Volume 54, Issue 5 pp. 612-620
Regular Empirical Article

Do community and autonomy moral violations elicit different emotions?

Dolichan Kollareth

Corresponding Author

Dolichan Kollareth

Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

Correspondence should be addressed to Dolichan Kollareth, Department of Psychology, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA. (E-mail: [email protected]).Search for more papers by this author
Mariko Kikutani

Mariko Kikutani

Department of Social Psychology, Toyo University, Tokyo, Japan

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Mariko Shirai

Mariko Shirai

Department of Psychology, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

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James A. Russell

James A. Russell

Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

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First published: 11 June 2018
Citations: 4
All authors have made equal contribution.
We thank our collaborators in St. Xavier's College, Thumba, India, for their assistance in conducting the study.

Abstract

According to one important set of theories, different domains of immorality are linked to different discrete emotions—panculturally. Violations against the community elicit contempt, whereas violations against an individual elicit anger. To test this theory, American, Indian and Japanese participants (N = 480) indicated contempt and anger reactions (with verbal rating and face selection) to both the types of immorality. To remedy method problems in previous research, community and autonomy violations were created for the same story-frame, by varying the target to be either the community or an individual. Community and autonomy violations did not differ significantly in the emotion elicited: overall, both types of violations elicited more anger than contempt (and more negative emotion of any kind than positive emotion). By verbal rating, Americans and Indians reported more anger than contempt for both types of violation, whereas Japanese reported more contempt than anger for both types. By face selection, the three cultural groups selected anger more than contempt for both types of violation. The results speak against defining distinct domains of morality by their association with distinct emotions.

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