1.1 Right-populism and right-wing protective popular nationalism

For the purpose of the current paper, populism is a term used to represent the uprising of “the people” in their shared agency to oppose (potentially) corrupt and privileged elites (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017 for a comprehensive review). Historically, populism coincides with democracy and can bridge the political-ideological spectrum from left to right (March, 2017). In recent years, there has been a global swing toward the political ascendency of populist political figures and parties whose conservative views and policies are a common thread hence weaving right-populism throughout North and South America, Europe, and Asian countries including Australia (for example, Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Viktor Orban, Matteo Salvini, and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka's newly elected President).

Topics such as immigration, multiculturalism, border security, national identity, and international threat provide right-populist leaders with political rhetoric that is disseminated through political campaigns, public policy, and the media instilling a narrow sense of national belonging (those who rightfully belong, and those who do not and should be feared as “the other”) resulting in what scholars refer to as a politics of fear which is argued to be a core characteristic of the current political landscape (see Gale, 2005 for an example). A politics of fear activates the grassroots nature of right-populism because those who prescribe to conservative ideals perceive a sense of threat to self and the nation from “the other.” Examples of this were present in Trump's “Let's make America great again” 2016 presidential campaign and in Orban's claim to be Europe's defender “against Muslim migrants” (Youngs, 2018). Right-populist rhetoric is divisive because it offers a prescriptive, narrow viewpoint regarding national group membership (Gale, 2005; Hage, 1998). When pitted at the national level, such rhetoric is simultaneously populist and nationalistic and has been described as contributing to a form of popular nationalism (see Gale, 2004, 2005).

Nationalism is typically defined within social psychology as feelings of national superiority, usually derived from race (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989). However, when placed within a sociological framework, nationalism has been theorized by referring to symbolic boundaries of inclusion and exclusion rather than racial superiority (Gale, 2004). Gale (2005) along with other scholars argued that ethnicity and cultural difference often determine national belonging and that this can be (and is) used by populist leaders to promote a language of us (those belonging to the ingroup) and them (those belonging to the outgroup). Gale argued that a populist form of conservative (right) nationalism is espoused where outgroup members (anyone who does not subscribe to the assumed cultural and ethnic norms of the ingroup) are feared because their presence is perceived as a threat to ingroup culture and national way of life, leading to outgroup exclusion (Gale, 2004).

Gale's (2004, 2005) popular nationalism is concerned with cultural differences that pose a threat to an established national way of life. Extending this theory, RWPPN may occur when this concern leads some ingroup members to want to protect and preserve their national way of life (culture) from outgroup influence (Flannery & Watt, 2019). With reference to the Australian context, events such as race riots, the rise in far-right political groups and the growing popularity of conservative political leaders, a narrow and exclusive national identity has been forged and captured in the phrase “the Australian way of life.” While this “way of life” is open to individual interpretation (Gale, 2004), the promotion of Australian white/Anglo stereotypes has influenced its construction resulting in a “way of life” that is deemed “good and ordinary” and at threat from the “suspicious and different” other (Gleeson, 2014, p. 127). An extensive national survey on social cohesion in Australia (with over 17,000 participants surveyed) indicated that 90% of respondents believed that the maintenance of the “Australian way of life” is important (Markus, 2018). Such a finding reflects the prevalence of national protection within the Australian context.

Empirically conceptualizing RWPPN within a social psychological framework (Flannery, Watt, & Schutte, Under review) developed the RWPPN scale, a ten-item scale that seeks to measure an individual's level of RWPPN. Validation of the RWPPN scale found that high levels of RWPPN related to adverse emotional and behavioral reactions toward ethnic minorities, such as anger, fear, avoidance, and aggressive tendencies along with social and national exclusion reflected in opposition to multiculturalism. Further, higher levels of RWPPN was found for those who identified as Caucasian, compared to those who did not identify as Caucasian. Exploration of RWPPN in an audience segmentation study, using an Australian sample, identified three distinct groups of like-minded people (Flannery & Watt, 2019). These groups were defined by varying levels of RWPPN and a range of variables that tapped notions of ethnic inclusion and exclusion. The audience segmentation results suggested that RWPPN relates to monocultural tendencies which place limitations on social cohesion. Of particular importance, the “Exclusive” group, which was high in RWPPN, also showed the highest tendencies toward anger, fear, aggressive tendencies, and avoidance of members of other ethnic groups. With right-populism at its core, these results suggest that RWPPN relates to a narrow and defensive sense of national identity, which yields negative consequences for outgroup members (Flannery & Watt, 2019). As RWPPN concerns feelings about the nation, we theorized that RWPPN could interact with other nationally related constructs to increase aggressive tendencies toward outgroups. In the following section, we consider four known nationally related predictors of aggression toward outgroup members: collective narcissism, identity fusion, threat, and flag-displays and examine the possibility that they interact with RWPPN to predict heightened aggression to outgroup members.

