1 INTRODUCTION

The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC we're not only the most shocking terrorist attacks conducted by a sub-state group in history but portrayed the unpredictability, underlying complexities, and how far terror groups are willing to go to carry out their mission (Ilardi, 2009). Subsequently, the attacks altered the concept and approach of border security, soon after, a plethora of concepts underpinning the need to address terrorism emerged, such as “war on terror” and “the securitisation of terrorism”. Building on the insights of Mohan and Mawdsley (2007), this paper reinforces the notion that the growth and sophistication of terrorism as a process is not an isolated incident. It is a process driven by a combination of factors such as underdevelopment, state fragility, hegemonic interests, ideological differences within the religious context and ethnic differences. The authors are of the view that weak state institutions accompanied by poor governance and the role of external actors (e.g., Multinational cooperation's and third party states undermining the sovereignty of other countries) are additional factors that are giving birth to terrorism in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Furthermore, the quest to define terrorism and its underlying principles is complicated by the growth of religion and its association and understanding of the concept. For example, Islam is seen as an inherently violent religion compared to the Christian faith, which is seen as less militant. Therefore, defining the concept of terrorism will differ greatly between Western governments and their Middle Eastern counterparts. Crenshaw (1981) suggests that the significance of terrorism largely depends on the national political choice. As a purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of an organisation's (non state actor) decision that it observes as politically useful to oppose a government. Terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means to advance the desired ends. Poor governance and the disillusionment of the people can also result in terrorism, states must be capable of governing, and failure to do so might allow the minorities or the elite to embark to terrorism knowing that the masses will offer their support.

However, De Zulueta (2006) correctly argued that post 9/11 and the global entrenchment of the concept of “war on terror” has not addressed the core factors driving terrorism. It has rather allowed developed countries, with their expansionist and hegemonic interests to violate international law by intervening in the affairs of other sovereign states under the pretext of eradicating terrorism. This flagrant disregard for international law has given rise to a new dimension of terrorism; one which is driven by revenge and the need to alter the current international security paradigm (Hudson, 1999). Even though terrorist organizations have grown in numbers and size, they have also increased their ability to stage attacks in every corner of the globe. However, developing countries, characterised by broken governance systems, political instability and the absence of a strong impartial judiciary are more likely to feel the true brunt of terrorism. Herzog (2008) attests that developing countries lack effective intelligence services, which can gather data and are likely to have porous borders. As a result, these countries become the hubs of operation and planning for terror groups. Ever since the emergence of the Islamic State group (taking into consideration the decline of Al Qaeda) in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Yosufi (2016) and Solomon (2017) assert that a considerable number of previously unknown terror groups in Africa have confined to the ideological groundings of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). They have pledged their allegiance to the group and began to implement the group's ideological stance with regards to establishing a caliphate and the consolidation of sharia law. In Mali, Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Somalia, and Mozambique, there have been frequent attacks on civilians and law enforcement agencies by groups aligned to ISIS (Bamidele, 2015).

This paper focuses on Mozambique, a country characterised by years of state fragility because of the conflict between Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo). Since the attacks began in Cabo Delgado region, which is characterised by rampant poverty and inequality, Mozambique has struggled to address the attacks which have killed hundreds of people, gave way to population displacement and societal destabilisation. Igreja (2008) expressed that Mozambique has never truly healed from its past, rather political compromises have had to be made to ensure peace and development. However, today, apart from the frequent political squabbles, Mozambique faces a real threat, which if not contained will drive the country towards a period of socio-economic uncertainty. The inability of Mozambique to contain the growing terror threat has been underpinned by a plethora of reasons, Meyer (2019) contends that political indecisiveness and corruption are the integral factors. Shinn (2016) communicated that poverty and inequality in the northern region have hindered the government's ability to ensure youths are not recruited into the ranks of insurgency groups. Whatever the case might be, the on-going attacks have been devastating for the country. It is, therefore; with the above contention that the paper seeks to explore three elements. First, what the implications of the growing terror threat for Mozambique? Second, what are the broader implications for the SADC and finally, what are the implications for South Africa.

