The role of corporate social responsibility in creating a Seussian world of seafood sustainability

3.1 Certification

One of the most prominent tools employed by the seafood industry to demonstrate its commitment to sustainable sourcing is that of third-party certification (Ward & Phillips, 2008). Certification standards most relevant to the seafood industry include the Marine and the Aquaculture Stewardship Councils (MSC, ASC), Friend of the Sea, Global Aquaculture Alliance's Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) and Fair Trade USA (FT-USA). Seafood certifications, which usually go hand-in-hand with associated eco-labels, are voluntary (although sometimes coerced (Miller & Bush, 2014)) and convey an issue of resource sustainability, low environmental impact, and/or responsible fisheries or aquaculture production practices. Environmentally focused certification programmes for capture fisheries certify the fishery and this approach is mainly employed by companies that own, control or have significant influence overfishing activities such as fishermen, vessel owners, or even a buyer or group of buyers that buy all the product from the entire fishery (a “monopolistic” buyer). Despite the call for more socially responsible seafood (Kittinger et al., 2017), few fishery standards are available to certify good working conditions at the vessel or fishing company level except for the recently developed FT-USA fisheries standard (Asche et al., 2015; Bailey, Bush, Oosterveer, & Larastiti, 2016; Bailey & Egels-Zandén, 2016) and Seafish's Responsible Fishing Scheme (Seafish, 2015). In addition to environmental criteria, the FT-USA standard includes social and labour criteria that must be met to be awarded certification. Aquaculture standards more broadly cover social standards (M. F. Tlusty, Thompson, & Tausig, 2015) than do fishery standards, although only the BAP has been recognized by the Global Social Compliance program (https://bapcertification.org/blog/bap-completes-gscp/).

Concern has been raised that certification can only drive improvement so far because once a fishery or farm is certified, there is no impetus for further improvement, which therefore makes sustainability a static rather than dynamic goal (Bush, Toonen, Oosterveer, & Mol, 2013; Tlusty, 2012; Tlusty & Thorsen, 2016). The lack of improvement also occurs because of over-promising to deliver a sustainable product. When a company uses CSR to define their view of “sustainable,” upon achieving their goal of sourcing all product that meets their definition of sustainable, the 100% declaration is then made. This ceases further improvement because why (or how) do they improve when the product is sustainable? The mere transition to discussing “sustainability” instead of “sustainable” can promulgate continuous improvement (Tlusty & Thorsen, 2016; Tlusty et al., 2012).

A more egregious outcome is when a CSR commitment gives credit to less- and unsustainable products. Intuitively, the most important question to be asked about sustainable seafood certifications is: are the products they certify actually sustainable? With regard to fisheries and stock status, Gutiérrez et al. (2012) found that when looking at Principle 1 of the MSC standard (stock status and harvest levels), nearly 75% of certified fisheries were above biomass levels that would produce maximum sustainable yield (B_MSY) and over 80% had an exploitation rate that would maintain the stock at, or rebuild it to, B_MSY. Yet these results differ to those from a study published only three months earlier that looked at the same stocks, which found that only 44% of MSC stocks had a biomass level above B_MSY and only 52% had an exploitation rate that would maintain B_MSY or rebuild the stock (Froese & Proelss, 2012). This latter study also examined Friend of the Sea certified fisheries, with the result being worse, only about a third of certified stocks were “sustainable.” These two different studies are in one way evidence of two parallel realities unfolding in the realm of seafood sustainability: the Seussian world that MSC is living in, versus the grounded reality that scholars and practitioners are living in.

Just short of 15% of total fisheries and about 5% of total aquaculture production is certified by MSC or ASC (Bush, Belton et al., 2013; Marine Stewardship Council, 2016). The criticisms reviewed above, coupled with the small volume of certified seafood currently available, and the low certifiability of future fisheries and farms globally (i.e., how much production will ever be certifiable? See Bush, Belton et al. (2013)), certifications may always remain on the periphery and not be a scalable solution for seafood sustainability. In the end, certifications will continue to be important because they help define how seafood is caught or produced but do not guarantee the most sustainable seafood (Jonell, Phillips, Rönnbäck, & Troell, 2013). Despite this reality, an incredible amount of money, and business and scholarly attention (this paper included!) continue to be directed to certifications, leaving other important potential solutions to remain off the radar of those in the Seussian world.

