How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?
We wish to thank Jeppe Christoffersen for valuable help in the process.
Abstract
This study seeks first to examine how firms implement impairment tests as required by IAS 36, and second, to explore factors which may explain why some firms are not entirely in compliance with IAS 36. It is based on a survey which includes 58 completed questionnaires representing 73% of the firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that recognize goodwill on the balance sheet. The findings imply a variety in the application of IAS 36. Based on our analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this simply indicates that firms adopt an approach suited to their organizational and economic structures, or if it reveals that firms are uncertain as how to apply the standard. Our analysis further indicates inconsistencies in the implementation of IAS 36. This includes both how firms define a CGU and how they estimate the recoverable amount. Further, multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected here are less likely in firms that systematize the procedures for impairment testing and use persons with considerable valuation experience. The findings should be of interest to a number of parties including firms, financial advisers, auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements.
In March 2004 the revised IAS 36 was approved by the IASB (2004a). According to it, firms must carry out an impairment test of goodwill on at least a yearly basis. If, as a result of this, the recoverable amount of goodwill is less than its carrying amount, the carrying amount shall be reduced to its recoverable amount (e.g., an impairment loss is recognized). IAS 36 defines the recoverable amount as the higher of an asset's ‘value in use’ and ‘fair value less costs to sell’. This is a radical change in accounting for goodwill. Previously, international accounting standards required recognition of goodwill subject to amortization over its useful lifetime.
We conduct a descriptive study which examines how Danish companies implement the revised IAS 36. We identify what firms do in cases where IAS 361 provides little or no specific guidance. The work focuses on two issues in IAS 36 that have received attention in the literature: (a) how firms define a cash-generating unit (CGU), and (b) how those firms measure the recoverable amount of a CGU. Technical aspects related to carrying out impairment tests of goodwill are examined: for instance, how firms calculate cost of capital and how terminal value is estimated in calculating the recoverable amount. However, we do not address if estimates seem fair.2
Based on the feedback from the survey, we further examine factors which may explain why some firms seem to be in better compliance with IAS 36 than other firms. This should provide useful help in how to improve compliance.
An empirical examination of how firms implement impairment tests of goodwill seems warranted. First, while prior research (see, e.g., Henning et al. 2000; Jennings et al. 2001; Bugeja and Gallery, 2006) examines the information content of goodwill and goodwill amortization (the correlation between accounting numbers for goodwill and market data [stock prices and stock returns]), we examine how firms implement impairment tests of goodwill. Anderson (2004) argues that the new and revised standards on business combinations and intangible assets have been well documented but there has been little discussion of how these requirements will be followed in practice.
Second, IAS 36 is a standard that involves substantial judgment. An example is the identification of a cash generating unit (IAS 36, 68). Further, while value in use is one of the measurement concepts in IAS 36, the standard is silent on how various value drivers should be estimated. For example, IAS 36 does not provide guidance about how terminal value should be measured. In addition, IAS 36 deviates from traditional valuation practice on certain issues. A prime example is para. 55 that requires discount rates to be pre-tax rates.3 In fact, this policy was questioned by those who responded to the exposure draft on IAS 36 (BC91). Petersen et al. (2006) provide evidence that discount rates in practice are estimated on an after-tax basis. This approach is also supported by a number of popular valuation textbooks such as Koller et al. (2005) and Damodaran (2002).
Finally, IAS 36 is a complicated standard which requires specific knowledge of valuation techniques. Producers of accounting information (firms) and their financial advisers must possess the necessary technical skills (e.g., be able to apply valuation models) and economic expertise (e.g., be able to make reasonable budget assumptions) to carry out impairment tests. These skills are needed, as auditors of a firm may not assist in such valuation work under strict ethical and independence rules (Anderson, 2004).
Many argue that an impairment test only approach seems a logical step in the development of accounting for goodwill. First, the underlying logic for removing the traditional amortization methodology is that the amortization on a straight-line basis over a number of years contains no information value for those using financial statement (Jennings et al., 2001). Moreover, IFRS 3 (IASB, 2004b) no longer requires that companies perform the almost impossible task of estimating the useful life of goodwill (Jansson et al., 2004). Second, the impairment approach should provide users of financial statements with better information, as goodwill is not automatically amortized (Colquitt and Wilson, 2002; Bens and Heltzer, 2005). Finally, goodwill impairment tests would be operational and capture a decline in the value of goodwill (Donnelly and Keys, 2002).
On the other hand, the new approach in accounting for goodwill may be questioned on several grounds. First, while amortizing of goodwill is considered to be arbitrary, it is easy to apply in comparison with the impairment approach. The major benefit of amortization, on a straight line basis, is that it is possible to predict its impacts on earnings with greater accuracy (Stevenson and McPhee, 2005). This is in line with Lachnit and Müller (2003), who argue that to achieve comparability among firms, adjustments for different accounting practices are necessary. Among the different kinds of treatment of goodwill, they regard amortization over a predetermined time horizon as the most useful practice. Only by amortizing on a systematic basis is it possible to determine ‘normalized’ or ‘permanent’ income as a measure of earnings power. Second, conducting a detailed test for impairment on every asset and associated goodwill from initial acquisition at the end of each reporting period may be time consuming and costly (McGreachin, 1997; Rockness et al., 2001). Third, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) in their comments to IFRS 3 expresses ‘major concerns’ over IFRS 3. EFRAG argues that the standard would introduce unreliable measurements of the recoverable amount of goodwill.
In light of the above, it is relevant to examine how Danish firms implement impairment tests of goodwill. To do so, questionnaires were sent to all Danish listed companies that recognize goodwill.4 Thereby, we obtain a unique dataset that provides in-depth information concerning how impairment tests of goodwill are carried out. The results indicate that practice varies considerably among firms. Further, some firms do not define a CGU and hence do not comply with IAS 36. We also find inconsistencies in the way firms estimate recoverable amounts. Areas of concern include calculating the pre-tax discount rate, adjusting for risk and estimating the cash flow in the terminal period. Finally, our multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected in our study are less likely to occur in firms that systematize their impairment testing procedures and involve persons with considerable valuation experience.
Since international accounting standards are mandatory for all listed firms in the EU and have been adopted by listed firms in several countries—for example, Australia and New Zealand5 adopted the international accounting standards on 1 January 2005 and 1 July 2007, respectively—our results should be of interest to firms, auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements outside a Danish setting.6 Among other things, our findings can be used to improve current practice, especially in areas where firms seem to have difficulties in carrying out impairment tests in compliance with IAS 36.
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL UNDER IFRS 3 AND IAS 36
IFRS 3, 36 requires that acquired assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities are recognized at fair value in the annual accounts of the acquiring firm and if they comply with recognition criteria, regardless of whether they have been recognized previously. It requires that, to the extent the purchase price exceeds the total fair value of the identifiable net assets, the difference is recognized as goodwill. It does not permit amortization of goodwill, but requires goodwill to be tested for impairment as set forth in IAS 36.