2 THEORISING THE CONCEPT OF INSURGENCY

It has been argued that decades of research into violent extremism has shaped a collection of risk factors in the psychological, social, and political domains. Nivette et al. (2017) expounded that these include psychological characteristics (low self-control), social context features (alienation), and political processes (exclusion from politics). Holistically examining and describing the underlying factors that drive insurgency is very difficult. Reinforcing this, the authors noted that part of the difficulty in synthesising information on extremist violence is due to the breadth of attitudinal, behavioural, and group-based outcomes examined under one conceptual umbrella. Nevertheless, there are some theories underpinned by years of research, which have attempted to explain what drives insurgency or terrorism (Harpviken, 2020). Generally, strain theories explain criminal attitudes and behaviours as manifestations of negative coping in response to adverse events, conditions, or treatment (Nivette et al., 2017). The revised version of the general strain theory aimed at improving the earlier version of the theory, only this time, by expanding on the types of negative relationships that can strain relations and explicating the socio-psychological mechanisms that underlie the relationship between strain and crime (Rocque, 2008). Agnew's General Strain Theory predicts that support for violent extremism is more likely when collective strain is experienced. This is perceived as discrimination against a group, which one identifies with feelings of injustice, or vicarious or direct trauma from war and civil strife (Nivette et al., 2017). This paper takes into account the on-going insurgency in Mozambique and examines the assumptions of the general strain theory and its possible explanations within the contexts of the Mozambique insurgency. As argued earlier, strain theories explain criminal attitudes and behaviours as manifestations of negative coping in response to adverse events, conditions, or treatment (Nivette et al., 2017).

Strain resulting from negative relationships with others can become a reality when individuals are prevented from achieving their goals, which include relationships or interactions that are perceived as unjust or inequitable. Strain arises when positively valued stimuli are removed, such as the loss of a parent, romantic partner, or employment. It can further result from noxious stimuli such as victimisation, child abuse, and negative experiences with parents, peers, police, and employers (Agnew, 1992; Kalmakis & Chandler, 2015). Exposure to these strains can produce negative emotions like anger and frustration, which demand corrective action. In Mozambique, there are a plethora of observations that can relate to the underpinnings of the general strain theory. Meyer (2019) argues that youth in the Cabo Delgado region have been isolated and neglected. This neglect feeds into rebellious acts against the government, which then results in conflict and youth being recruited by insurgency groups. It further prevents individuals from socio-economically achieving their goals. Mukeredzi (2020) indicates that years of central government neglect, joblessness, and poverty have pushed the province's disenchanted young people into the arms of armed militias. Those who have lost parents and friends to the violence especially at the hands of the security forces become easily recruited and are eager to join the ranks of insurgents; often such eagerness is driven by the need to avenge thier loved ones. Mozambique has never healed from its past (especially the civil war), thus the country has failed to create a cohesive society underpinned the shared values. Agnew (1992) attests that overtime vicarious collective strains are more likely to lead to negative coping strategies, which are likely to trigger violence and instability. Mozambique, incorporating the strain theory reflects the ever-changing social dynamics, which are a combination of social and political factors. The youth are systematically marginalised and are lingering in poverty and this has fed into the insurgency and thus conflict has become an everyday occurrence (Mukeredzi, 2020). While issues such as poverty and inequality have been seen as underlying contributors to the insurgency, however, weak borders and the inability of the Mozambican government to end the inflow of fighters from other countries are also contributing factors. Subsequently, it becomes difficult to observe how the insurgency will be addressed, considering the socio-economic damage it has inflicted to the region and to Mozambique as a whole.