1.2 Collective narcissism

Collective narcissism is an “emotional investment in the unrealistic belief about the ingroup's greatness” (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009, p. 1074). It is developed through specific social contexts and is independent of individual-level narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Empirical results have consistently found that inflated and unrealistic notions of ingroup greatness have been associated with intergroup conflict and aggression (Golec de Zavala, 2011, 2019; Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), which is particularly evident when ingroup members perceive outgroup members as a threat (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012).

Recent research has extended the theoretical underpinnings of collective narcissism by finding that low self-worth motivates the collective narcissist to invest in ingroup greatness (Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, & Lantos, 2019). This results in an over-compensatory process which renders the collective narcissist sensitive and hypervigilant to threats to the group's position (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). The collective narcissist is, therefore, retaliatory and susceptible to conspiratorial thinking which further exacerbates intergroup tensions and hostilities (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2015; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019).

A surge in empirical findings on collective narcissism has revealed commonalities and relationships between right-wing phenomena such as Trump's presidential win and Brexit (e.g., Federico & de Zavala, 2018; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017). In short, collective narcissism has been considered a vital component of right-populism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019) and in this way is conceptually related to RWPPN. Given that collective narcissism is known to contribute to overt expressions of aggression and is also associated with right-populism, we considered that collective narcissism may be amplified in the presence of RWPPN, potentially heightening aggressive tendencies toward outgroup members. The current research tested this potential interaction effect of RWPPN and collective narcissism.

1.3 Identity fusion

Identity fusion concerns the degree to which the individual experiences connectedness with their ingroup (Gómez et al., 2011). Individuals who are high in identity fusion perceive a strong sense of relational ties to their group as their personal and social identities become fused in a sense of “oneness” with the group (Gómez et al., 2011; Swann & Buhrmester, 2015). When relational ties develop among members of small groups with whom personal relationships exist (family), local fusion is said to occur. When relational ties occur among members of larger groups with whom no personal relationships exist (nation) extended fusion is said to occur (Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012).

Fused individuals are more prone to support extreme pro-group behavior such as fighting and killing for the group specifically when fusion occurs at the extended level (i.e., the nation) (Gómez et al., 2011; Swann, Gómez, Huici, Morales, & Hixon, 2010; Swann et al., 2012). Further, research has shown that highly fused people endorse extreme self-sacrifice, such as willingness to die for the group (Swann et al., 2014). When asked to indicate a preference for whom one is willing to die for, research has shown that people indicate smaller groups such as family over larger groups such as nation (Swann et al., 2012, 2014). Even so, willingness to die for the group is found for both forms of fusion (local and extended) (Swann et al., 2014).

By way of explaining why people would die for those with whom they have no familial ties, research has suggested that group members are more likely to project the familiar ties of local fusion onto the extended group when core characteristics of the group are made salient (Swann et al., 2014), hence resulting in extreme behaviors at the extended level of nation. Given this, we argue that national identity fusion would relate to national protection because the more a person is fused and has a sense of “oneness” with a specific national identification, the more they would want to protect such characteristics that are core to their own identity. Therefore, it is likely that RWPPN and identity fusion interact, with RWPPN amplifying the effects of identity fusion. Of particular concern is the possibility that people who are highly fused with the nation and high in RWPPN might show extreme protection of a narrowly defined ingroup and in turn negativity and aggressive tendencies toward the outgroup.

1.4 Threat

Perception of threat is a vital consideration for both political and social psychology in the understanding of war, the development of alliances and conflict resolution (see Stein, 2013 for a review). Notions of threat have significantly predicted preference for assimilation and resistance to multiculturalism (e.g., Callens, Meuleman, & Marie, 2019). Perceptions of nuclear threat (from a range of countries with nuclear weapons), international terrorism, and threat from Islamic fundamentalism have also been found to significantly explain the relationship between collective narcissism and support for military aggression (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). As mentioned earlier, discourse espoused by charismatic right-populist leaders instils a culture of fear whereby threats (real or imagined) are embedded in messages promoting an exclusionary and aggressive backlash to those painted as the threatening “other” (Gale, 2005; Wodak, 2015). Therefore, while perceived threat may originate from external sources (such as international terrorism), the fear that is generated is expressed within intergroup dynamics at the grassroots level resulting in ingroup favoritism and negative outgroup evaluation. In relation to RWPPN, preliminary evidence has found support for this; participants who strongly endorsed the need to protect the nation from those deemed as “the other” (e.g., ethnic minorities living in Australia) were found to have a strong sense of perceived international threat (Flannery et al., Under review). Therefore, we would expect that when international threat perceptions are activated along with RWPPN, the interaction of these two variables will result in heightened aggressive tendencies toward ethnic minorities.