IAS 36 demands that each separate asset is tested for impairment, if there are any indications of impairment. Assets with an indeterminable lifetime, which are not amortized, must be tested for impairment at least on a yearly basis. Goodwill cannot be tested separately, as it represents resources that cannot be identified or quantified reliably. Goodwill is therefore allocated to the individual CGU or group of CGUs that benefit from the acquired goodwill (IAS 36, 80). If the recoverable amount of the CGU, to which goodwill is allocated, is lower than the carrying value of that CGU, the difference is recognized as an impairment loss in the income statement. If this difference is greater than the carrying amount of goodwill, the total goodwill amount is written off, while the remaining difference is allocated to (subtracted from) the remaining assets on a pro rata basis (IAS 36).7
The recoverable amount for an asset, CGU or group of CGUs is the higher of its fair value less costs to sell and its value in use. Applying value in use of a CGU is problematic, as it requires forecasting of future earnings and estimating an appropriate discount factor. Discounted cash flow calculations have previously been applied to financial assets and liabilities, where the expected future cash flows to a much larger extent are a good proxy for the future realized cash flows than will be the case for discounted cash flow calculations used to test for impairment.
RESEARCH DESIGN
A survey-based analysis is adopted to examine how Danish firms apply IAS 36 in practice. Given the descriptive nature of our study, surveys seem superior to other research methods (Yin, 1994). Surveys complement other research methods based on either large samples or case studies. As pointed out by Graham and Harvey (2001), large studies are the most common type of empirical analysis offering statistical power and cross-sectional variation. On the other hand, large sample studies have the weakness related to variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions. Case studies offer details and unique information regarding corporate behaviour; however such samples are small and results are often sample-specific. Surveys as adopted here offer a balance between large sample studies and case studies. We obtain a larger sample than in case studies, improving the validity. Further, we are able to ask detailed questions which improve the quality of the data. However, surveys (questionnaires) are not without potential problems. There are risks that the respondents are not representative of the population and that the questions are misunderstood. Each of these issues is addressed below.
Based on a careful review of IAS 36 and related literature, we developed a draft questionnaire that focuses on (a) identifying a CGU and (b) measuring its recoverable amount. The draft pilot questionnaire was circulated to auditors from leading auditing firms and CFOs employed at large Danish firms. The revised questionnaire incorporated their suggestions including a (few) new questions as well as a refinement of some of the existing questions. Further, we sought advice from colleagues who specialize in surveys and received valuable feedback on design issues and ideas as how to increase the response rate. As a final test the questionnaire was mailed to four firms, which led to additional modifications of the questionnaire.
Based on the feedback from the firms, five areas with apparent non-compliance with IAS 36 (labelled ‘inconsistencies’) were identified. In order to further explore those inconsistencies, we identified seven firm characteristics which may explain non-compliance. Multiple regression analyses were run to examine which of the seven factors explain non-compliance.
SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
To identify firms that carry goodwill on the balance sheet, data were collected from Account Data, a large database that records accounting data from Danish listed firms. Eighty out of 165 firms that were listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange as of 1 March 2006 recognized goodwill as an asset.8
Each of those 80 firms was contacted by phone in order to identify the person in charge of impairment testing.9 These personal contacts served two purposes. We wanted to make sure that the questionnaire was mailed to the right person (i.e., the person deeply involved in impairment testing), and that the personal contacts would enable us to make follow-up phone calls either to remind respondents to fill in the questionnaire or for clarification purposes. Four of the 80 firms did not wish to participate in the survey. An internet-based questionnaire was submitted to the remaining 76 firms. The link was forwarded directly to the person in charge of impairment tests. The respondents also received a letter outlining the purpose of the survey. After approximately three (six) weeks a reminder (second reminder) was e-mailed to the persons who had not yet filled in the questionnaire. Finally, after another couple of weeks, we called the firms that had still not completed the questionnaire and encouraged them to do so.
Eventually, 58 firms responded to each question in the questionnaire. An additional four firms submitted usable feedback that was sufficient to be included in the analysis, although a few questions were left unanswered, leaving a final sample of 62 observations. Launsø and Rieper (2000) argue that feedback from at least 70% is sufficient to provide a picture of the population. Our questionnaire was filled in by 72.5%, while additionally 5% of the respondents provided feedback on the major part of the questionnaire.10 A feedback rate of over 70% is quite unusual for questionnaires. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) dispatched 4,440 questionnaires, of which just 392 were returned, an 8.8% response rate. Mukherjee et al. (2004) examined merger motives and obtained 75 usable responses: 11.8% of the 636 delivered responses.
In order to check the validity of the data (completed questionnaire) we received, respondents were contacted, and asked to elaborate on their data and provide any further information they might have. This additional check confirmed the general results as reported in the following sections.
Descriptive Statistics
More than two-thirds of the firms have a turnover of DKK 0–5 billion and total assets amounting to DKK 0–10 billion. The largest firms have a turnover in excess of DKK 45 billion and assets of more than DKK 90 billion. Goodwill is a significant item ranging from DKK 1 million to DKK 28.5 billion. On average, goodwill amounts to 6% of total assets. In one case, goodwill totalled approximately one-third of total assets. On average (median) firms report DKK 1,280 (88) million in goodwill. This indicates that a few firms recognize considerable goodwill amounts. Most firms make on average 0–4 firm acquisitions per year (not reported).11
Table 2 Panel A uncovers that impairment tests typically are carried out by one or more persons from headquarters. This is the case in 47 of the firms. For fourteen firms impairment tests are carried out in a team involving the centralized and decentralized level.12 None of the participating firms carry out impairment tests exclusively on a decentralized level. This indicates that utilizing an impairment test is a complicated exercise, which requires special knowhow. These competences are often found at the centralized level (headquarters) only. Table 2 Panels B and C illustrate that it is mostly persons within the firm that carry out impairment tests, while twelve firms receive external assistance by an auditing firm.13 In 52 of the participating firms, the persons who are involved in impairment tests are partly or often engaged in other valuation tasks (Table 2 Panel D). In six firms the person(s) who is involved in impairment tests is not active in other valuation tasks. As there is a considerable overlap in the competences that are required to carry out impairment tests and other valuation tasks (typically acquisitions of firms), it would seem more appropriate to involve the same resource person(s). This is also confirmed in subsequent tests.