3.2 Fishery improvement projects

Not all fisheries are able to attain eco-certification, either because they are unable to meet the data/demonstration requirements, or they are operated using unsustainable practices. Sustainable sourcing policies may therefore also include procuring products through FIPs, with the hope that this active engagement will improve environmental aspects of a fishery in order for it to eventually meet a standard of sustainability (usually the MSC standard). FIPs can lead to collaboration between a variety of private and public actors including fishermen, processors, buyers, retailers, government and NGOs. In the case of companies, there are several ways to support a FIP, for example, companies can lobby governments for better fisheries management, and may also take part in fulfilling public responsibilities such as port-side data collection; both of which are key issues in developing country fisheries (S Bush et al., 2017; Pauly & Zeller, 2016; Smith et al., 2010).

Fisheries improvement projects are one way to increase the pull towards a certification defined threshold, and in this way, may be an important component towards continual improvement in seafood (M. F. Tlusty, 2012). However, FIPs can also erode progress when, through their CSR mandates, businesses use them to meet a sustainable purchasing goal. Fisheries in FIPs are not managed to the same rigorous level as those that meet a voluntary sustainability standard. Thus, companies that source seafood within a “certification or FIP” to meet volume needs have lowered their sustainability bar.

Furthermore, the success and effectiveness of FIPs have been mixed and uneven with reports showing a large number of FIPs in the early phases of improvement (i.e. workplan design), without moving on to the implementation phase (Sampson et al., 2015). The effectiveness of FIPs is limited to the extent that it is a top-down approach to improvement (based on market demand), is still subject to weak transparency and verification, and often lacks “fair” cost-sharing structures as middle and upstream actors often bear most of the costs. The business case for these upstream actors has yet to be demonstrated. Despite these limitations, FIPs hold potential for using market forces to drive improvements through a collaborative approach, particularly in small-scale and developing world fisheries. Aquaculture improvement projects are nascent in their inception and are focusing on ensuring to minimize impacts over larger areas than just a farm. Because of their infancy, we forego any further discussion.

3.3 Traceability

Growing awareness of the negative impacts of seafood production around the world has led to an increase in regulatory and non-regulatory pressure on the industry to be more transparent about production practices and sustainability attributes of seafood products (Bush et al., 2017). This increased demand for transparency is a way for civil society and governments to hold companies accountable with regard to the sustainability and legality of their operations, which is key for accountability and legitimacy of private governance such as CSR (Cashore, 2002).

One way seafood companies have chosen to increase the transparency of their activities is through seafood traceability. Certain governments are tackling the current opaqueness in supply chains through data requirements for imported seafood products while some NGOs are running campaigns that aim to increase consumer demand for traceable seafood products (Bailey, Bush, Miller, & Kochen, 2016). Improving traceability in seafood supply chains is not without challenges as it requires intense sectoral and intra-sectoral collaboration across countries, cultures, and businesses. Moreover, there are currently no agreed upon guidelines or standards delineating what constitutes a minimum set of data elements to be reported and or acceptable verification systems that make up a credible traceability system. Consequently, companies tend to develop their own systems resulting in a myriad of traceability systems and databases that may not be compatible with each other. Additionally, the United States relies on company to company traceability, operationalized through their new Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), while the European Union relies on country to country traceability, operationalized through the EU IUU programme. This lack of coordination has limited implementation, interoperability and impact of seafood traceability (Hardt, Flett, & Howell, 2017).

To address some of these issues, WWF and the Global Food Traceability Center initiated a Global Dialogue on Seafood Traceability (GDST) that seeks to develop a global framework for seafood traceability useable by businesses around the world. Beyond technological roadblocks, traceability is also challenging due to the unequal distribution of costs and benefits associated with its implementation. The perception is that benefits tend to be higher for downstream companies in terms of increased legitimacy and reputation and costs carried by upstream actors (Bailey et al., 2017). Broadly speaking, traceability holds great potential for eliminating IUU fishing, combatting seafood fraud, and ensuring sustainability claims are verified but it is questionable whether consumers should be—and can be—the ones driving the demand for traceable and legal seafood products (Bailey & Egels-Zandén, 2016).