1.5 Flag displays

National flags have long been a prominent feature of national symbolism and representation and as such are considered important in the construction of national identity (see Fozdar, Spittles, & Hartley, 2015 for a review). Research has shown that in times of perceived threat (such as 9/11) or when national identity is made salient (such as sporting events and national celebrations), national flag displays become omnipresent (Skitka, 2005).

Research has explored the impact that flag exposure may have on people and how this exposure can influence individual behavior and attitudes. For example, a brief exposure (nonconscious priming effect) to the American flag resulted in increased Republican tendencies and voting patterns among both Republican and Democratic American participants with effects lasting up to 8 months (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011). Further research has shown that flag-waving relates to increased nationalism, prejudice, intergroup hostility, and opposition to multiculturalism (Becker et al., 2017; Fozdar et al., 2015; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008). Contrary to such findings, flag associations have also been shown to reduce hostility toward outgroups among a nationalistic sample (Butz, Plant, & Doerr, 2007). In response to such inconsistencies, it has been proposed that outcomes of flag exposure may depend on the social context and concepts that people associate with the flag (Becker et al., 2017; Becker, Enders-Comberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012). For example, nationalism (measured as national pride) was shown to moderate the process whereby flag exposure lead to heightened prejudice in a German sample (where flags were associated with national socialism) compared to previous research with an American sample that found reduced prejudice (where flags were associated with egalitarian concepts) (see Becker et al., 2012).

As the outcomes of flag displays are contingent on various contextual constructs it appears that flags can represent different things for different people. However, the prevalence of national flags cannot be ignored in the context of right-populism and extreme right activism, where national flags are often displayed. National flags represent solidarity at times. However, they can also convey a message of exclusion toward people who fall outside narrow parameters of national belonging (Dunn, 2009).

Fozdar et al. (2015) provided a comprehensive overview and exploration regarding the rise of national flag displays within the Australian context, arguing that the popularity of this phenomenon has coincided with a growing trend toward conservative (right) nationalism. Further, they highlighted that Australians are showing increasingly overt national flag displays, especially when linked with national celebrations and sporting events. Specifically, flag displays have become highly prevalent on Australia Day (the nation's official national day), where it has become popular to display the Australian flag on cars, homes, everyday objects and on one's person (clothing items, temporary/permanent tattoos, face painting). While such flag display behavior appears reflective of the nationalistic sentiment and pride espoused on Australia Day, Fozdar et al.'s (2015) results demonstrated that Australia Day flag displays were associated with exclusionary nationalistic sentiment. Those who displayed the flag were more likely to feel negative toward perceived outgroup members (such as Muslims and asylum seekers), and more likely to feel that Australian culture and values were at risk compared to those not engaging in flag displays. Hence demonstrating that, in certain contexts (when national sentiment is salient), the Australian flag is associated with exclusion toward those deemed as “the other.” Similar to collective narcissism, collective fusion, and threat, the theoretic overlaps between RWPPN and the effects of flag displays lead us to expect that one could amplify the effects of the other. People who are high in RWPPN, and hence feel a strong drive to protect the perceived national culture, are likely to feel even more protective (and aggressive) when displaying the national flag.

1.6 The current research

We aimed to examine the role of RWPPN in aggression toward outgroup members which in the case of the current study was ethnic minorities living in Australia (the terms outgroup members, ethnic minorities, and ethnic minorities living in Australia will be used interchangeably). Based on previous research we hypothesized that nationally related constructs (collective narcissism, identify fusion, international threat, flag displays, and RWPPN) would independently account for a significant amount of variance in aggressive tendencies toward ethnic minorities, where higher levels of each predictor would relate to higher levels of aggressive tendencies (Hypothesis 1). Given the proposed theoretical interplay suggested between each predictor and RWPPN as outlined in the above sections, we hypothesized that RWPPN would moderate these relationships whereby the predictive ability of collective narcissism, identify fusion, international threat, and flag displays on aggressive tendencies would strengthen but only when RWPPN was high (Hypothesis 2). Given the rise of conservative populism across the globe and its potential to impact intergroup dynamics, the characteristics of RWPPN speak directly to this. Hence, we argue that by exploring the moderating effects of RWPPN on established relationships between national constructs and aggressive tendencies toward outgroups members, we may gain further insight to national intergroup dynamics and cohesion.