Panel A: How are impairment tests carried out? | N |
---|---|
By a central or central placed person | 47 |
In a cooperation between decentralized and centralized levels | 14 |
Outsourced to decentralized levels | 0 |
Don't know / does not wish to answer | 1 |
Total | 62 |
Panel B Who carries out impairment tests at the group level? | N |
---|---|
One internal expert | 12 |
A team of internal experts | 36 |
External expert(s) | 0 |
Internal and external experts | 12 |
Don't know / does not wish to answer | 0 |
Total | 60 |
Panel C: Which of the following terms best describes the external experts? | N |
---|---|
Audit firm | 12 |
Corporate finance firm | 0 |
Consulting firm | 0 |
Don't know / does not wish to answer | 0 |
Other (please specify in the textbox below) | 0 |
Total | 12 |
Panel D: On a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 =‘Not at all’ and 5 =‘To a very large extent’), to what extent are people who carry out impairment tests involved in other valuation jobs? | N |
---|---|
Don't know / does not wish to answer | 3 |
1 | 1 |
2 | 5 |
3 | 13 |
4 | 19 |
5 | 20 |
Total | 61 |
CASH GENERATING UNITS
Defining a CGU
A CGU (cash generating unit) is the smallest group of identifiable assets that generates cash flows independent of cash flows from other assets or group of assets (IAS 36, 6). Ernst & Young (2006) note that determining CGUs is not easy in practice. Also, IAS 36, 68 concedes that determining a CGU involves judgments. IAS 36, 80b states that a unit or group of units shall not be larger than an operating segment determined in accordance with IFRS 8 (operating segments). Despite this IAS 36 provides limited guidance on how to define a CGU. Deciding what constitutes a CGU, however, has an impact on the need to recognize impairment losses. Evidently the need to write-off depends upon the number of CGUs.14 Based on empirical research of the largest firms in Europe, Ernst & Young (2006, 35) conclude that in practice a firm recognizes one CGU for each of its segments, even though firms do not specifically disclose this fact.
The results in Table 3 illustrate, however, that only approximately 25% of the firms use a segment to represent a CGU. The main number of firms (36) has more CGUs than segments as defined in IFRS 8. Five firms operate with fewer CGUs than segments, which is not in compliance with IAS 36, 80b. The number of CGUs varies considerably across firms (not reported). There is on average (median) 16 (5) CGUs per firm. A few firms have one CGU per firm only, while one firm operates with around 200 CGUs.
Which of the following statements describes the relation between the number of CGUs and the number of segments (in accordance with IFRS 8)? | N |
---|---|
No. of CGUs = no. of segments | 15 |
No. of CGUs < no. of segments | 5 |
No. of CGUs > no. of segments | 36 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 6 |
Total | 62 |
In conclusion, at least five firms do not comply with IAS 36. Further statistics (not reported) expose a great variety in the way CGUs are determined, which may impact the need for recognizing impairment. From a user perspective this is not appropriate, as it complicates comparison of accounting data and financial ratios across firms.
Allocation of Goodwill
To carry out impairment tests on the CGU-level, in accordance with IAS 36, 80, purchased goodwill must be allocated to the respective CGUs that are assumed to benefit from synergies from the acquisitions.15
Table 4 Panel A shows to which level goodwill is allocated. Thirty-three of the participating firms allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level. Twenty firms do not allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level. In their verbal comments firms which do not allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level argue that they wish to make impairment tests operational.
Panel A: Do you allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level? | N |
---|---|
Yes | 33 |
No | 20 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 9 |
Total | 62 |
Panel B: Are impairment tests carried out at the group level so that the book value of all the groups' assets is compared with the recoverable amount for the entire group (covers the 20 respondents who answered ‘No’ in Panel A)? | N |
---|---|
Yes | 7 |
No | 11 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 2 |
Total | 20 |
If firms do not allocate goodwill, IAS 36 requires that an impairment test on the group level must be carried out. Table 4 Panel B reveals, however, that only seven out of twenty firms carry out impairment tests on the group level. The result that eleven firms apparently do not carry out an impairment test—even at the group level—is puzzling. A possible explanation might be that goodwill is immaterial. However, our data do not support that this is the case. The level of goodwill deflated by total assets for the eleven firms corresponds to the level of goodwill for the remaining sample. An alternative explanation might be that the respondents do not distinguish between a full-dress impairment test and the more ‘casual’ one as described in IAS 36, 99.16
Technically, eleven firms apply IAS 36 incorrectly (non-compliance). Forty firms do it correctly.
Allocation of Corporate Assets
Corporate assets (for example, a headquarters a common research centre and common support facilities) may be problematic in relation to impairment tests of goodwill. IAS 36, 102 states that corporate assets must be allocated to individual CGUs. In the event that this is not possible, impairment tests should be carried out at a higher level (group of CGUs), to which it is possible to allocate corporate assets. As it might be difficult to allocate corporate assets to a CGU or group of CGUs in ‘a reasonable and consistent way’ (IAS 36, 102), it is likely that many firms choose not to do so.
Table 5 Panel A confirms this prediction. Thirty-three firms do not allocate corporate assets to a lower level than group level, while only seventeen firms do so. The 33 firms that do not allocate corporate assets to a lower level than group level should carry out impairment tests on the group level (cf. IAS 36, 102iii). The results (Table 5 Panel B), however, indicate that only 10 of the 33 firms carry out impairment tests on the group level. As a consequence firms may not recognize impairment losses to the extent that they should. In their verbal comments respondents state that firms which do not allocate goodwill to a lower level than the group level do so to make impairment tests operational. Nonetheless, twenty firms are not in compliance with IAS 36.
Panel A: Are corporate assets and expenses allocated to a lower level than the group level? | N |
---|---|
Yes | 17 |
No | 33 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 12 |
Total | 62 |
Panel B: Are impairment tests carried out on the group level, at which the carrying value of all the groups assets are compared to the recoverable amount for the entire group? | N |
---|---|
Yes | 10 |
No | 20 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 3 |
Total | 33 |
METHODS FOR ESTIMATING THE RECOVERABLE AMOUNT
Choice of Valuation Approach
A central element in an impairment test is estimating the recoverable amount. The assets' carrying value is compared with the recoverable amount and an impairment loss is recognized, if the recoverable amount is the lowest one. In accordance with IAS 36, 18, the recoverable amount is the higher of its fair value less costs to sell and its value in use.
Table 6 Panel A exposes that it is primarily value in use that is applied in determining the recoverable amount. Only five firms use fair value less costs to sell. Sixteen firms use this method in combination with value in use. Other firms (41) apply the value in use method exclusively. A possible explanation for the limited use of fair value (less costs to sell) is that the method necessitates that the market value of the CGU is known. It requires, in reality, that the CGU is a listed firm or (reliable) indicators of the market value are available—for example, because an offer has been made.
Panel A: Which methods are used to estimate the recoverable amount for a CGU or group of CGUs? | No. |
---|---|
Fair value less costs to sell | 5 |
Value in use | 41 |
Both methods | 16 |
Total | 62 |
Panel B: Which of the following methods are used to estimate value in use in relation to impairment tests (more than one answer permitted)? | No. |
---|---|
DCF-model (discounted cash flow model) | 56 |
EVA-model (economic value added model) | 2 |
Multiples | 9 |
Other (please specify in the textbox below) | 1 |
Total | 68 |
No. of respondents | 57 |
Methods to Calculate Value in Use
In estimating the value in use IAS 36, 30 suggests applying the discounted cash flow model (DCF). Out of the 57 firms that apply the value in use method to determine the recoverable amount, 56 firms apply the DCF model (Table 6 Panel B). In addition, the EVA model (2) and multiples (9) are applied. These methods are often used as a ‘sanity check’.17 The one firm applying another method (‘other’), seems to use a variant of the DCF model. Of the nine firms that use multiples, P/E (3) and EV/EBIT (3)18 are the most popular ones (not reported). As the P/E multiple estimates market value of a CGUs equity, it is only meaningful to use this multiple on financial firms. However, only one of the three firms that use P/E multiples is a financial firm (i.e., a bank).
