Tackling Poverty Across the United Kingdom. Devolution, Difference and Discourse

1 Devolution Has Quietly Changed UK Social Security

It remains common to talk as if there is a single UK-wide social security system, but this has not been the case for some time. Devolution is creating significant spatial variations in social security law, policy, and practice in the United Kingdom [1, 2]. A consequence of these changes is that some social security entitlements now vary quite significantly across the United Kingdom, including attempts to mitigate the impact of some of the harshest welfare cuts implemented by the Conservative-led Westminster governments between 2010 and 2024. For instance, in Northern Ireland, the Benefit Cap has never been applied, while in Scotland the introduction of the Scottish child payment (SCP) provides a top-up to a number of key means-tested benefits such as universal credit and its payments are exempt from the two-child limit, providing a partial, if indirect, mitigation of the two-child limit for some families. To give an example of how devolution has begun to affect entitlement at the household level, our analysis suggests that, in 2023, a typical out-of-work couple with four children would have received £22,000 in York, compared with £32,000 in Belfast and £37,000 in Glasgow.¹

Further change here is in train; with the Scottish Government announcing in the December 2024 budget a commitment to ensure that no family in Scotland is affected by the UK government's two-child limit policy (affecting the child element of Universal Credit—a reserved benefit) from 2026. If delivered successfully, such political commitments may further widen the potential gap in household incomes for low-income families [3].

“Devolution is creating significant spatial variations in social security law, policy and practice in the United Kingdom”

In addition, local authorities in Great Britain have been asked to play a growing role in delivering discretionary welfare over the past decade, a patchwork of local schemes replacing (or compensating for the erosion of) provision that, until recently, had largely resided at central government level since the formation of the welfare state [4]. In England, this trend accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic and cost-of-living crisis as local authorities were asked to administer a range of ‘temporary’ discretionary welfare funds that have now been a feature of the policy landscape for the past 5 years. The Household Support Fund (HSF) is the largest of these recent schemes, currently in its sixth wave of funding and has accounted for around £1 billion per annum of spending in recent years; there was intense lobbying to extend the scheme earlier this year, reflecting it has played a vital role as a backstop in a fractured welfare system [5].

The scale and impact of these changes remain poorly understood, and under-researched—something that needs to change, and change fast, if we are to learn the lessons from these aspects of difference and draw on them in future policy development. This is especially important in the current context, with a new Labour government committed to reforming social security and developing an ambitious child poverty strategy.

“The scale and impact of these changes remain poorly understood”

Already, Keir Starmer has shown an awareness of the importance of and scope inherent within devolution, first by prioritising a visit to each of the UK nations in his first days of office, and second by bringing together the regional mayors for a meeting at Downing Street, the first time this has happened. On the back of this, Labour has established a ‘new Council of the Nations and Regions to renew opportunities for the Prime Minister, heads of devolved governments and mayors of combined authorities to collaborate with each other’ [6]. In December 2024, Labour published an English Devolution white paper, with Angela Raynor, Deputy Prime Minister pledging that ‘devolution will be the default in our constitution’, with a reorganisation of local government combined with plans to give more powers to the regions to control decisions on planning, transport and economic growth [7].

These are important and significant changes that suggest that devolution will be a key mechanism for the new government's efforts to deliver on its policy promises.

2 Devolution, Social Security and Counternarratives

But governing in the context of devolution is not the same as governing a unitary state, and there is no guarantee that leaders of each layer of government will sing from the same hymn sheet. Indeed, the slowly evolving variations in social security support around the United Kingdom reflect differing social policy landscapes that have developed as devolution has created space for policymakers to articulate competing narratives about social security in different parts of the United Kingdom.

“there is no guarantee that leaders of each layer of government will sing from the same hymn sheet”

A key example here has been in relation to child poverty. The UK government's approach to child poverty changed markedly in 2016, to de-emphasise income-based poverty (via the Life Chances Act 2010, formerly the Child Poverty Act 2010, as amended by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016), but the Scottish parliament reintroduced targets for the near-elimination of income-based poverty the following year (Child Poverty (Scotland) Act 2017) and the Northern Ireland executive remains subject to a statutory duty to produce a strategy to ensure children do not suffer social disadvantage (Life Chances Act 2010, s12). These differences in legal context not only represent different formal positions on child poverty in different parts of the United Kingdom, they also have significant implications for the work of local government in the different UK nations. For instance, it is a requirement for local authorities in Scotland to produce an annual report detailing action they are taking to contribute to national child poverty reduction targets, but there is currently no equivalent requirement for local authorities in England [8].

While Labour's commitment to developing a child poverty strategy may close some of these gaps, it will need to grapple with the question of devolution if it wishes to do so. Even if it does, there is the distinct possibility that competing discourses will persist as different political actors (re)position themselves in relation to the Westminster view. Certainly, this was a feature of social security policy under the previous Conservative-led UK governments, whose frequent pejorative representations of social security were often challenged by leaders of devolved and regional governments as a key part of their strategic positioning to the electorate.

