Volume 63, Issue S1 pp. 975-1028
RESEARCH ARTICLE

CEO incentive compensation and stock price momentum

Jian Wang

Jian Wang

Department of Finance, School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China

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Yanhuang Huang

Yanhuang Huang

Department of Finance, School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China

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Hongrui Feng

Corresponding Author

Hongrui Feng

Department of Finance, Black School of Business, Penn State Behrend, Erie, Pennsylvania, USA

Correspondence

Hongrui Feng, Department of Finance, Black School of Business, Penn State Behrend, Erie, PA 16563, USA.

Email: [email protected]

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Xingjian Li

Xingjian Li

Department of Finance, School of Economics, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China

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Shu Yan

Shu Yan

Department of Finance, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA

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First published: 19 December 2022

Abstract

We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay-for-performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk-taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay-for-performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk-taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub-samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data available on request due to privacy/ethical restrictions. The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

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