3 MOZAMBIQUE'S ENCROACHING TERROR THREAT

During the second half of the 20th century, Mozambique had been the stage of decades of violent armed conflict, first in its fight for independence from the Portuguese regime in 1964–1975. The Mozambican post-independence civil war, which took place from 1977 to 1992, deeply divided the country and is estimated to have accounted for the deaths of nearly one million people (Hanlon, 2010). The Cabo Delgado Province is the most northern province of Mozambique with an estimated population of 2, 32 million. The region is also rich with natural gas and other minerals, which amongst others has become a driving factor in the conflict. Contextualising the on-going insurgency in Mozambique becomes narrow without describing the current contexts under which these events are taking place (Fabricius, 2020). Precisely documenting the beginning of the Insurgency in Cabo Delgado is challenging because of the inability of news agencies to accurately report from the region. Armed attacks by extremist militant groups in Mozambique's oil-rich Cabo Delgado province have increased over the years, sending a wave of panic throughout neighbouring countries. From mid-2018, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and extremists from Kenya and Tanzania and a home-grown group called Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (bound together by their anti-Christian and anti-western agenda) have been behind the rise in violence in the Cabo Delgado province (Mukeredzi, 2020). Ever since the conflict broke out, civilians, Mozambican security forces have been targeted. However, of late, militants have begun to target Mozambique gas projects, which could cripple the inflow of foreign direct investments. Building on the above insights, the paper argues that religious extremism feeds on the suffering of millions and the inability of governments to ensure inclusive socio-economic development. As argued earlier, it has worryingly, become a widely accepted notion that some religions and ideological teachings spread violence. However, demystifying this, the paper contends that people have found a way to use religion (through violence) to promote their interests. Arguably, this might hold when observing religious extremism in Africa, for example, in Nigeria, Mali, Central African Republic, and Somalia where active insurgent groups have called for a new political dispensation and a alternative ways of governance. In Mozambique, Mukeredzi (2020) argues that religion is the main factor driving this insurgency in the region, the marginalisation of its majority Muslim population has played a key role in stoking the fires of insurgency.

The fragility of Mozambique as a country translates to the difficulty the state will have in planning out a well-coordinated response to the insurgency. The growth, consolidation, and the ability of Ansar al-Sunna to carry out attacks in the region is driven by an array of factors. The Scalabrini Institute for Human Mobility in Africa (2020) indicated that Islamic radicalisation is taking advantage of the extreme inequality in the region. Although the province is one of the richest in the country, the resources are exploited by multinationals. On the other hand, the majority of the Mozambican population lives under shoestring conditions, with inadequate access to health care, education, and decent sustainable jobs. The debate around religion and its role in the insurgency has gained traction in the quest to understand the drivers of the on-going insurgency in Mozambique. However, Orre and Rønning (2017) downplayed the association of religion with insurgency because sometimes individuals resort to violence due to lack of provision of basic services. The marginalisation, coupled with Cabo Delgado's rich mineral resources, means Northern Mozambique now risks becoming a regional centre of Islamist extremism, and the security threat requires a coordinated response before it spills over into the rest of the SADC.

4 MOZAMBIQUE RESPONSE TO INSURGENCY IN CABO DELGADO'S

The Islamic insurgency operating in Mozambique's northern Cabo Delgado province is showing increased tactical capacity, outmanoeuvring a government hobbled by strategic mistakes and capacity shortfalls. This translates to the inability of the government to grasp the turn of events on the ground and the role that is being played by poverty and inequality. The frequent attacks on civilians and security forces reflects increased sophistication, planning, and confidence, as well as a shift to targeting government structures and wooing civilian support (Columbo, 2020). Regrettably, the increasing attacks, the deaths of civilians, and the inability of the armed forces to quell the violence have brought into sharp focus on Maputo's struggle with describing and countering the worsening violence in Cabo Delgado province. There is mistrust between security forces and civilians, in some cases; security forces did not repel insurgent attacks. Furthermore, they shed their uniforms to blend in with civilians and avoid combat, provoking criticism. Nonetheless, this highlights the lack of trust in the security services and perceptions of the insurgents' growing capability. Needless to say, the above observations have coincided with a lack of incoherent response from the Mozambican government; seemingly the pace at which the insurgency has grown has caught the government unprepared. President Nyusi and Jaime Neto declared the insurgents a potential threat to national sovereignty and have acknowledged that to some extent the country's security forces have struggled to cope with the increasing insurgency (Columbo, 2020). This evident by President Nyusi during the January UK-Africa Summit where he called for foreign assistance to deal with the insurgency. Subsequently, while the defence minister argued that the country's security forces have the situation under control, recent attacks and their sophistication perhaps altered the minster's stance on this position as he soon pondered “Do we need reinforcement? Yes, and if we get them, we will use them.” Afterward, Mozambican officials signed security memoranda of understanding with a variety of countries, including Egypt, India, and Russia—which could potentially help with the training and equipment supply for the security services (Columbo, 2020).