Pre-Tax or After-Tax Discount Rates and Cash Flows
IAS 36, 50, 51 and 55 specify that pre-tax cash flows must be discounted with a pre-tax discount factor. However, IAS 36, BC94 acknowledges that, conceptually, discounting post-tax cash flows at a post-tax discount rate or discounting pre-tax cash flows at a pre-tax discount rate should give the same results. Even though the estimated value should be insensitive to the choice of discounting pre-tax cash flows with a pre-tax discount rate or after-tax cash flows with an after-tax discount rate, most academic books (e.g., Koller et al., 2005) estimate value in use on the basis of after-tax cash flows, discounted with an after-tax discount rate. An after- tax calculation takes into consideration that firms pay tax on earnings from operations. In return, firms benefit by tax savings due to interest expenses on its debt.
IAS 36 is not explicit in its guidance as how to calculate (estimate) a pre-tax discount factor. Nonetheless, in reality the standard implicitly requires an iterative approach. Clarification concerning a pre-tax discount factor can be found in IAS 36, BC85.19 After the conclusions in BC85, an example illustrates that a pre-tax discount rate can be calculated by an iterative process, so that discounting either pre-tax cash flows with a pre-tax discount rate or after-tax cash flows with an after-tax discount factor yields identical results. In other words, it requires that value in use is estimated by applying an after-tax approach, followed by iteration process to find a pre-tax discount factor that yields exactly the same value as the after-tax approach.
An iterative process can only be avoided under the strict assumption that future cash flows are infinite and constant. In this special case the pre-tax discount rate is calculated as the after-tax discount rate divided by the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate (1 – corporate tax rate). Thus, it is not possible to calculate a discount factor that can be applied to different projects, as the iterated discount factor depends upon the distribution of the individual project's cash flows (see below and Appendix for further comments on this subject).
Table 7 shows that approximately half of the respondents (26) choose to estimate value in use based on pre-tax cash flows discounted by pre-tax discount rates. The other respondents measure value in use based on an after-tax calculation. As mentioned above, a pre-tax valuation of a project with finite expected cash flows only provides correct value in use estimates if a value in use calculations is applied, where the pre-tax discount rate is found by the iteration procedure (where the estimated value equals the value that is estimated using the after-tax approach). The same applies for projects with infinite expected cash flows that are assumed to grow. In Table 8 the respondents were asked how to transform an after-tax discount rate to a pre-tax discount rate.
Which of the following two methods do you apply for discounting cash flows? | N |
---|---|
Discounting of pre-tax cash flows with pre-tax discount factor | 26 |
Discounting of after-tax cash flows with an after-tax discount factor | 23 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 5 |
Total | 54 |
How is the after-tax discount rate transformed to a pre-tax discount rate? | Panel A: How is the pre-tax discount rate estimated for projects with a finite lifetime? | Panel B: How is the pre-tax discount rate estimated for projects with an infinite lifetime? |
---|---|---|
After-tax required return / (1 - corporate tax rate) | 4 | 2 |
Other adjustment of after-tax required rate of return | 1 | 1 |
By iteration | 0 | 0 |
Investors required rate of return * equity/(equity + interest borrowing debt) + interest rate * interest borrowing debt/ (equity + interest borrowing debt) | 8 | 11 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 10 | 9 |
Other (please specify in the text box below) | 3 | 3 |
Total | 26 | 26 |
Table 8 Panels A and B expose that none of the respondents use the iteration method to determine the pre-tax discount rate. Panel A shows that four respondents divide the after-tax discount rate with the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate. As a result the valuation is biased, as evidenced in the Appendix, which also highlights that the shorter the expected lifetime of the project, the more biased the value estimate. Based on the example, the percentage difference from the theoretically correct value estimate increases from approximately 9% to almost 29% if the lifetime of the project is changed from, for example, twenty years to five years. This type of error thus has a significant impact on the value estimate.
Table 8 Panel B reveals that two respondents divide the after-tax discount rate with the reciprocal value of the corporate tax rate. This is only correct under the assumption that cash flows from a CGU are infinite and constant. But as the questionnaire does not reveal whether the cash flows that are discounted are constant, this makes it impossible to determine if the two respondents make unbiased estimates of the discount rate and, hereby, the value estimate.
Eight (11) respondents use a discount factor that disregards tax benefits associated with interest bearing debt in their WACC-calculation used for valuing projects with a finite (infinite) lifetime. However, this is not the correct way to calculate the pre-tax discount rate. This can best be shown by looking at firms that are 100% equity financed. For those firms, equity holders' required rate of return is equal to the firm's WACC. Furthermore, the before- and after-tax discount rates (WACC) are identical, as the firms do not have any tax savings from loan capital. In this scenario, expected earnings pre-tax and after tax will be discounted by the same (required) rate of return, which is incorrect. As a consequence the estimated values based on pre-tax cash flows are biased upwards as the pre-tax discount rate is too low.
The three respondents who ticked ‘other’ reply that they either use a pre-tax discount rate estimated by an ‘external investment bank’ or that their firm does not have ‘a fixed practice for estimating the pre-tax discount factor’. While the latter response is basically uninformative, it indicates that the firm may not be fully aware of the issues in calculating the pre-tax discount rate. Unfortunately, the respondents do not explain how they estimate a pre-tax discount factor.
In summary, seventeen firms provide the wrong answer to the question—only one firm may have provided the correct answer. Overall, the feedback indicates that at least seventeen firms are not in compliance with IAS 36.
Risk
In accordance with IAS 36, 55 and 56 and appendix A15, risk specific to the asset must be accounted for by either adjusting the cash flow or the discount rate. This is in line with recommendations in prevalent corporate finance literature (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2003), who name the two methods ‘the certainty equivalent’ and the ‘risk-adjusted discount rate’. Theoretically, the two methods yield identical results and choosing between them shouldn't matter. Previous studies have shown that practitioners almost exclusively use the risk-adjusted discount rate method (Petersen et al., 2006). It is also the method that is best described in the popular valuation literature (e.g., Koller et al., 2005; Damodaran, 2002). In addition beta values, which are used to estimate the risk adjusted discount rate, are reported in financial databases like Bloomberg. Beta (β) is measured as

where Cov, rass, rm and Var represent covariance, return on assets, market return and variance, respectively. The certainty equivalent method estimates the cash flow that makes an investor indifferent between a certain cash flow and an uncertain cash flow at a given point of time. The certainty equivalent method requires that the cash flows are adjusted for risk. This adjustment can be shown as CE(CF) = (Expected cash flow – b[um-rf]). um is the expected rate of return on the market portfolio and b is measured as

In the following we examine how firms adjust for risk.
