demonstrate that each narrative has been predominantly tied to specific instruments. For example, the narratives of ‘China as a threat’ and ‘Chinese companies’ – either directly as a justification for the 5G toolbox or indirectly as a threat to the 5G network due to connections with the Chinese government – were the most frequently cited reasons for adopting the 5G toolbox. Similarly, China's use of economic coercion was closely linked to the ACI. The narratives of ‘China as a justification’ and, particularly, ‘China as a threat’ were central to justifying the FDI screening mechanism, reflecting the growing perception amongst EU stakeholders that Chinese investment poses a threat. Meanwhile, narratives emphasizing the unfairness of Europe's economic and trade relationship with China were most frequently used to support the FSI and the IPI. Specifically, media coverage of the IPI highlighted the closed nature of China's procurement market, whilst references to the FSI underscored China's financial support for its companies, particularly SOEs and state-controlled enterprises (SCEs), as key sources of this perceived unfairness.

Overall, Chinese investment in Europe, especially in strategic sectors like 5G networks, has been framed as a security threat, whilst trade with China in the areas of procurement and subsidies has been depicted as unfair, thereby justifying the introduction of instruments aimed at addressing these imbalances.

Interestingly, the analysis also reveals that media discourse has presented a selective and somewhat unrepresentative sample of elite rhetoric, shaping public perceptions of Chinese investment and trade by deliberately emphasising particular narratives. Specifically, the media has tended to highlight the ‘unfairness’ narrative in discussions of trade, whilst stressing the ‘threat’ narrative in the context of investment. Chinese investment is primarily portrayed as a multifaceted threat, encompassing diverging standards, aggressive market acquisition – particularly in the post-pandemic context –, wolf warrior diplomacy, and investment in strategic sectors such as high technology. Conversely, trade with China is framed as unfair from the EU's perspective, due to perceived issues such as a lack of openness, an uneven playing field and significant state aid to Chinese firms. Across all instruments, the more neutral ‘China as a justification’ narrative appears consistently.

Overall, the analysis of these correlations demonstrates that China has been portrayed from different angles, resulting in a heterogeneous narrative in which specific perspectives are strategically emphasized to justify the various TDIs. Additionally, it shows that media framing of policy-makers' rhetoric has led to a shift away from the predominance of the ‘unfairness’ narrative towards a more diversified narrative that increasingly highlights ‘China as a threat’, its coercive practices and concerns about government control over Chinese companies.

Regarding EU institutions (Graph 6), the most prevalent narrative over the years has been the unfairness in the EU's economic relationship with China. This narrative has been most frequently applied to justify the FSI and the IPI. Consequently, trade – particularly in the contexts of procurement and subsidies – is portrayed as unfair, with these instruments framed as necessary measures to address the imbalance attributed to China. In contrast to the media, the ‘China justification’ narrative is less prominent in the discourse of EU institutions, whilst the justification for the 5G toolbox is primarily linked to China's growing power.

Additionally, the analysis reveals that following the Commission's initiation of the first investigations under the FSI in 2023, the ‘Chinese companies’ narrative gained prominence, as these companies were disproportionately represented in the consortia under investigation. Meanwhile, the initial IPI investigations have continued to reinforce the dominance of the unfairness narrative. Notably, the ‘China threat’ narrative, which was almost absent in institutional discourse before 2022 (except within the European Parliament), began to gain traction as EU institutions started promoting ‘de-risking’ and Economic Security strategies. This narrative has occasionally supplanted the unfairness narrative, whilst at other times it has complemented it.

In summary, since 2023, the TDIs have become increasingly integrated into broader strategic frameworks, moving beyond their original focus on ‘strategic autonomy.’ This shift reflects a deepening trend towards the geopoliticisation of trade within the European Union (Meunier and Nicolaidis, 2019).