Why do States Pursue Nuclear Weapons (or Not)
Wilfred Wan
University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorEtel Solingen
University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorWilfred Wan
University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorEtel Solingen
University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
This essay traces the evolution of the literature on the rationale behind states' pursuit of nuclear weapons, from classical neorealist explanations focusing on relative power to neoliberal institutionalist ones underlining the deterrent power of institutions and constructivist work on the impact of norms, status, and identities. We call attention to their contributions as well as their conceptual and empirical deficiencies and introduce an approach that links both nuclear ambition and nuclear restraint to models of domestic political survival. The inclusion of this previously overlooked independent variable harnesses the utility of extant approaches, allowing more effective weighing of the impact of other causal variables, while accounting for variation over time, across and within states. We take stock of more recent work employing quantitative and qualitative approaches and identify an agenda for advancing causal theories explaining why some states pursue nuclear weapons whereas others do not.
References
- Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226–254.
- Barnett, M., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. International Organization, 53(4), 699–732.
-
Betts, R. K. (2003). Striking first: A history of thankfully lost opportunities. Ethics & International Affairs, 17(1), 17–24.
10.1111/j.1747-7093.2003.tb00414.x Google Scholar
- Braun, C., & Chyba, C. (2004). Proliferation rings: New challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. International Security, 29(2), 5–49.
- Broad, W. J., & Sanger, D. E. (2006, October 15). Restraints fray and risks grow as nuclear club gains members. The New York Times.
- Chai, S.-K. (1997). Entrenching the Yoshida defense doctrine: Three techniques for institutionalization. International Organization, 51(03), 389–412. doi:10.1162/002081897550401
-
De Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., & Wu, S. S. G. (1993). Forecasting the risks of nuclear proliferation: Taiwan as an illustration of the method. Security Studies, 2(3–4), 311–331.
10.1080/09636419309347528 Google Scholar
- Dunn, L. A. (1982). Controlling the bomb: Nuclear proliferation in the 1980s. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Eckstein, H. (1975). Case study and theory in political science. In F. J. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), Handbook of political science (Vol. 7, pp. 79–137). Reading, England: Addison-Wesley.
- Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52(4), 887–917.
- Fuhrmann, M., & Li, X. (2008). Legalizing nuclear abandonment: The determinants of nuclear weapon free zone treaty ratification (p. 23). Cambridge, England: Harvard Kennedy School.
- Goldschmidt, P. (2009). Exposing nuclear non-compliance. Survival, 51(1), 143–164.
-
Guzman, A. T. (2008). How international law works: A rational choice theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305562.001.0001 Google Scholar
- Haas, E. B. (1953). The balance of power: Prescription, concept, or propaganda? World Politics, 5(04), 442–477. doi:10.2307/2009179
- Hardin, R., Goodin, R. E., Mearsheimer, J. J., & Dworkin, G. (1985). Nuclear deterrence: Ethics and strategy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Husbands, J. L. (1982). The prestige states. In W. H. Kincade & C. Bertram (Eds.), Nuclear proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and proposals (pp. 112–138). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Hymans, J. E. C. (2006). The psychology of nuclear proliferation: Identity, emotions and foreign policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Jervis, R. (1982). Security regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 357–378.
- Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: Understanding the debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63.
- Jo, D.-J., & Gartzke, E. (2007). Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(1), 167–194. doi:10.2307/27638542
- Johnston, A. I. (2001). Treating international institutions as social environments. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 487–515.
-
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
10.1515/9781400820269 Google Scholar
- Klotz, A. J., & Lynch, C. M. (2007). Strategies for research: In constructivist international relations. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
-
Lavoy, P. R. (1993). Nuclear myths and the causes of nuclear proliferation. Security Studies, 2(3–4), 192–212. doi:10.1080/09636419309347524
10.1080/09636419309347524 Google Scholar
- Liberman, P. (2001). The rise and fall of the South African bomb. International Security, 26(2), 45–86.
- Lipson, C. (1984). International cooperation in economic and security affairs. World Politics, 37(1), 1–23.
-
Long, W. J., & Grillot, S. R. (2000). Ideas, beliefs, and nuclear policies: The cases of South Africa and Ukraine. The Nonproliferation Review, 7(1), 24–40.