Eight respondents adjust for risk in the cash flows and 31 respondents adjust for risk in the discount rate (Table 9). IAS 36, 55–56 speaks of ‘adjustments to the cash flows’ without specifying how these adjustments should be made. Since the standard is silent as how to risk adjust cash flows, we want to examine current practice. The results are reported in Table 10.
Where do you adjust for the risk, when you apply the DCF-model? | N |
---|---|
The cash flows (nominator) | 8 |
Discount rate (denominator) | 31 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 16 |
Total | 55 |
How do you adjust cash flows for risk, when you apply the DCF-model? | N |
---|---|
By making a conservative estimate of the free cash flows | 4 |
By weighting the likelihood of possible future cash flows | 1 |
They expected free cash flows are reduced by multiplying them with a factor calculated via the risk adjusted required rate of return (the factor can for explicit budget years be estimated as follows:((1+rf)/(1+r))n) | 0 |
They expected free cash flows reduced with a fixed percentage | 1 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 2 |
Other (please specify in the textbox below) | 0 |
Total | 8 |
Four respondents adjust for risk by measuring cash flows conservatively. While this procedure adjusts for risk, it will be unbiased only by chance. Furthermore, in practice it is unclear what ‘measuring conservatively’ means. What some might perceive as conservative, others might perceive as the most likely outcome. One respondent adjusts for the risk by probability weighting future cash flows. This corresponds to what IAS 36, appendix A defines as expected cash flow. This method simply weights the different likely outcomes (cash flows) and adds them. The method is proposed as an alternative to estimation of the expected cash flows rather than the most likely cash flow. A probability weighting of the different cash flows, therefore, is not the correct way to adjust for risk. One respondent reduces the expected cash flows with a fixed percentage. There is no way to tell how this percentage has been calculated, but if the same fixed percentage is used across business units that carry different risks, the adjustment for the risk is not correct. Two respondents do not inform how they adjust for risk in the cash flows. At least six firms do not properly adjust for risk.
IAS 36, 56 requires that the discount rate reflects the risk of the assets; that is, the risk of each CGU. If the discount rate is adjusted for risk, cash flows should be discounted with the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or a variant thereof (e.g., implicit discount factor for comparable firms) that reflects the risk of each CGU.20
As reported in Table 11 approximately half (13) of those who adjust for risk in the denominator use WACC, which is correct if the WACC reflects the risk to the specific CGU. Of the fifteen respondents who use WACC, twelve use different WACCs across CGUs (not reported). They argue that this is due to the fact that business activities carry different risks, for example, due to CGUs that are situated in different parts of the world (country risk) and differences in the financial leverage in the individual CGUs. Two respondents, who argue that risk is adjusted in the discount factor, use the risk free interest rate. Clearly, the risk free rate does not take risk into account. Of seven respondents that use the equity holders' required rate of return, three are financial institutions. The remaining four use interest bearing debt as well as equity in their capital structure and should use WACC or a variant hereof as the discount rate. The two respondents who respond ‘other’ use a ‘combination of WACC and average rate of return on excess cash’ and an ‘estimated discount factor’. It is difficult to evaluate an ‘estimated discount factor’, while a ‘combination of WACC and average rate of return on excess cash’ is incorrect (one respondent).
Your responses to the previous questions have shown that in applying the DCF model you discount after-tax cash flows with an after-tax discount rate. Which of the following after-tax discount rates do you apply? | N |
---|---|
Implicit discount factor for comparable firms | 0 |
WACC | 13 |
The risk free rate | 2 |
The average borrowing rate | 0 |
The marginal borrowing rate | 0 |
Equity holders required rate of return | 6 |
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 1 |
Other (please specify in the textbox below) | 2 |
Total | 24 |
In conclusion, of the 27 who relate how they adjust for risk, at least six (seven) firms adjust for risk in the cash flow (choice of discount rate) in a way not supported by theory, and are thus considered not to be in compliance with IAS 36. Considering how well this area is portrayed in the finance literature, these results are surprising.
The Length of the Budget Period and Determining Terminal Value
IAS 36, 33 states that ‘projections based on these budgets/forecasts shall cover a maximum period of five years, unless a longer period can be justified’. The intention is to limit the number of explicit budget years, prior to the terminal period.
Most respondents use the same budget period for all CGUs, while the budget period generally varies from five to ten years (not reported). Decisive factors for choosing the length of the budget period included the ability to create abnormal profit and the life cycle of the CGUs. Thus, the choice of the explicit budget period seems to be well founded and in accordance with IAS 36.
IAS 36 does not provide any guidance as to which method(s) to use in estimating the terminal value. Table 12 shows that 28 respondents apply Gordon's growth model; while three respondents use the value driver formula (i.e., 31 respondents assume growth in the terminal period). Six respondents assume that growth does not create value in the terminal period and thus use the convergence model. These results match those reported in Petersen et al. (2006). They find that professional investors and financial advisers generally assume growth in estimating terminal value. Two respondents use multiples to estimate terminal value. While this is not ruled out in IAS 36, it is a violation of the DCF model. As presumably 70% or more of the estimated value can be attributed to the terminal value, most of the value estimate is captured by the multiple. It is therefore an open question if the respondents who use multiples in essence apply a DCF model.
Which of following statements are in accordance with your calculations of value in the terminal period? | How many years into the terminal period do you budget explicitly? | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | 1 | 2 or more | Don't know / do not wish to answer | Total | |
Free cash flows in terminal period grow with a constant growth rate every year = FCF/(WACC-g), (Gordon's growth model) | 11 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 28 |
Growth in the terminal period does not create value / free cash flows in the terminal period does not grow = NOPAT/WACC (convergence model) | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6 | |
Return on invested capital is different from cost of capital in the terminal period = (NOPAT*(1-g/ROIC ))/(WACC-g) (value driver formula) | 1 | 2 | 3 | ||
We use multiples | 1 | 1 | 2 | ||
Other (please specify below) | 1 | 1 | |||
Don't know / do not wish to answer | 2 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 12 |
Total | 19 | 12 | 17 | 4 | 52 |
A prerequisite for a proper application of estimating terminal value is that the estimated expected start-of-terminal-period cash flow is indicative of the future cash flow generation. Therefore a firm must have reached the so-called ‘steady state’, where all parameters that decide future cash flows (turnover, expenses, invested capital, etc.) have reached the same level of growth. The only way to assure this is to budget the free cash flow, based on the income statement and balance sheet (at least) one year into the terminal period (Lundholm and O'Keefe, 2001).
If the convergence model is applied, it is assumed that depreciations (and amortizations) match reinvestments, which is why net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) is used as an estimate for the free cash flow. In such cases it is typically not necessary to forecast into the terminal period. NOPAT for the last explicit budget year is representative for future earnings (cash flows). Only in the special case, where depreciation is a poor estimate for reinvestments, is it necessary to forecast explicitly into the terminal period or make adjustments to depreciation. It is typically the case, if significant investments have been made prior to the last budget year. In summary, firms should forecast one to two years into the terminal period if they use Gordon's growth model.