4.1 The problem with the business case

Given that CSR is based on voluntary activities that usually aim to meet a public and/or market demand for sustainability, the extent to which companies engage in CSR largely depends on whether there is a business case for CSR. But, even if consumers have the willingness to support companies engaging in CSR activities, not all have the financial capacity to do so, especially as products sold by responsible companies may be more expensive (Valor, 2008). Additionally, beyond a certain level of investments in CSR, the market may cease to reward it (Mintzberg, 1983). In other words, there is an optimal CSR investment (den Hond, 2006), and the business case for CSR may only occur for large companies with a high public profile, leaving behind small and medium-sized enterprises, which make up a large percentage of the business community (Williamson, Lynch-Wood, & Ramsay, 2006). Lastly, relying on the business case for sustainability means that the sustainable seafood movement “is constrained by the extent to which sustainability enhances profitability” (Konefal, 2013). The question whether there is a “market for virtue” has been extensively addressed by Vogel (2006) who expresses several reservations of how much voluntary corporate activities can actually achieve. Looking at seafood, some authors go as far as saying that current private initiatives have only created a market for sustainable fish rather than driving improvements for sustainable fisheries (Ponte, 2012). Now, this is not to say that CSR initiatives do not have value in raising awareness in the business community and amongst consumers, but requiring a business case to promote CSR as a good business strategy is inherently problematic. The fact that someone is apparently willing to pay more for a “sustainable” product (although what that means is itself a problematic question, as we explore below) is what has allowed the Seussian world to flourish. In being willing to pay for a sustainability attribute, we have fooled ourselves into believing we are delivering on sustainable seafood.

4.2 Accessibility limited where it matters most

Private sustainability initiatives probably have more room to make impact where state oversight is weak or partial, yet it is fisheries in these countries that remain largely unable to harness the potential impacts of CSR (Bailey, Miller, Bush, van Zwieten, & Wiryawan, 2016c; Bush et al., 2017). Additionally, much of the seafood production in the developing world comes from small-scale operations, which in some cases may be more ecologically sustainable than their industrial counterparts (Cao, Diana, Keoleian, & Lai, 2011; Jacquet & Pauly, 2008). But for fisheries, the MSC remains inaccessible to much of the world's developing country fisheries due to the expenses associated with the programme and the high data requirements for assessment (Bush, Belton et al., 2013; Jacquet et al., 2010). And traceability has been posited as a way for developed world markets to leverage more control over developing country producers, such that transparency through traceability will also disadvantage the developing world (Bailey, Bush, Miller, et al., 2016). As more than half of the internationally traded volume of fish exports by value originate in developing countries (FAO, 2016), it is imperative to gain an understanding on how to best utilize CSR tools to promote sustainability. As the developing world moves forward to secure market access and improve their fishing practices, answering the question of which types of standards or programmes are most appropriate for small-scale developing world fisheries is paramount (Borland & Bailey, In review).

Given the global nature of seafood supply chains, any market that creates too high a barrier to access (through price, or compliance with third-party certifications) will be out-competed by markets without these barriers. If the North American and European markets set their sustainability criteria at too rigorous a level, instead of being incentivized to engage in certifications or FIPs, developing world producers may turn to more accommodating markets (e.g. Asia) where fewer barriers exist. To truly engage the seafood industry in a move towards greater sustainability will take a global effort, and not the stewardship of a privileged few. Indeed, the Seussian worldview on seafood sustainability seems to be heavily subscribed to in developed world fisheries, where these tools are linked with sustainable seafood outcomes, and where the developing world experience, and the worldview contained therein, is ignored.