The government's response to the insurgency reflects a similar pattern across Africa. In Libya, the Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria, and Egypt, the focus has been on military action, and thus Mozambique has followed suit. However, military action for a developing country like Mozambique does not eradicate poverty and inequality, factors which have been highlighted as driving the conflict. Mozambique's use of the army fails to take into cognisance that it is the socio-economic exclusion in the Cabo region that is feeding into the insurgency. The focus has been directed towards the need to crush the insurgency, but little attention has been given to the underlying root causes, which are driving it. The deployment of the army is informed by the need to protect one's national interests even though it has been accused of human rights violations. Kajjo (2020) declares that the army in the short term may reduce insurgent attacks but it will unlikely stop them entirely because Islamist insurgents have exploited social and economic grievances of the local population in the resource-rich region. As posited by the general strain theory, the insurgents seem to grow in areas where the population has been marginalised by the government, particularly young people, who in some cases sold what little they had and went to join the [armed] groups (Mukeredzi, 2020). Reflective of this, the youth in South Africa have shared similar sentiments especially relating to youth unemployment and the lack of government intervention to address such.

Building on the above insights, the Mozambican government's response has angled towards crushing the insurgency. However, in the process, it has failed to identify the root causes of radicalisation in that part of the country. In all, Mozambican armed forces have had difficulties in providing adequate security in northern Mozambique. While there is a short-term need for an effective military response to the insurgency. However, in the longer-term this needs to be backed up with an effective developmental strategy that reduces persistent poverty and provides jobs. Columbo (2020) asserts that the lack of a well-coordinated response means that Nyusi's government will likely turn to foreign partners for security assistance if insurgent attacks continue to grow in complexity and frequency—at minimum to protect foreign investments in the region. Nonetheless, the above reflects a need for the SADC as a region to collectively intervene to assist Mozambique.

5 THE SADC'S AND ITS REACTION TO THE INSURGENCY IN MOZAMBIQUE

The SADC understands that the insurgency in Mozambique risks exploding into a full-blown regional challenge. Nevertheless, despite such observations, the ineffectiveness, vagueness, and lack of policy direction towards addressing the insurgency has emboldened critics of the regional body. Breytenbach (2000) argues that the failure of the SADC to effectively intervene (through assisting Mozambique) should not come as a surprise. The author further argues that for years the SADC has failed to intervene concerning the political instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which has been engulfed by conflict for years. Building on the above insights, Mwanawina (2011) communicated that while the SADC ought to represent the interests of regional states, it however, has to respect the principle of territorial sovereignty of member states. This emanates from the fact that if Mozambique has not requested the regional body's assistance, then one cannot expect SADC to unilaterally intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state. The insurgency in Mozambique calls for a clear cut policy on a regional level; it calls for collective action and more importantly it calls for decisive leadership. Sadly, for the region, the SADC unpersuasive response has questioned the idea of collective action and unity, further consolidating the widespread notion that the regional body lacks the political will to mobilize member states in times of need. Mukeredzi (2020) contends that the political indecisiveness of regional economic communities in Africa is common. This was further alluded by Odusote (2015) who mentioned that regional economic communities in Africa are dominated by a few countries, and their interests supersede the interests of others. Hence this hegemonic inequality hinders their overall ability to collectively work together to solve regional problems, as with the current dilemma in the SADC.

6 THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SADC'S RESPONSE AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

In a region of 345 million people characterised by growing rates of poverty and inequality, the spread of the insurgency would be socio-economically devastating for the region (Heywood, 2020). Needless to say, ever since the insurgency broke out in Mozambique, the SADC has issued numerous statements condemning the insurgency and calling for de-escalation and the need to preserve Mozambique's territorial integrity. However, there has been a lack of actionable policy to support these condemnations. Mukeredzi (2020) attests that while the SADC understands the complexity and seriousness of the situation; it has so far failed to provide sufficient support to Mozambique. However, Columbo (2020) expressed the concern that the SADC cannot be solely blamed for lack of action because Mozambican officials have reported that the insurgency is under control and that the country does not require external assistance. While terror in the region would have significant ramifications, the lack of action from regional countries reflects a much greater challenge. The SADC's failure to coordinate the process of addressing the insurgency in Mozambique cannot be observed in isolation. The lack of leadership in addressing these issues makes it cumbersome to observe how the body from a policy perspective and a diplomatic point of view (considering the region's political indecisiveness) will ensure the stabilisation of Mozambique as failure would have wide-reaching ramifications regionally (Mukeredzi, 2020).