In Table 12 the choice of terminal value model is paired with number of years forecast into the terminal period. This pairing is made to highlight whether respondents who apply Gordon's growth model make explicit forecasts into the terminal period. As seen in the table, 11 out of 28 respondents do not explicitly forecast into the terminal period. The consequence is that the free cash flow that terminal value estimation is based on is most likely biased. It may at the same time have a significant effect on the value estimate. It is difficult to give an unequivocal answer on how the remaining firms make explicit forecasts, but generally the judgment is that the free cash flow/NOPAT that are used as a basis for the respective terminal value models are estimated correctly.
In total, at least 11 firms (13 firms if the use of multiples are accounted for) make errors in calculating terminal value; these 11 (13) firms are considered to be in non-compliance (inconsistent) with IAS 36 and valuation theory.
WHAT EXPLAINS INCONSISTENCIES IN IMPAIRMENT TESTS?
The descriptive analysis reveals that some of the methods used when defining a CGU are not in compliance with IAS 36. We also find inconsistencies in the way that firms estimate the recoverable amount. These findings naturally beg the question of what explains these inconsistencies. We therefore examine firm characteristics that may account for these discrepancies. Such an analysis may help firms to improve their impairment testing, assist auditors to focus on areas that need more attention and enable standard setters to consider how to improve the standard.
Based on previous research and certain relevant firm characteristics, a number of factors are identified which we believe explain inconsistencies in carrying out impairment tests in practice. Below, we list five factors which could affect how impairment tests are applied:21
- 1
Firm size. Generally it may be expected that larger firms will have more opportunities to acquire competences within special disciplines, including firm valuation. This is supported by Bens and Heltzer (2005). Thus, larger firms are expected to commit fewer inconsistencies in the application of impairment tests than smaller firms. The log of turnover is used as a proxy for size.
- 2
Magnitude of goodwill. Firms with insignificant goodwill, measured as goodwill in percent of total assets, may not offer as much attention to impairment tests, as the effect on earnings on possible impairment losses may be negligible.
- 3
Common model. Petersen and Plenborg (2009) examine how financial analysts implement valuation models in spreadsheets. Based on their findings, they recommend that the same valuation model is used across financial analysts in order to reduce the number of errors in firm valuation. Likewise, it may be expected that applying the same model (spreadsheet) across CGUs will reduce the level of impairment tests' inconsistencies, as resources are released to produce an error-free model.
- 4
Other experience with valuation. Persons with considerable experience in valuation of firms are expected to commit fewer inconsistencies than persons with limited knowledge about the subject. The respondents were asked to indicate their experience with valuation of firms on a scale from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates substantial experience.
- 5
Manual. Firms that systematize their impairment testing procedures are anticipated to commit fewer inconsistencies. ‘Preparation of a manual’ is used as a proxy for how systematic firms are applying impairment tests. Thus, firms that prepare a manual for impairment testing (coded 1) are presumed to have fewer inconsistencies than firms that do not (coded 0).
A multiple regression analysis is applied to test to what extent the total number of inconsistencies (that firms commit) might be explained by the five firm characteristics just described. This leaves the following model:

For all five firm characteristics the coefficient (β1–β5) is expected to be negative. ‘Inconsistencies’, which is our response variable in equation (1), is measured as the number of inconsistencies divided by total responses (maximum five responses).22 If for example one out of four responses from a firm is categorized as an inconsistency that firm receives a score of 1/4.
Our analysis of impairment practice among Danish firms reveals five areas of inconsistency:
- •
Number of CGUs is less than number of segments;
- •
Lack of impairment tests on the group level in cases where goodwill and corporate assets are not allocated to a lower level than the group level;
- •
Incorrect calculation of the pre-tax discount rate;
- •
Incorrect incorporation of systematic risk in cash flows or discount rate; and
- •
Terminal value calculation errors.
In Table 13 we summarize these inconsistencies.
Inconsistency | No. of firms in compliance | No. of firms with inconsistencies | No. of observations |
---|---|---|---|
Definition of a CGU | 42 | 3 | 45 |
Allocation of goodwill and corporate assets | 28 | 20 | 48 |
Pre-tax discount rate | 1 | 14 | 15 |
Discount factor | 15 | 12 | 27 |
Terminal value | 29 | 10 | 39 |
Inconsistencies (total)a | 10 | 39 | 49 |
- a ‘Inconsistencies’ is calculated as the number of inconsistencies divided by the total number of responses. For each area of inconsistency we report the number of firms that are (not) in compliance with IAS 36.
It is important to stress that the reported statistics in Table 13 are affected by missing observations of the explanatory variables (firm characteristics). This implies that fewer inconsistencies are included in the analysis than are found in the descriptive study. For example, seventeen firms do not estimate the pre-tax discount rate according to theory (and IAS 36), but due to missing observations of certain explanatory variables only fourteen of those firms are included. While some of the inconsistencies only contain a limited number of observations or have a limited variability, Table 13 also shows that our response variable in equation (1), inconsistencies, contains 49 firm observations. Eighty per cent (39 firms) of these firms commit at least one inconsistency.
Table 14 provides descriptive statistics on inconsistencies and the firm characteristics (explanatory variables).
Min. | 25% | Mean | Median | 75% | Max | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inconsistencies (total)a | 0.00g | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.75 |
Sizeb | 1.96 | 2.72 | 3.44 | 3.53 | 4.14 | 4.66 |
Magnitude of goodwillc | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.31 |
Common modeld | 0.00 | 1.00 | 0.78 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Other experience with valuatione | 2.00 | 3.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 5.00 | 5.00 |
Manualf | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.53 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
- a Inconsistencies is calculated as the number of inconsistencies divided by the total number of responses.
- b Size is measured as the log of turnover.
- c Magnitude of goodwill is measured as goodwill divided by total assets.
- d Common model is coded 1 if the same capitalization model is used across CGUs in a group and 0 if this is not the case.
- e Other experiences with valuation is measured on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates no or severely limited involvement in other valuation tasks.
- f Manual is coded 1 in case a manual is made and 0 otherwise.
- g The number of observations equals 49.
The descriptive statistics show that 50% (median) of the sample firms obtain an inconsistency score of 0.5. This indicates that half the responses for those firms are not in compliance with IAS 36. As is apparent in Table 1, size is not normally distributed. We therefore use the natural logarithm of turnover. The descriptive statistics on size reported in Table 14 show that the transformed size variable is normally distributed. On average, goodwill makes up 6% of total assets. In the most extreme case goodwill makes up 31% of total assets. Thus, for most firms the magnitude of goodwill seems modest. This supports the view that these firms may not offer as much attention to impairment tests, as the effect on earnings on possible impairment losses may be negligible. Most firms apply the same valuation (impairment) model across CGUs. Approximately 50% of the persons involved with impairment testing have substantial experience with valuing firms in general. Finally, a manual for impairment testing has been developed by 50% of firms.