4.3 Clash of sustainability concepts

Beyond the logistical and economic challenges of assessments and market access, conflicting ideas of sustainability are also a barrier to large-scale improvements. Not only do sustainability definitions clash between NGOs and the industry, but even between NGOs engaged in the sustainable seafood movement (Roheim, 2008) and between different certification schemes (Jonell et al., 2013). Typically thought of as the purview of the ecologically-minded, CSR has demonstrated its lack broader reaching ecological analyses and energy footprinting (Ziegler et al., 2016). Now, CSR is now turning towards addressing growing concerns for the social aspects of seafood value chains are becoming increasingly topical (Bailey & Egels-Zandén, 2016). Standards are evolving to include such criteria as ensuring fundamental human rights, empowerment and community development, wages, working conditions and access to services. FT-USA developed a standard for capture fisheries that places additional emphasis on the social sustainability of the fishery, while the BAP standard was just recognized as GSCP compliant. Some groups confound social issues in the context of locality but there is a difference between social sustainability and local sustainability (McClenachan, Dissanayake, & Chen, 2016). While the former accounts for safe working conditions and fair pay of fishers (regardless of where the fish they catch is sold), the latter focuses on ensuring fish is sold close to where it is caught. Primary supporters for the latter suggest that reducing the length of the supply chain offers more money to the fisher, directly supports the local economy (where it is sold), and has a lower environmental impact as the cost of transport is removed (Fluech, 2011). However, audits on the cost of production and distribution suggest that products from afar may actually require less energy and thus have lower greenhouse gas emissions than local products (Tlusty & Lagueux, 2009). Therefore deciding between seafood products on the basis of “sustainability” is problematic, when sustainability can mean such different things to different people.

There is no guarantee that simply because a fishery addresses human rights issues or sells most of its catch close to where it is landed that it will also meet the requirements of ecological sustainability. The Japanese-based label PrideFish places a heavy emphasis on locality and encourages consumers to support national fisheries. To this end, the only requirement for products bearing this label is that they are from Japanese coastal waters and thus it has no bearing on what impacts those fisheries may have had on local stocks or habitats (Swartz, Schiller, Sumaila, & Ota, 2017). A similar situation exists in New England, with the Gulf of Maine Responsibly Harvested eco-label. Again, consumers are encouraged to support local fishers from an explicitly defined region off the east coast of the United States, but the programme's criteria surrounding stock health and effective management are ambiguous and no clear scoring or assessment process is explained (GMRI 2010). The ability to blindly select a few token sustainability dimensions and ignore the others is another example of living in a Seussian reality.

4.4 Creeping authority of the private sector

One of the arguments against relying too much on the CSR approach to sustainability is that, by being involved in defining responsibilities through guidelines and private standards, businesses are creating a business-friendly environment made up of soft rather than hard laws. This allows for the avoidance of creating regulations, leaving the implementation of sustainable development at the discretion of the private sector (Clapp, 2005; Konefal, 2013). This discretion has meant that a slow but unmistakable privatization has occurred by which public resources (or common pool resources), are appropriated to certain business actors, likely at the expense of others (Foley & McCay, 2014). Are businesses equipped to solve global social and environmental issues and is it wise to put these responsibilities in such powerful hands only? Certainly not. The state remains the key regulator for fisheries and needs to bridge the gap between a faceless regulator, and a consumer-facing entity. For example, the United States has been discussing a federal seafood certification based on principles of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (Stoll & Johnson, 2015). This certification would apply to US seafood generally because if managed in accordance with Magnuson-Stevens, the seafood should be sustainable. Iceland decided on a similar trajectory, ignoring the romanticization of MSC as a solution to their marketing problems, and instead focused on a national branding campaign (Kvalvik, Noestvold, & Young, 2014).

But it's not just about the state moving back to reclaim authority over business practices, rather, the extent to which private CSR initiatives are driving improvement in international seafood governance is understudied, and an exciting area for future research. States have a role in regulating and incentivizing CSR and are essential for facilitating certifications in many ways (Foley, 2013). Still, it seems that CSR, in its own right, is also incentivizing improvements in state behaviour. For example, in the case of the MSC certified Parties to the Narau Agreement (PNA) free-school skipjack fishery, eight Pacific Island countries have increased their bargaining power and are pushing for change at the international level (Yeeting, Bush, Ram-Bidesi, & Bailey, 2016). This movement away from a fully corporate-centred CSR approach has been deemed “political CSR,” whereby business-centric ethic is softened, and CSR moves into the public sphere to address social and environmental issues (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). State regulations tend to be less rigorous, as the goal is to have the state industry be as profitable as possible, and thus include as many participants as possible. Voluntary certifications operate across many nations, and thus can have greater rigor (Tlusty et al., 2015). Yet, being a business, they also need to certify products, and thus cannot be expected to be the bastion of sustainable production. This evolution is certainly a space to watch in the coming years.