2.1 National Assembly activities and citizen's welfare in Nigeria

The National Assembly appears to pursue its private interests than the interest of the people. The National Assembly has constitutional powers to appropriate to itself whatever amount it deemed fit for its constituency projects, salaries, services – current and capital expenditures, allowances and so on. However, the extent to which such powers have been adequately or arbitrarily utilized for the interest of the people remains highly debatable. Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Dimeji Bankole had on 19 February 2009 condemned and decried his colleagues for being ‘unserious’ with their legislative activities (Bankole, cited in The Nation, 2011, May 10, p. 18).

The National Assembly has 109 senators and 360 members of the House of Representatives which make up a total of 469 members. On the other hand, the 36 State Houses of Assembly in Nigeria have 990 members, thus, totaling the number of legislators in Nigeria at 1459. According to Aluko (2010), the actual capital expenditure on the National Assembly in 2008 was N15.6 million or N33.3 million per member. The total recurrent and capital expenditure per member in 2008 was thus N143.3 million. The actual recurrent expenditure of the 990 members in the 36 states Houses of Assembly in 2008 was N45.5 billion or N46 million per member. It rose to N52.5 billion in 2010 or N53 million per member (Aluko, 2010).

Former Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Lamido Sanusi revealed that the legislature appropriates about 25% of the Federal Government's overhead expenditure (Lamido Sanusi, cited in Vanguard 4 December 2010). The legislature in Nigeria lacked independence and therefore continues to play along the interest of the executive arm of government (Egwu, 2005). It is not surprising why the legislators do the biding of the executive branch as some of the lawmakers pursue contracts from the executive making some of them to compromise core legislative values and standards.

The high cost of running and maintaining Nigerian legislators affects the progress of Nigeria as a country. Despite Nigeria's enormous natural resources and wealth, the expenditures of the legislature have constituted a drainage pipe on Nigeria's income making the country one of the poorest and undeveloped countries in the world. Nigeria now has worse economic indices of human development in the world. For example, Nigeria scored a very low grade of 0.511 points and ranked 158th out of 182 countries in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2009) which placed Nigeria at the bottom line of human development, as it only managed to scale above Togo, Malawi and Niger. Nigeria legislature has therefore made less effort to advance democratic ideals in the country (Sowunmi, 2004).

Political systems are meant to provide public goods through good governance (Bratton & Lewis, 2007; Iwuoha, 2020; Kinder & Kiewet, 1981; Pennock, 1966; Rotberg, 2004). However, the National Assembly has over the years lost sight of its constitutional role of promoting quality laws that significantly address the issues of public goods and social welfare of the citizens (Ogundiya, 2010). Pennock (1966, pp. 414, 420) provides a description of what he meant by public goods or core political goods which includes: ‘security, justice, liberty and welfare’.

Ogundiya (2010) notes that the failure of the legislature to effectively discharge its constitutional mandate has denied the people the gains and dividends of democratic governance. The legislature in Nigeria generally seeks personal interest instead of pursuing legislation that will engender good governance and enhance equity in the distribution of national income. For example, the National Assembly earmarked for itself a whooping sum of 47.8 billion naira as emoluments in the 2009 budgetary allocation. The 360 members of the House of Representatives were to receive 26.67 billion naira while the 109 Senators were to get 16.3 billion naira. When provisions for legislative aides, the National Assembly Service Commission and the National Assembly Office are factored in, the total allocation to the federal legislature stood at 61.6 billion naira. The emoluments of the National Assembly members who constitute an insignificant fraction of the population in Nigeria amounted to about 2.9% of the total provision made for the recurrent expenditure of Federal Government. Hence, the National Assembly has not provided the expected selfless, purposeful and democratic legislative leadership.

2.2 Theoretical analysis on parliamentary democracy in Nigeria

The theory of post-colonial state is adopted to explain the nature of parliamentary democracy in Nigeria. Marxist post-colonial state analysis is established by Miliband (1967), Hamza Alavi (1972) and Ake (1985) among others. The concept of post-colonial state refers to the new nation-states that emerged out of the process of decolonization in the post-World War II period. Alavi (1972) argues that the post-colonial state was ‘over-developed’ due to its foreign creation. The emergent state subsequently became too powerful compared to the leading agrarian and industrial classes, which later became ‘underdeveloped’. The state thus had only limited autonomy as a result of the independent material base of the bureaucratic–military oligarchy, and its relative autonomy from the other propertied classes. Thus, the post-colonial state is fundamentally driven by the interests of the few governing elites expressed in complex economic relationships (Bayart, 1993).