Answers | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Turnover (billion DKK) | 0–5 | 5–10 | 10–15 | 15–20 | 20–25 | 25–30 | 30–35 | 35–40 | 40–45 | >45 | 62 |
69% | 15% | 6% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 0% | 2% | ||
Assets (billion DKK) | 0–10 | 10–20 | 20–30 | 30–40 | 40–50 | 50–60 | 60–70 | 70–80 | 80–90 | >90 | 62 |
76% | 8% | 0% | 2% | 8% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 5% | ||
Goodwill (billion DKK) | 0–0.2 | 0.2–0.4 | 0.4–0.6 | 0.6–0.8 | 0.8–1.0 | 1.0–1.2 | 1.2–1.4 | 1.4–1.6 | 1.6–1.8 | >1.8 | 62 |
74% | 6% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 0% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 8% | ||
Goodwill/total assets | 0–1% | 1%–2% | 2%–3% | 3%–4% | 4%–5% | 5%–6% | 6%–7% | 7%–8% | 8%–9% | >9% | 62 |
21 | 9 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 13 | ||
No. of subsidiaries | 0–10 | 11–20 | 21–30 | 31–40 | 41–50 | 51–60 | 61–70 | 71–80 | 81–90 | >91 | 62 |
42% | 16% | 10% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 2% | 8% |
In Table 15 we report preliminary evidence on equation (1).
Sizeb | Magnitude of goodwillc | Common modeld | Other experience with valuatione | Manualf | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inconsistenciesa | −0.18g | −0.12 | −0.06 | −0.38 | −0.38 |
(0.01) h | (0.01) | ||||
Size | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.32 | |
(0.03) | |||||
Magnitude of goodwill | 0.19 | −0.11 | 0.28 | ||
(0.05) | |||||
Common model | 0.20 | 0.38 | |||
(0.01) | |||||
Other experience with valuation | 0.04 |
- a Inconsistencies is calculated as the number of inconsistencies divided by the total number of responses.
- b Size is measured as the log of turnover.
- c Magnitude of goodwill is measured as goodwill divided by total assets.
- d Common model is coded 1 if the same capitalization model is used across CGUs in a group and 0 if this is not the case.
- e Other experiences with valuation is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates no or severely limited involvement in other valuation tasks.
- f Manual is coded 1 in case a manual is made and 0 otherwise.
- g The number of observations equals 49.
- h Spearman correlation coefficients marked in bold denote significance levels on the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Only p-values for significant observations are shown.
As expected, inconsistencies are negatively correlated with all five firm characteristics. In fact the correlations between inconsistencies and ‘other experience with valuation’ and ‘manual’ are negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, ‘other experience with valuation’ of firms has a positive effect on the number of correctly implemented impairment tests. Furthermore, firms which use manuals for impairment testing purposes experience fewer inconsistencies than firms which refrain from making manuals.
There is a tendency that large firms make an impairment test manual (significant at the 3% level). This is also evident for firms where the magnitude of goodwill is substantial (significant at the 5% level). Firms which use the same valuation model across CGUs also produce manuals more frequently (significant at the 1% level). These results indicate that large firms, firms with a substantial amount of goodwill and firms that use the same valuation model across CGUs are more systematic in carrying out impairment tests. The correlation matrix reported in Table 15 suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in the subsequent multiple regression analysis.23
Table 16 reports the results from the multiple regression analysis. In line with the correlation coefficients reported in Table 15, the coefficients on ‘manual’ and ‘other experience with valuation’ are negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, after controlling for the other variables both ‘manual’ and ‘other experience with valuation’ remain significant. None of the other firm characteristics explains variations in inconsistencies.
Model: Inconsistencies =α+β1size + GW/asset +β3 Common model+β4 Other experience with valuation +β5 Manual +ε | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Interception | Size b | GW/Assetc | Common modeld | Other experience with valuatione | Manualf | R 2 | F-statistics | No. of observations | |
Model | 0.72 | 0.002 | −0.27 | 0.09 | −0.09 | −0.18 | 24.0% | 4.0 | 49 |
(0.01) g | (0.97) | (0.48) | (0.19) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) |
- a Inconsistencies is calculated as the number of inconsistencies divided by the total number of responses.
- b Size is measured as the log of turnover.
- c GW/asset is measured as goodwill divided by total assets.
- d Common model is coded 1 if the same capitalization model is used across CGUs in a group and 0 if this is not the case.
- e Other experiences with valuation is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates no or severely limited involvement in other valuation tasks.
- f Manual is coded 1 in case a manual is made and 0 otherwise.
- g The figure in parenthesis shows if the coefficient is significant (1% or 5% significance level). Significant t-values are marked in bold.
In order to examine the robustness of the reported results, additional tests are conducted. First, we replace (log) revenue with (log) total assets as a proxy for size. The reported results remain robust if this alternative measure of size is applied. Also examined is the sensitivity of the coding of our response variable (inconsistencies). For example, one may argue that firms which use multiples when estimating the terminal value violate the internal coherence of the discounted cash flow model. Using these alternative specifications for inconsistencies (not reported) did not affect the reported results.
Various test diagnostics (not reported) further reveal that the standard assumptions in linear regression analysis are not violated. As mentioned above, multicollinearity is not an issue. Likewise, diagrams for the standardized residuals support the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed. These further analyses support the conclusions in our research.
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
We examine how firms define a CGU and how those firms measure the recoverable amount of a CGU adopting a survey approach. A risk inherent in surveys is that the respondents are not representative of the population and that the questions may be misunderstood. We put considerable effort into reducing those risks. As a result we obtained a high response rate (more than 70%) and received feedback from respondents who are deeply involved in carrying out impairment tests. Our survey generally supports the proposition that a common practice has not yet been established. Based on our analysis it is difficult to say whether this simply reflects that firms adopt an approach suited to their organizational and economic structures or that firms are uncertain as to how to apply the standard. We also find that some firms do not define a CGU in compliance with IAS 36. Twenty firms do not include corporate assets in a CGU for impairment testing purposes, which is a violation of IAS 36, 102. Further, we find inconsistencies in the way that firms estimate the recoverable amount. None of the firms used the iteration method to transform an after-tax discount rate to a pre-tax discount rate. Firms also experience difficulties in risk adjusting cash flows and discount rates. The estimation of the free cash flow in the terminal period is another area of concern.
A multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected in our study are less likely when the impairment tests are carried out by persons with considerable valuation experience and when manuals are prepared. This indicates that firms which systematize their impairment testing encounter fewer inconsistencies.