“competing discourses will persist as different political actors (re)position themselves in relation to the Westminster view”

Most notable perhaps has been the counternarrative emerging from the Scottish polity. This has been led by the Scottish national party (SNP), the main party of government since 2007, but key tenets—including the need for social security to respect users' dignity—have won unanimous support from the Scottish parliament. Despite changes in SNP leadership between 2011 and 2024, a consistent feature of its approach was a pro-social security policy discourse that was intentionally oppositional to the then Conservative UK government's stance. Prominent commitments to eradicate poverty, promote social justice and invest in community wellbeing have been central to its ‘articulation of a social democratic welfare state imagery’ that ‘(re)frames “welfare” as a desirable public good’ [9]. This discourse has been highly visible in SNP declarations of support for social security and welfare benefits. For example, Shirley-Anne Somerville, cabinet secretary for social justice, has previously stated that ‘social security is an investment in our people and a public service’, a theme echoed by Nicola Sturgeon, former first minister of Scotland, who stated that the ‘[SCP] invests in the long-term potential of children and young people who would otherwise be held back by the dire impact of poverty’ [10]. Sturgeon described the introduction of the SCP as her proudest achievement [10]. It is notable that the early parliamentary challenge to Labour on its approach to the two-child limit came as a result of an SNP amendment to the King's Speech, which set out the party's opposition to this policy. This different discourse was also visible in the announcement of the decision to scrap the two-child limit in Scotland, with Cabinet Secretary Shona Robinson setting the case out thus: Our first priority is tackling child poverty. The two-child cap is a pernicious part of the UK welfare system, it has caused misery for children and families in Scotland [11].

“a consistent feature of its approach was a pro-social security policy discourse that was intentionally oppositional”

Northern Ireland has a distinctive political and socioeconomic context. Rates of disability and economic inactivity are consistently higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom, while elected representatives are widely regarded as closer to their communities than their counterparts in Great Britain. Consequently, an ‘anti-welfare commonsense’ [12] can be harder to sustain (which is not to say that negative narratives about social security are absent). Since 2012, there has been clear political support for a more solidaristic social security system, although there are considerable administrative and budgetary constraints on the country's ability to develop a distinctive agenda [2].

Of the national, devolved administrations, Wales has the least devolved power in relation to social security. Even so, the Welsh government still spends approximately £400 million a year on its own anti-poverty schemes. Furthermore, in 2022, it funded and launched a basic income pilot [13]. Echoing similar social investment narratives as noted in Scotland, the then first minister, Mark Drakeford, emphasised policies that supported ‘trust, autonomy and respect’ [13]. There are also calls [14] to devolve the administration of the same benefits to Wales as have been devolved to Scotland, to enable Wales to create its own welfare narrative and associated policies.

While English regions and localities have no formal constitutional role in social security policymaking, they too have played an increasingly important role in presenting counternarratives about welfare recently. Notably, several regional mayors placed anti-poverty strategies front and centre during the May 2024 mayoral elections. For example, the North East mayor, Kim McGuiness, has made tackling child poverty her top priority [15] and has said that ‘reducing child poverty in the North East’ will be the ‘simple measure of success’ against which her whole agenda should be judged [16]. As part of this mission she has established the North East Child Poverty Reduction Unit, which the English Devolution White Paper highlighted as a key example of ‘devolution in action’ [17]. The mayor of Greater Manchester, Andy Burnham, has been heavily critical of the way the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has run job centres, arguing that ‘the current system with all the tick boxes and sanctions leaves people further away from work rather than bringing them towards it’ [18].

Significantly, November's Get Britain Working Again white paper included the announcement of the piloting of the devolution of employment support to the regional level; part of a wider agenda to support local economies in identifying skill shortages and providing effective support to their communities [19].

“[local authorities] too have played an increasingly important role in presenting counternarratives about welfare recently”

3 Devolution, Policy and Power

Crucially, these competing narratives represent different views not only on the substance of social security policy, but also on questions of where power and competency should lie. During the 2014 Scottish independence referendum campaign, the SNP frequently highlighted social security, arguing that independence offered an alternative to Conservative-led austerity. When the referendum did not lead to a majority ‘yes’ vote, the subsequent Smith Commission devolved a range of new social security powers to Scotland, thus demonstrating the central role that constructions of the welfare state and differing expectations from social security had played in the political contestations. This, in turn, led to the development of the Scottish Social Security Agency, the Scottish Social Security Act 2018 and the associated Social Security Charter, a co-produced charter promoting principles of fairness, dignity and respect that ‘explains how Scotland will do things differently, creating a positive and supportive system that is there for all of us should we need it’ [20]. Such moves have been presented as an example of a so-called ‘Scottish approach’ [21] to policy that claims to incorporate both collaborative and participatory governance and has involved the creation and nurturing of policy communities across the public, private and third sectors in policymaking and implementation [22].

