Volume 65, Issue 2 pp. 1811-1836
RESEARCH ARTICLE

Judicial independence and earnings management

Ellen Jin Jiang

Ellen Jin Jiang

International Business School, Xi'an Jiaotong Liverpool University, Suzhou, China

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Xiao Jia

Corresponding Author

Xiao Jia

School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China

Correspondence

Xiao Jia, School of Economics, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China.

Email: [email protected]

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First published: 16 December 2024

Abstract

We investigate the crucial relationship between judicial independence and corporate earnings management, utilising China's staggered judicial delocalisation reform. We establish a causal and negative relationship between the judicial independence of local courts and corporate earnings management. Channel analyses demonstrate that judicial independence limits local government officials' capacity to interfere in corporate decisions and increases the ex post legal risks for information distortion. This effect is particularly pronounced among non-state-owned enterprises and in regions with stronger institutional frameworks. These findings highlight the indispensable role of judicial independence in fortifying the rule of law and reducing corporate information distortion.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Restrictions apply to the availability of these data, which were used under license for this study. Data are available at https://data.csmar.com with the permission of CSMAR.

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