The centrality of the theory is that the emergent post-colonial elites drenched themselves in primitive accumulation of wealth in which they entrenched separationist contradictions that continually adumbrate the reality of inclusiveness in the polity. The state is meant to be an objective force in a given polity, which stands above the society to wield a supreme power/authority over its subjects through governmental authorities and rules (Ake, 1985; Alavi, 1973).

However, the evolving character of the state became mutually consistent with the manner and level of development of the productive forces and social relations of production (Kumar, 2005; Saul, 1974). In this modality, the state assumed a class character of which serves the interest of the dominant class in society. As a result, the state became a specific modality or tool of class domination (Ake, 1985; Engels, 1978; Ibeanu, 1998). This development is reinforced by the primitive interests and activities of post-colonial elites who controlled the state in post-colonial societies. Ekekwe (1986, p. 12) remarks that, ‘in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of development of the productive forces make the state, through its several institutions and apparatuses, a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements’. Therefore, as observed by Miliband (1967), the state becomes the source of economic power as well as its instrument, through which the ruling class aims to achieve its private interests.

According to Hamza Alavi (1972), the colonial state was equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable them through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-colonial society inherited the overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.

Saul (1974) maintains that the postcolonial state pretentiously symbolizes the unity of the social formation, seeming to transcend any narrow class or sectional interest, but in doing so only tends to legitimize the status quo. This underpins the class orientation of emergent political leadership in Nigeria (Nweke, 1985), including the legislators who became errand boys or stooge to the presidency, as a means to assert and consolidate their economic, political and personal interests in forfeiture of true legislative independence.

The National Assembly therefore makes more of legislation that specifically advance or promote their private interests and the pecuniary interests of the presidency rather than pursuing legislation that critically addresses citizen's welfare. This explains why little or no efforts are made by the legislators in the National Assembly to rally together or galvanize public interests of their constituencies through constant meetings in order to push legislation that addresses their problems and welfare. The lawmakers rarely visit their constituencies except during the election periods. It is therefore instructive that the National Assembly has passed more of executive bills than bills originating from themselves and their constituencies.

2.3 Evaluation of National Assembly bills that relate to citizen's welfare in Nigeria

A critical examination of the trend of legislation and passage of bills in the National Assembly is instructive in understanding the level of responsiveness of the lawmakers especially in terms of promptness and dutifulness or diligence in passage of bills for the welfare of the people. Table 1 shows the category of bills received and considered in the Senate between June 1999 and June 2015; while Table 2 shows the number of bills passed by the Senate within the same period.

As indicated in the table, from June 1999 to June 2015, a total of 390 bills were passed by the Senate. Of the total bills received by the Senate, that is, 1788 only 458 bills representing about 25.6% of the total bills received originated from the executive; while 1330 representing about 74.4% of the total bills received originated from the lawmakers as member bills. However, a closer examination of the categories of bills passed shows that, of the total bills passed by the Senate, that is, 390 (i.e., 21.86% of the 1788 total bills introduced), as much as 173 executive bills were passed representing about 44.3% of the total bills passed, while only 217 member bills were passed representing about 55.7% of the total bills passed. In other words, the Senate members introduced as many as 74.4% of the total bills received by the Senate, and succeeded in passing only about 12.14% of the bills; while they received only 25.6% executive bills and passed up to 9.7% out of the number. This shows that even though the Senators introduced many bills in the floor of the upper chamber, they either discontinued/delayed or entirely abandoned their own initiated bills in preference for prompt passage of executive bills. Thus, the upper chamber devoted more of their legislative time doing the bidding of the ruling party which controls the majority of the members in the National Assembly. The implication of this development is that bills sponsored from the constituencies which generally are expected to galvanize and reflect the interests and welfare of the people are abandoned or shortchanged in favor of the interests of the executive whose bills are generally not people-oriented by way of origin, and particularly poised against people's interest. Some executive bills for instance, seek to remove fuel subsidy and increase fuel pump price, increase vat and tax, closure of the borders or ban of importation of pro-poor goods such as rice, ban of imported second hand clothing, and so on. In other words, the interest of the executive is placed quite above that of the interest of the people by the upper chamber as indicated by the categories of bills they have passed over the years.

Further, Table 2 shows the number of bills passed by the Senate within the same period. It should be noted that in each election preparation year, the Senate passed only a few number of bills showing that the lawmakers always lost focus and concentrated their time more on electioneering campaigns than attending to their constitutionally mandated legislative activities. They characteristically abandon much of their legislative activities during election period despite receiving huge emoluments all year round. The case of 2010 election preparatory year was so appalling that only 14 bills were passed ahead of the 2011 general election, whereas after the election, up to 35 bills were passed by the Senate. Likewise, in 2014 election preparatory year only about 18 bills were passed. Contrastingly, after the election in 2015, a total of 79 bills were successfully passed.