Since IAS 36 was adopted in March 2004 the survey responses are obtained from respondents that (in many cases) have limited experience with impairment tests of goodwill. It may therefore be premature to draw any strong conclusions based on our results. However, firms can use our findings to improve the way that they carry out impairment tests. Auditors can use our results to focus on areas that deserve further attention. Finally, standard setters are better able to evaluate the current standard and consider how improve it. For example, a follow through example that clearly explains how the value of a CGU is estimated based on a pre-tax/after-tax basis and how to adjust for risk in the cash flow and discount rate, respectively, would be useful.
This study permits the following extensions. Research could be extended to other accounting items with a similar complexity. Provisions, stock options and financial instruments are some of the accounting items which deserve to be further researched. It also seems appropriate to examine how users of financial statements read, interpret and use accounting information, including challenging accounting items such as write-offs of goodwill. This is also supported by the fact that new and more complex accounting standards are emerging. A recent research project in Norway (Kinserdal, 2006) documented that financial analysts do not believe that pension liabilities in Norwegian firms are valued differently (based on different assumptions). Such results may question, whether financial analysts use all value-relevant accounting information in valuation of firms.
Appendices
APPENDIX
The following examples show the consequences of calculating the pre-tax discount rate as the after-tax discount rate / (1 – the corporate tax rate) inconsistent with the recommended iteration method in IAS 36.
In the first example infinite lifetime is assumed, while the second example assumes finite lifetime.
EXAMPLE 1: INFINITE LIFETIME
In the first example, the required rate of return after tax (WACC) is assumed to be 10%, growth in both the explicit budget and terminal period is 3%, and the corporate tax rate is 30%. Finally, it is assumed that the free cash flow (FCF) after tax is 10.00 in the first forecast year.
Example, indefinite lifetime | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
WACC (discount rate after tax) | 10.00% | ||||
Growth in budget period | 3.00% | Terminal period | |||
Growth i terminal period | 3.00% | ||||
Tax rate | 30.00% | ||||
Free cash flow before tax | 14.29 | 14.71 | 15.16 | 15.61 | 16.08 |
Tax | −4.29 | −4.41 | −4.55 | −4.68 | −4.82 |
Free cash flow after tax | 10.00 | 10.30 | 10.61 | 10.93 | 11.26 |
After-tax calculation | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
FCF | 10.00 | 10.30 | 10.61 | 10.93 | 11.26 |
Discount factor | 0.9091 | 0.8264 | 0.7513 | 0.6830 | |
PV FCF | 9.09 | 8.51 | 7.97 | 7.46 | |
Present value of FCF | 33.04 | ||||
Present value of FCF – terminal period | 109.82 | ||||
Estimated value | 142.86 |
Before-tax calculation [WACC/(1-tax rate)] | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Free cash flow before tax | 14.29 | 14.71 | 15.16 | 15.61 | 16.08 |
Discount factor | 14.29% | ||||
Discount factor, before tax | 0.8750 | 0.7656 | 0.6699 | 0.5862 | |
PV FCF | 12.50 | 11.27 | 10.15 | 9.15 | |
Present value of FCF | 43.07 | ||||
Present value of FCF – terminal period | 83.51 | ||||
Estimated value | 126.58 |
Iteration | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Free cash flow before tax | 14.29 | 14.71 | 15.16 | 15.61 | 16.08 |
Discount factor (unknown) | 13.00% | ||||
Discount factor, before tax | 0.8850 | 0.7831 | 0.6931 | 0.6133 | |
PV FCF | 12.64 | 11.52 | 10.50 | 9.57 | |
Present value of FCF | 44.24 | ||||
Present value of FCF – terminal period | 98.61 | ||||
Estimated value | 142.86 |
As growth is the same in the forecast period and the terminal period, is it not necessary to operate with two forecast periods. This assumption is kept, however, as in practice most operate with a budget period as well as a terminal period. In the example the budget period is four years. Under the specified budget assumptions the discount rate is 9.8% too high (14.29% against 13.00%). As a result the value is 11.4% too low (126.58 against 142.86).
In the next table the same budget assumptions are applied except for the growth rate. This is assumed to vary from 0% to 6% in all future periods (contrary to 3% in the example above).
Growth | 0% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 5% |
Wrong discount rate before tax | 14.28% | 14.28% | 14.28% | 14.28% | 14.28% | 14.28% |
Correct discount rate before tax | 14.28% | 13.86% | 13.42% | 13.00% | 12.57% | 12.14% |
Discount rate, percentage change | 0.0% | 3.0% | 6.4% | 9.8% | 13.6% | 17.6% |
Value correct discount rate | 100.00 | 111.11 | 125.00 | 142.86 | 166.67 | 200.00 |
Value wrong discount rate | 100 | 107.53 | 116.28 | 126.58 | 138.89 | 153.85 |
Value, percentage change | 0.0% | −3.2% | −7.0% | −11.4% | −16.7% | −23.1% |
As seen from the table, a pre-tax discount rate calculated as

is only correct, assuming no growth in all future periods (growth = 0%). Under other growth assumptions, the discount rate pre-tax and hereby the estimated net present value (recoverable amount) is biased. The higher the assumed future growth, the more biased the estimated net present value.
EXAMPLE 2: FINITE LIFETIME
In the following example finite lifetime is assumed for the project (five years and twenty years, respectively) which is valued. FCF in the first budget year is 100 and the after-tax discount rate is 10%. Further, growth in the lifetime of the project varies from –5% to 5% p.a. Under these assumptions it is evident that the shorter the lifetime of the project, the higher the impact from the pre-tax discount rate estimated as

Assuming zero growth in the FCF and a five-year project lifetime, the pre-tax discount rate is undervalued by 44.3% (14.29% against 25.66%). As a consequence the project is overvalued by 28.5% (487 against 379). The example further illustrates the effect of the error if the project's lifetime increases from five years to twenty years. It demonstrates that the shorter the lifetime of the project, the greater the effect of the miscalculated pre-tax discount factor on value in use. Growth has an effect on, as evident from the example, the bias introduced by applying a wrong pre-tax discount factor. This is hardly surprising, compared with the example with infinite lifetime.
Example, finite lifetime | ||||||
Free cash flow after tax, 1. budget year | 100 | |||||
Discount rate after tax | 10% | |||||
Example, finite lifetime | ||||||
Lifetime of the project, years | 5 | 20 | 5 | 20 | 5 | 20 |
Growth in FCF p.a. | 0% | 0% | 5% | 5% | −5% | −5% |
Wrong discount rate before tax | 14.29% | 14.29% | 14.29% | 14.29% | 14.29% | 14.29% |
Correct discount rate before tax | 25.66% | 15.90% | 25.06% | 14.82% | 26.32% | 17.30% |
Discount rate, change in percent | −44.3% | −10.1% | −43.0% | −3.6% | −45.7% | −17.4% |
Value, correct discount rate | 379.08 | 851.36 | 415.06 | 1211.2 | 346.36 | 631.14 |
Value, wrong discount rate | 487.09 | 930.79 | 531.36 | 1256 | 446.76 | 722.36 |
Value, change in percent | 28.5% | 9.3% | 28.0% | 3.7% | 29.0% | 14.5% |