Channeling Consumers to Preferred Providers and the Impact of Status Quo Bias: Does Type of Provider Matter?
Lieke H. H. M. Boonen
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Address correspondence to Lieke H. H. M. Boonen, Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected]. Bas Donkers and Frederik T. Schut are with the Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Search for more papers by this authorBas Donkers
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Search for more papers by this authorFrederik T. Schut
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Search for more papers by this authorLieke H. H. M. Boonen
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Address correspondence to Lieke H. H. M. Boonen, Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; e-mail: [email protected]. Bas Donkers and Frederik T. Schut are with the Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Search for more papers by this authorBas Donkers
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Search for more papers by this authorFrederik T. Schut
Institute of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Context. To effectively bargain about the price and quality of health services, health insurers need to successfully channel their enrollees. Little is known about consumer sensitivity to different channeling incentives. In particular, the impact of status quo bias, which is expected to differ between different provider types, can play a large role in insurers' channeling ability.
Objective. To examine consumer sensitivity to channeling strategies and to analyze the impact of status quo bias for different provider types.
Data Sources/Study Design. With a large-scale discrete choice experiment, we investigate the impact of channeling incentives on choices for pharmacies and general practitioners (GPs). Survey data were obtained among a representative Dutch household panel (n=2,500).
Principal Findings. Negative financial incentives have a two to three times larger impact on provider choice than positive ones. Positive financial incentives have a relatively small impact on GP choice, while the impact of qualitative incentives is relatively large. Status quo bias has a large impact on provider choice, which is more prominent in the case of GPs than in the case of pharmacies.
Conclusion. The large impact of the status quo bias makes channeling consumers away from their current providers a daunting task, particularly in the case of GPs.
Supporting Information
Appendix SA1: Author Matrix.
Appendix S1: Choice Scenarios between Pharmacies.
Appendix S2: Background Characteristics of the Respondents.
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article.
Filename | Description |
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HESR_1196_sm_appendix.doc111 KB | Supporting info item |
HESR_1196_sm_authormatrix.doc46 KB | Supporting info item |
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