English regional mayors have also raised questions about power and competency in relation to welfare too. Burnham promised during the 2024 mayoral elections that ‘[i]f re-elected, I will start negotiations with Whitehall for more devolved control of benefits, including disability benefits’ [23] and, following the King's Speech in July, it was reported that ‘his top priority will be to devolve the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) budget for employment support’ [18]. McGuiness has also committed to pushing for further devolution of powers [24]. Local authorities in England, too, might be expected to push for a longer-term role in delivering discretionary welfare. They vocally advocated against termination of the Household Support Fund during the past year [25], the Local Government Association highlighting the ‘vital safety net’ it provides [26] and expressing disappointment that the March 2024 Budget only provided a 6-month extension to the scheme [27]. Campaigning organisations such as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Child Poverty Action Group have already made calls for the fund to evolve into a reformed but permanent form of local discretionary welfare [28, 29].

“English regional mayors have also raised questions about power and competency”

4 Policy Implications and Lessons for Future Policymaking

As the new Labour government settles into office, it will rightly face calls to deliver on its manifesto commitment [30] to reform universal credit, and—beyond that—to improve adequacy within the social security system. In opposition, some now Labour ministers spoke of the need to ensure dignity within the social security system design [31], and this is a pressing (and long overdue) area for change. As we have set out in this paper, there are already signs that Labour wants to both increase devolved powers (so that those—as Keir Starmer puts it—with skin in the game [32] have power over the decisions that affect them and their lives) and do more to connect up devolved policymakers, as evidenced by the early decision to bring all the regional mayors together for the first time at Downing Street and in the first speech by Liz Kendall, the new secretary of state for the DWP [33].

But there is a need to do more than this, and to go further, creating the strategies and spaces so that policymakers from across the United Kingdom can learn from the differences in devolved and localised social security policymaking that already exist, ensuring that this evidence-based learning can then drive future policy decisions. For example, we know that payment arrangements for universal credit differ in different parts of the United Kingdom—in Northern Ireland, for example, the default payment frequency is twice monthly, where elsewhere in the United Kingdom it is monthly [34]. If evidence suggests that one of these options works better for claimants, and fits better with the grain of their everyday lives, we can use that knowledge to reform and improve universal credit, conceptualising devolution here as ‘laboratories of democracy’ [35]. Similarly, there are real and significant differences in how crisis and discretionary support is provided at the regional and local level, and there is scope here to learn from these differences, and to deliver improved support in the future.

“there is a need to do more than this, and to go further”

Over recent years, there has too often been a tendency to ‘devolve and forget’, [36] failing to either explore or learn lessons from the policy differences that do exist. One reason for this may be political—it is hard, for instance, for a Labour government to champion an approach taken by the SNP Scottish government to child poverty as this would appear to concede ground to an opponent. But Starmer has promised to govern as service [37], and with trust in politicians low, it is perhaps time for a new approach, and one that seeks to overcome these political, tactical stances and get beneath the service to better understand what works, what matters and what helps low-income communities across the United Kingdom.

At the same time, there is scope to do more to explore the opportunities that devolution can open up, to develop different policies for different places, better fitted to the needs of local communities. There are signs that Labour wants to do just that—for example, on employment support [38]—and it will be vital to watch these developments closely.

“it will be vital to watch these developments closely”

All of this is only possible if we can properly monitor and understand the extent, nature and impact of devolved differences on devolution. To date, this area is under-theorised and poorly understood, but a new programme of research [39], funded by the Nuffield Foundation, and which we all as authors will contribute to, seeks to change that.

Underpinning differences in policy at the devolved level are differences in discourse too, and in policy practice, and just as there are lessons for Westminster on the substance of policy, there may also be lessons on policymaking processes and related narratives. On social security, there has long been a need at the UK level to make a positive case for spending in this area as an investment in the lives of all of the UK's citizens. Looking at how places in different parts of the United Kingdom do just that could help open up the conversation on social security, something that is both long overdue and much needed.

5 Author Contributions

Study concept and design: Ruth Patrick, Hayley Bennett, Mark Simpson, John Hudson. Analysis and interpretation of data: Ruth Patrick, Hayley Bennett, John Hudson and Mark Simpson. Drafting of the manuscript: Ruth Patrick, Hayley Bennett, John Hudson and Mark Simpson. Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual content: Ruth Patrick, Hayley Bennett, John Hudson and Mark Simpson. All the authors have made substantial contributions to the design of the work, the analysis and interpretation of the data, and the drafting of the work or its critical revision.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.