Volume 30, Issue 2 pp. 1689-1706
RESEARCH ARTICLE

How underinvestment reduces underpricing

Marco Bade

Corresponding Author

Marco Bade

ICN Business School, Université de Lorraine, CEREFIGE, Berlin, Germany

Correspondence

Marco Bade, ICN Business School, Université de Lorraine, CEREFIGE, Quartier 207, Friedrichstraße 76-78, 10117, Berlin, Germany.

Email: [email protected]

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Hans Hirth

Hans Hirth

Chair of Finance and Investment, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

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First published: 29 April 2024

Abstract

We develop an economic model demonstrating that firms can benefit from committing to underinvestment. The model considers a firm's IPO, secondary-market trading and subsequent investment decision. We analyse the conditions under which underinvestment can paradoxically be advantageous despite reducing the fundamental value of the firm. The benefit of committing to underinvest post-IPO is expressed in reduced underpricing and thus a higher valuation during the IPO. We furthermore show that the firm may commit to an inefficient investment policy by appointing a manager with biased expectations or risk aversion. Our findings imply that, under certain conditions, firms are better off relying on biased managers when their initial outlook is poor, but risk-averse managers when their initial outlook is good.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

The full text of this article hosted at iucr.org is unavailable due to technical difficulties.