7 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE INSURGENCY IN MOZAMBIQUE: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

South Africa's keen interest in the in-going Insurgency is not without careful consideration for its own security needs. Put it simply: borders on the continent (Including those of South Africa) were arbitrarily imposed by former colonial powers, are not respected and South Africa's weak border controls are an indictment on a weak government with no plan (Phepheng, 2020). One cannot deny that weak borders create a breathing ground for illegal migration, cross border crime, and the consolidation of terror groups. Reinforcing the above, newly appointed spy boss advocate Mahlodi Muofhe emphasised that South Africa's porous borders are the number one threat to domestic security in the country. Moufgle's hardline on border security fails to reflect the scourage of corruption and maladministration at the borders. Moreover, it fails to mention the difficulty in coordinating effective border management due to the presence of numerous department/agencies at the border. South Africa shares four border crossings with Mozambique. The main border crossing is the Lebombo border (known as Ressano Garcia on the Mozambique side), on the N4 (SA)/EN4 (Mozambique) that links Johannesburg and Maputo. Apart from the borders with Mozambique, confidence in the country's border control, border security, and migration policy implementation are critical in ensuring the support for effective border security.

For example, the Kosi Bay/Ponta do Ouro border, which links South Africa to Mozambique, has been marred by a rapid increase in the cross border theft of vehicles from South Africa to Mozambique, which has been necessitated by weak border systems coupled with corruption (Singh, 2018). However, focusing on corruption as the major enticing factor somewhat distorts the whole idea behind border security and does not reflect the current realities on the ground. This paper supporting the assertions of Steinberg (2005) contends that South Africa's years of under investments in border security (after the fall of apartheid) has given rise to incompetence, corruption, and the inability to effectively police the borders. Over the years, there has been a strong emphasis on border militarisation as a way to protect the country's borders (Jones & Johnson, 2016). As the urgency and desire to militarise the borders would suggest South Africa was facing some imminent foreign threat. But looking closer at the rhetoric of politicians in South Africa, this “threat” posed to the country's sovereignty was not some invading force. It is rather impoverished migrants seeking new opportunities and asylum seekers fleeing conflict and persecution (Bornman, 2020).

However, the above assertions failed to reflect the growing threat of terrorism in Mozambique and the implications it could have for South Africa. Hamilton et al. (2018) communicate that while the vulnerability to terrorism is not as substantial as compared to other countries, nevertheless, attacks in Mozambique pose a threat to South Africa given the country's political and economic vulnerabilities. The lack of South Africa's involvement in the conflict (be it as a mediator or reinforcing the Mozambican government militarily) is somewhat surprising, especially considering its regional hegemonic status. However, the South African government's stance is that the country is largely immune to terrorist threats because of its non-interventionist foreign policy. However, Hamilton et al. (2018) argue that such approach is short-sighted since an interventionist or non-interventionist foreign policy cannot be largely seen as a defining feature as to whether a country is attacked or not. South Africa is one of the most unequal countries on earth and over half of the population lives in poverty—which means that the majority have a vote but not a voice (Bergallo, 2011). The slow pace of transformation after apartheid, coupled with high levels of corruption in the executive branch and the so called state capture, has bred popular discontent with the government. A lack of national identity and social cohesion means that people are “othered” more than they are included. This othering, the lack of economic transformation, and the porous nature of the country's borders pose a serious internal and external security threat.

