A family of concepts labeled “mimesis” is fundamental to aesthetics, both ancient and modern. Philosophers have put mimesis to a variety of uses. Plato faults certain poets for their use of mimesis in one passage, while blaming all poets for it in another. Aristotle makes mimesis the genus to which all poetry belongs, without any hint that mimesis might need a defense. Modern philosophers and literary critics have used mimesis extensively; for example, philosopher, Kendall Walton has put mimesis at the center of his theory of art. Walton's mimesis is make-believe. Plato's covers impersonation, visual representation, and even legislation based on knowledge. Aristotle's mimesis emulates natural processes, or, in storytelling, emulates the normal course of events through plausible plot construction. In ancient Greek literature generally, mimesis can be adopting the customs or manners of another person or group (not merely copying them); it can also be pretending to be another, with or without the intention to deceive. Mimesis can be parody of a Cyclops or an effective cure achieved by the craft of medicine on the model of natural healing.

This chapter tries to bring order to this bewildering family of concepts as used in ancient Greek culture. After a brief review of earlier literature, I will turn to Plato and Aristotle. My main questions are these: Is Plato consistent on mimesis? And is there a core concept of mimesis that Plato and Aristotle share? I answer both questions in the affirmative.