On the other hand, Tables 3 and 4 show the category of bills received and considered in the House of Representatives as well as the number of bills passed by the House of Representatives in the same period.

As indicated in Table 3, from June 1999 to June 2015, a total of 615 bills were passed by the House of Representatives. Of the total bills received by the House of Representatives, (i.e., 1963), only 513 bills representing about 22.15% of the total bills received originated from the executive; while 1450 representing about 73.9% of the total bills received originated from the lawmakers as member bills. However, a closer examination of the category of bills passed shows that of the total bills passed by the House of Representatives, that is, 615 (i.e., about 31.4% of the 1963 total bills introduced), as much as 247 executive bills were passed representing about 40.2% of the total bills passed, while only 368 member bills were passed representing about 59.9% of the total bills passed. In other words, members of the House of Representatives introduced as many as 73.9% of the total bills received by the House of Representatives within the period, and succeeded in passing only about 18.8% of the bills; while they received only 22.15% executive bills and passed up to 12.6% out of the number. This shows that even though the members of the House of Representatives introduced many bills in the floor of the lower chamber, they either discontinued/delayed or entirely abandoned their own initiated bills in preference for prompt passage of executive bills. Thus, the lower chamber devoted more of their legislative time doing the bidding of the ruling party which controls the majority of the members in the National Assembly.

Similarly, Table 4 shows the number of bills passed by the House of Representatives within the same period. Like the case in the Senate, in each election preparation year, the House of Representatives passed only a few numbers of bills showing that the lawmakers always lost focus and concentrated their time more on electioneering campaigns than attending to their constitutionally mandated legislative activities. They characteristically abandon much of their legislative activities during election period despite receiving huge emoluments all year round. The case of 2002 election preparatory year was so appalling that only 13 bills were passed ahead of the 2003 general election, while in 2003 after the election, as many as 74 bills were passed by the House of Representatives. In 2006 election preparatory year only about 40 bills were passed while the following year in 2007 after the election about 67 bills were passed. The scenario is not any different in the 2010 and 2011 where only 45 and 60 bills were passed during the election preparatory year and in the following year respectively. In 2014 election preparatory year only 30 bills were passed while after the election in the following year as many as 102 bills were passed by the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, only few bills which related to welfare of the people were passed by the National Assembly during this period. Incidentally only a fraction of the bills passed by the National Assembly were eventually signed by the President. The implication is that only a few bills passed by the National Assembly which related to issues that strictly addressed the welfare of the people including employment, social welfare, security, and so on. were actually assented to by the President during the period. Tables 5–8 present a cursory examination of the bills passed by the 8th National Assembly and assented to by the President in recent years especially indicating its relatedness or responsiveness to the social welfare of the people.

The data presented above show that only very few bills passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the President have direct positive impacts on the citizen's welfare. In the year 2015, none of the 27 bills passed and assented to by the President had direct effects on citizen's welfare; in 2016 only one out of 18 bills passed and assented to addressed citizen's welfare; in 2017 only six out of 18 bills passed and assented to related to citizen's welfare, while in 2018 only five out of 23 bills passed and assented to impacted on citizen's welfare.

A critical look at the trend of passage of bills by the National Assembly and assent to bills by the President shows that even though large numbers of bills are usually initiated by the lawmakers – most of which do not directly address citizen's welfare, only very few of the bills are eventually assented to by the President. Unfortunately, out of the very few bills which scaled through and received President's assent, only an insignificant number are directly related to citizen's welfare. Thus, the lawmakers neither maintain adequate communication with their constituencies as to initiate pro-people's bills in the National Assembly nor have the technical capacity to lobby the presidency in order to get the President assent to the very few pro-people's bills which manage to find their ways into the floor of the National Assembly. It is very obvious that most of the bills which address citizen's welfare that make it to the floor of the National Assembly are those pursued by the civil society groups. While some of the bills end up not being pursued or abandoned half-way in the legislative house, the very few which eventually scale through always suffer defeat of assent as a result of lack of capacity to lobby further at the presidency.

2.4 National assembly, democratic governance and citizen's welfare in Nigeria

The National Assembly has faced enormous challenge in promoting citizen's welfare through its legislation. Unfortunately, only a modicum of its legislation has truly addressed citizen's social welfare over the years since a two-decade of Nigeria's democratic experience. A close look at the key indices of social welfare in Nigeria indicates that the people have not fared well over these years despite the constitutional powers of the National Assembly and its members who are expected to transform the society and create adequate social welfare through legislation.

