Volume 60, Issue 239 pp. 343-354

THE MEREOLOGICAL CONSTANCY OF MASSES

Charlie Tanksley

Charlie Tanksley

University of Virginia

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First published: 02 March 2010
Citations: 1

Abstract

It is controversial whether masses (what mass nouns refer to) exist. But on the assumption that they do, here are two uncontroversial facts about them: first, they satisfy a fusion principle which takes any set of masses of kind K and yields a mass fusion of kind K; secondly, a mass must have all and only the same parts at every time at which it exists. These two theses are usually built into the concept ‘mass’. I argue that the latter follows from the former. This shows that the concept ‘mass’ is unified, not gerrymandered. Moreover, since my arguments show that any entity which follows a certain fusion principle is also mereologically constant, and since these two properties are sufficient for being a mass, my arguments make it easier to argue that there are masses.

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