2.1 Participants

Four hundred and twenty-three Australian citizens were recruited by the Online Research Unit, a company that uses offline recruitment methods to build online panels. Previous research using an identical recruitment method yielded a sample where 84% of participants identified as Caucasian (Flannery et al., Under review). As the same recruitment method was used for the current study, a similar percentage of Caucasian participants was anticipated. We excluded participants who were under the age of 18 (n = 26), cases with missing data (n = 39), participants who completed the survey in under 5 minutes, which was deemed too short a time for participants to provide meaningful responses (n = 37), and cases with multivariate outliers (n = 5). Therefore, 316 cases were retained for the subsequent analysis, of whom 161 (50.9%) were male, 154 (48.7%) were female and one participant (.3%) identified as other. Their ages ranged between 18 and 84 (M = 45.46, SD = 15.97). Regarding education, 38.6% of participants had partially or fully completed tertiary education (Bachelor degree or higher), 29.2% had partially or fully completed vocational training or a diploma, 20.3% had completed secondary school, and 11.4% had not completed secondary school. Concerning political orientation, 37.7% of participants reported a central political orientation, 22.8% reported a left political orientation, 21.8% reported a right political orientation, and 17.7% reported disinterest in politics.

2.2 Procedure

The participants were invited to complete an online questionnaire of randomly ordered items, in return for incentives determined by the Online Research Unit.

2.3 Measures

4.1 Theoretical considerations

The results of the current study progress the preliminary work that has been conducted on RWPPN and the theoretical basis of RWPPN as a newly introduced social psychological construct. RWPPN has been shown to significantly predict aggressive tendencies toward ethnic minorities (Flannery & Watt, 2019; Flannery et al., Under review). The current results demonstrate that RWPPN also has moderating effects on relationships between established psychological constructs and aggressive tendencies. With the current rise in right-populism and its social consequences (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), as a derivative of right-populism, RWPPN offers a basis within the nationalism literature to further understand the mechanisms of right-populism and its consequences for ingroup outgroup relations. Specifically, the need to protect a national way of life may be an important feature not only in the current political landscape, but also in times of heightened threat (real or perceived).

4.2 Limitations and future research

The concept of RWPPN has been specifically linked with the rise of right-populist politics and rhetoric within Australia (Flannery & Watt, 2019) and the research on this topic has been conducted in Australia. However, the concerns that have been expressed by Australian politicians are not unique to Australia; countries across the world are grappling with issues of national identity that is perceived to be endangered by multiculturalism, immigration pressure, and accompanying conversations about border security and control. All of these are prominent topics in right-politics and right-rhetoric generally. As such, there is an urgent need to study RWPPN in other countries, and especially its contribution to tendencies toward aggression to ethnic minorities and other “outgroup” members when national outgroups are narrowly defined and individually constructed.

The existing research on this topic is correlational and needs to be further tested using experimental research that manipulates RWPPN to test its causal effects. It is also proposed that populism and right-rhetoric create the motivation to protect and preserve a narrowly defined national culture which we have defined as RWPPN. This theoretical basis was developed within sociology and is based on an analysis of media reports of political messaging (Gale, 2004). However, the effects of populism and right-rhetoric on levels of RWPPN have not yet been tested; more research on the connection between RWPPN and populism and right-rhetoric is an important direction for future research.

Additional research is required to address the unexpected results concerning the negative relationship between identity fusion and aggressive tendencies toward ethnic minorities when RWPPN is high. A possible limitation of the current research was that survey wording and phrasing may have had an influence on responses. Future research could control for this by ensuring that consistent terminology is used across measures during data collection. It is intriguing that different terms for country and nation could have implications for inclusion or exclusion of different groups, particularly in the Australian context. This warrants further investigation, especially for the applied potential of such terms in interventions to increase social inclusion, social marketing, and persuasive messages. Secondly, as identity fusion is known to be related to constructs such as personal values, emotions, and self-efficacy, such personal traits may have confounded the results of the current research. Future research could include such variables to further explore the interplay between RWPPN and identity fusion within the context of intergroup dynamics.

Participants in the current research were not asked to disclose their ethnic background. Because Australia is multicultural, ethnic background was considered to be a likely contributor to variability in RWPPN scores. However, we collected information about ethnic background in research that used an identical method of recruitment and resulted in a sample that was 84% Caucasian (Flannery et al., Under review). This figure matches the Australian Census data (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016), and we expect that the current sample had a similar composition. Nonetheless, it is a limitation of the current research that the ethnic composition of the sample was not measured. Lastly, a limitation may lie with the measure of flag displays within a population. Future research could seek alternative measures for flag displays. One direction would be that flag displays in the everyday offer a banality which has been argued to give rise to nationalistic sentiment and shaping of national identity that is easily overlooked but is nonetheless influential (Billig, 1995).