8 CAN SOUTH AFRICAN BORDERS PROTECT THE COUNTRY?

Apart from the above-mentioned challenges with regards to border security management in South Africa, the global standard against the need to eliminate terrorism places great resolve on having a strong intelligence service, which can gather real-time data. Therefore, the strength and effective operation of borders alone are not the only important element in combatting terrorism but rather a well-functioning intelligence service is also imperative (Africa, 2009). This paper laments the observation that in developing countries, intelligence services are manipulated by politicians and used to settle political agendas. Evidence suggests that South Africa has been used as a transit point for terrorists, and as a base for planning, training, and financing terror operations. Over the years there has been a string of high profile arrests of people associated with terrorism, terrorism financing, and planning in South Africa (Schoeman, 2016). In 1999, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian trained by al-Qaeda, was arrested in Cape Town for his role in the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Similarly, the case of the ‘White Widow’, Samantha Lewthwaite, Lewthwaite was the widow of Germaine Lindsay, one of the four terrorists responsible for the 7/7 bombings in London. Between 2008 and 2010, she lived and worked in South Africa using a false South African passport. South African authorities have admitted that fake South African passports that have been found in the possession al-Qaeda affiliated members has given rise to the notion that South Africa has failed to contribute towards the global fight against terrorism (Schoeman, 2016). Several factors make South Africa an attractive and safe place for potential terrorist, first, the large number of illegal migrants raises questions around border control and the ability of security forces to track those operating in the country. Second, advanced communications networks and financial institutions are also useful for planning operations beyond South Africa, for example, Henry Okah, the alleged leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, lived in and out of the country (South Africa) from 2003 and reportedly coordinated attacks in Nigeria from South Africa (Schoeman, 2016).

While the country's authorities agree that South Africa is being used as a transit country for potential terrorists and those that plan terror attacks, internally, the extent of domestic radicalisation and extremism in South Africa is less clear. Nevertheless, The lack of communication from government and the manner with which known cases have been dealt with has left many unanswered questions that fuel fears about the risk South Africa faces from extremism (Schoeman, 2016). It has also led to some questioning—whether warranted or not—the government's ability and commitment to addressing the problem that is fast becoming a highly debated topic not only in South Africa but also within the international political domain.

The decline of South Africa's intelligence services was further put to light under the presidency of Jacob Zuma. Cowan (2019) shares the same sentiment that during the years of Jacob Zuma's presidency, elements of the State Security Agency were repurposed and used to fight factional ANC political battles. Africa (2009) contended that the intelligence services remain very close to the seat of political power, making possible the potential abuse of intelligence for political purposes. Furthermore, the author argues that the intelligence services in a pre and post-apartheid South Africa have greatly evolved. During the colonial period and apartheid, the role of intelligence was to protect white minority interests. In the new political dispensation of post-1994, electoral violence and corruption became key areas that the National Intelligence services sought to address in addition to gathering information on those who may want to harm the national interests of the country (Africa, 2009). Thus, the intelligence services have expanded, with an increased budget and more personnel at the same time. However, with these newfound responsibilities, the question today is whether the intelligence oversight institutions of the post-apartheid era and the constitutional framework under which the services operate are adequate. Are they effective, resilient, and resistant to abuse and can they protect the country from the many security challenges present in the region? (Africa, 2009). Within the premise of the above discussion, the paper's contentions are underpinned by two important elements; first, South African borders are failing to secure the country's territorial integrity. Second, the intelligence services (considering the high profile cases that have made the news in South Africa in the past) are battling to collect effective intelligence needed to ensure the country's national interests are protected.

Within the confines of borders, the insurgency in Mozambique reflects the need to evaluate how borders are managed. However, one may also argue that in the minds and lives of people especially in an African context, borders do not actually exist, rather they are a symbol of a colonial legacy that ought to be erased. Despite such thoughts, global trends have shown that weak borders present a national security conundrum for nation-states. At the current state at which borders are managed and considering their loopholes, South Africa is not immune to terror attacks. Apart from the need to reinforce borders, South Africa shares similar socio-economic characteristics with Mozambique, it has a large population, which lives below the poverty line, and inequality is rife. The government is failing to address these pressing issues, which have the potential to create a full-blown rebellion (Mahr, 2019) Sadly, South Africa post 1994 relaxed the stringent border security status that was attached to the apartheid regime, rather the country sort to open up and reciprocate in kind to states that helped liberate it from apartheid. However, this relaxation has bought with it increased problems, which today, the country is failing to address. Weak borders are a menace in the fight against terrorism, as evident by the role of weak borders in perpetuating conflict in countries such as Mali, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. Therefore, should ISIS or other insurgency groups in Mozambique opt to increase their foothold by venturing in South Africa, the current state of South African borders will serve little purpose in protecting the country national interests.