Rather than promote the interest of the people, the National Assembly members seek for their private interests. This is depicted in the way and manner in which the National Assembly members appropriate and allocate unimaginable emoluments and allowances to themselves despite the realities of Nigeria's excruciating economic downturn and woes. The revelation made by Senator Shehu Sani and Professor Itse Sagay about entitlements of the senators shocked many Nigerians. Senators receive monthly expenses of 13.5 million naira (£27,000; $37,500), in addition to their monthly salaries of about $2000. Despite Nigeria's position as one of the world's poorest nations, having over 50% of its citizens living in extreme poverty, and with only a meager per capita income of $2, 249 per annum as against $46, 350 of the US, the National Assembly members remain the highest paid in the world, with each earning more than President of the United States (Shehu Sani, and Itse Sagay, cited in Vanguard, 2018, 18 March). The table below compares the earnings of legislators and their minimum wages in six countries with that of Nigeria.

A comparative analysis of Nigerian lawmakers' earnings and those of other countries therefore shows that Nigerian lawmakers are earning much more than their counterparts in other countries regardless of the excruciating economic realities and poverty rate in the country. In contrast, minimum wage in Nigeria remains one of the lowest if compared with other countries, as depicted in the table. Moreover the comparison of legislators' earnings exposes the unimaginable gap existing between the legislators earning and that of other categories of public servants.

Many Nigerians have remained in abject poverty and without sustainable means of livelihood. The standard of living has deteriorated over the years without any hope of alleviating the plights of the masses by creating enabling social environment through qualitative legislation. For instance, unemployment rate (percent of total labor force) of Nigeria has increased from 10.57% of total labor force in 2012 to 22.56% of total labor force in 2018 growing at an average annual rate of 16.02%. Table 9 below illustrates the trend of unemployment in Nigeria, especially showing that more Nigerians are becoming less-empowered or disempowered by the day without any proactive legislative measures taken by the National Assembly to address the problem (Table 10).

The above is instructive and explains why many Nigerians have been thrown into extreme poverty. In fact, a trend analysis of poverty levels in Nigeria over the years is imperative as it provides adequate insight and understanding on the level of unemployment in Nigeria over the years. Many Nigerians now live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day. The outlook for poverty alleviation in Nigeria has remained bleak over the years with extreme poverty index in the country increasing by six people every minute. The 86.9 million Nigerians that now live in extreme poverty represent nearly 50% of its estimated 180 million population.

Importantly, the National Minimum wage remains a strategy for poverty reduction and improvement of workers' welfare. However, the National Assembly has made only insignificant strides in restructuring the minimum wage regime for the welfare of the citizenry especially the lower class in society. Despite the records of about eight Acts on wage fixing spanning across 15 Commissions from 1934 till date, Nigeria's current N30,000 minimum wage trail behind South Africa's N135,000 minimum wage comparatively. The minimum wage regime has been shrouded in conspiracy and controversy to the detriment of the workers – with the federal government paying its workers about N7500 while the state and private employers paid N5500 between 2000 and 2004. The National Assembly however made reluctant attempt to harmonize these discrepancies with the Minimum Wage Act of 2004; and later introduced Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act in 2011 to review the minimum wage upwards from N7500 to N18,000. It was however the intense pressure from the Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) that overwhelmed the executive arm to effect the 2019 adjustment of minimum wage from N18,000 to N30,000 after an overstretched long-lasted debate. Instead of making frantic efforts to improve on the current minimum wage bill to the expected N50,000 in view of the prevailing economic realities in the country, the National Assembly has been involved in a series of debates and deliberations on how to delist minimum wage from the exclusive list to concurrent list (Trotsky, 2014). Generally, as Neumark and Wascher (2004) contend, minimum wage increase in Nigeria rather appears to increase poverty instead of reducing poverty. The State Assemblies on the other hand have not only failed to compel their governments to fully implement the stipulated N30,000 minimum wage bill but have watched helplessly while their governments sacked thousands of workers under their employ as they claim they cannot offset their wage bill.

Again, the National Assembly has continued to assume a blank position regarding the issue of restructuring of the subversive federal system in Nigeria which is highly skewed in favor of the Federal Government which controls the lion share of the federation account. Nigeria's fiscal federalism is characteristically undercut by injurious imbalances and inequities to the detriment of both the States and the Local Governments which are closer to the people at the grassroots. Under Nigeria's revenue allocation formula, the Federal Government gets 52.68% of national revenue while 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) get only 26.72%, and the 774 Local Government share 20.60% (NEITI, 2019). A review of the current revenue allocation formula therefore becomes compelling especially to establish a fiscal federalism that underpins equitability in the distribution of resources in a multi-constituent federation like Nigeria in order to lift people at the grassroots out of poverty.