Volume 78, Issue 5 pp. 2725-2778
ARTICLE

Contracting in Peer Networks

PETER M. DEMARZORON KANIEL

Corresponding Author

RON KANIEL

Peter DeMarzo is at Stanford University and NBER. Ron Kaniel is at the University of Rochester; FISF, Fudan; Reichman University; and CEPR. We are grateful to Shai Bernstein; Gian Luca Clementi; Florian Ederer; Willie Fuchs; Denis Gromb; Adriano Rampini; Jeff Zwiebel; and seminar and conference participants at Amherst, Baruch College, Boston University, Cheng Kong Graduate School of Business, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Drexel University, Emory, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Fudan, IDC Herzeliya, INSEAD, John Hopkins, London School of Economics, National University of Singapore, Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Rice, Rutgers, Singapore Management University, Stanford, Stockholm School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tulane, University of Chicago, University of Gothenburg, University of Hong Kong, University of Houston, University of Lugano, University of Melbourne, University of Minnesota, University of Rome, University of Texas at Dallas, University of Toronto, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Washington University in St. Louis, Annual Meeting of the Western Finance Association, Utah Winter Finance Conference, Finance Theory Group conference, Luxembourg Asset Management Summit, and the Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association for helpful comments. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement no. 312842. Under the American Finance Association disclosure guidelines, we both have nothing to disclose. An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title “Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping Up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts.”

Correspondence: Ron Kaniel, University of Rochester, Simon School of Business, 305 Schlegel Hall, Rochester, NY 14627; e-mail: [email protected].

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First published: 14 July 2023
Citations: 1

ABSTRACT

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.

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