Within the context of South Africa's intelligence services, the easy entry of people linked to terror-related incidences in the country and the ability for them to stay off the radar paints a worrying picture for South Africa. This view is not in isolation, for long countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have argued that South Africa is becoming a haven for terrorists and that South African intelligence services are unable to track the movements of persons linked with terror-related incidences (Schoeman, 2016). The above was reinforced by the explanation of Africa (2009) who argued that politics has compromised the ability of intelligence services to protect South Africa. However, amid such arguments, the decline of the intelligence services cannot be studied from a specific timeline, rather there are other factors to consider, for example, increasing scope of references has weighed on the ability to carry out their mandates effectively.

In all, the insurgency in Mozambique ought to be addressed as a collective rather than letting Mozambique single handily resolve the issue. However, the SADC has been rather quiet on the matter, which has raised questions regarding its commitment to aid a fellow member. For South Africa, the stakes are even greater, its development, role in the region, and its interests in Mozambique may push it to play some role in contributing towards the end of the violence. However, should ISIS and other groups present in the region retaliate for its involvement; the question is how will the country counter this act of aggression. This paper, having taken into consideration the discussions above argues that should the insurgency spread beyond the borders of Mozambique, South Africa for its part may not be able to manoeuvre quickly enough to prevent insurgency groups from consolidating their presence in the country taking into consideration the above challenges. Moreover, the spread of terror-related incidences from Mozambique to South Africa may not necessarily mean fighters crossing over from Mozambique to South Africa, but it may be the internal radicalisation of young marginalised youth from all corners. The radicalisation of marginalised youth may be taking place already, but with a seemingly politically compromised intelligence service, It becomes difficult to understand how South Africa can truly understand the scale of such radicalisation. However, apart from the prospect of internal radicalisation, should fighters from Mozambique choose to cross over to South Africa, will the country's borders prove to be a deterrence? The paper argues that borders in their current state will not play a vital role preventing fighters from entering SA as borders have become riddled with corruption, maladministration, and years of under investments, factors, which have decreased the effectiveness of borders. With the above, this ppaper contends that a SADC initiated plan of action to quell the violence is key is stabilising Mozambique and for South Africa, increase investments in border investments and ensuring the impartiality of the intelligence services becomes key ensuring the country has the ability to repel any possible attack.

9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The insurgency in Mozambique is multifaceted, taking different approaches and turns each day. Whether the insurgency has a religious element or an inequality dimension to it, one cannot deny that it has caused social destabilisation in Mozambique's Cabo region and contributed to heightened fears of the coming terror threat in Southern Africa, a region, which has seen little terror-related incidences. There is an urgent need for the SADC to assist Mozambique and this urgency cannot be delayed. Should the SADC be serious about preventing a spillover of the conflict to the region, action is needed to bring about stability and social cohesion in Mozambique. Poverty and inequality in Mozambique, coupled with the porous borders in the SADC and the lack of credible intelligence services will make it hard for the region to combat the insurgency should it move beyond Mozambique. Moreover, should the SADC fail to contribute towards a practical solution to the impasse, it risks profiling itself a weak institution and this might give rise to new regional challenges. For South Africa, the question is to get involved or not. Either way, gone are the days of insurgency or terror-related attacks been viewed within the confines of the Middle East, Western Europe, and West Africa? Today, terror is right at South Africa's doorstep and South Africa's reaction must take into consideration a plethora of possible outcomes before intervening in Mozambique. Reactions might contribute towards stability in the region, which will be good for socio-economic development, also, sending troops to assist Mozambique, may portray brotherly support in times of need. However, such reaction may also pit South Africa against ISIS and other terror groups, which may retaliate by targeting South Africa. With a porous borderline and a fractured intelligence service, the general mistrust between society and government, South Africa may find itself under attack from insurgency groups. In all, South Africa is in a predicament, however, its weak borders and a declining intelligence service need a total re-alignment to current regional challenges. Other means should be employed to fight terrorism, some of which are in current use ranging from diplomacy, political solution and in extreme situations, sanctions, and blocking terrorist financing.