10.1080/10736700008436792 Google Scholar
- March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1998). The institutional dynamics of international political orders. International Organization, 52(04), 943–969.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1981). The theory and practice of conventional deterrence. Cornell University Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY.
- Miller, S. E. (2012). Nuclear collisions: Discord, reform & the nuclear non proliferation regime (pp. 1–42). Cambridge, England: American Academy of Arts & Sciences Retrieved from http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21875/nuclear_collisions.html
- Mochizuki, M. (2006, September 21). Japan rethinks pacifism. Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/21/opinion/oe-mochizuki21
- Montgomery, A. H., & Sagan, S. D. (2009). The perils of predicting proliferation. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(2), 302–328.
- North, D. C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Nye, J. S. (1986). Nuclear ethics. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Nye, J. S. (1988). U.S.-Soviet cooperation in a nonproliferation regime. In A. L. George, P. J. Farley & A. Dallin (Eds.), U.S.-Soviet security cooperation: Achievements, failures, lessons (pp. 336–352). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
-
Ogilvie-White, T. (1996). Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? An analysis of the contemporary debate. The Nonproliferation Review, 4(1), 43–60.
10.1080/10736709608436652 Google Scholar
- Okimoto, D. I. (1978). Ideas, intellectuals, and institutions: National security and the question of nuclear armament in Japan (Ph.D Dissertation). University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
- Paul, T. V. (2000). Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Mcgill Queens Univ Pr.
- Potter, W. C., & Mukhatzhanova, G. (2008). Divining nuclear intentions: A review essay. International Security, 33(1), 139–169.
- W. C. Potter, & G. Mukhatzhanova (Eds.) (2010). Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st century. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies/Stanford University Press.
- Rosecrance, R. N. (1964). The dispersion of nuclear weapons: Strategy and politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Rublee, M. R. (2009). Nonproliferation norms: Why states choose nuclear restraint. Athens, Greece: University of Georgia Press.
- Sagan, S. D. (1996). Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb. International Security, 21(3), 54–86.
- Sagan, S. D. (2011). The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), 225–244.
- Schelling, T. (2000). A half-century without nuclear war. The Key Reporter, 65(3), 3–5.
-
Sil, R., & Katzenstein, P. J. (2010). Beyond paradigms: Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
10.1007/978-1-137-01359-0 Google Scholar
- Singh, S., & Way, C. R. (2004). The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), 859–885.
- Solingen, E. (1994a). The domestic sources of regional regimes: The evolution of nuclear ambiguity in the Middle East. International Studies Quarterly, 38(2), 305–337. doi:10.2307/2600979
- Solingen, E. (1994b). The political economy of nuclear restraint. International Security, 19(2), 126–169. doi:10.2307/2539198
- Solingen, E. (2004). Southeast Asia in a new era: Domestic coalitions from crisis to recovery. Asian Survey, 44(2), 189–212. doi:10.1525/as.2004.44.issue-2
- Solingen, E. (2007). Nuclear logics: Contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Solingen, E. (2010). Domestic models of political survival: Why some do and others don't (Proliferate). In W. C. Potter & G. Mukhatzhanova (Eds.), Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st century: The role of theory (Vol. 1–2, pp. 38–57). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tannenwald, N. (2005). Stigmatizing the bomb: Origins of the nuclear taboo. International Security, 29(4), 5–49.
- Tannenwald, N. (2007). The nuclear taboo: The United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Tetlock, P. (2005). Expert political judgment: How good is it? how can we know? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Walker, W. (2010). The absence of a taboo on the possession of nuclear weapons. Review of International Studies, 36(4), 865–876.
- Walsh, J. (2005). Learning from past success: The NPT and the future of non-proliferation (pp. 1–65 (No. 41)). Stockholm, Sweden: Weapons for Mass Destruction Commission.
- Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1981). The spread of nuclear weapons: More may be better. London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Wan, W. (2014a, forthcoming). Firewalling nuclear diffusion. International Studies Review, 16(2).
- Wan, W. (2014b, forthcoming). Security institutions and change: The nuclear non-proliferation regime in crisis (ms.)
Further Reading
- W. C. Potter, & G. Mukhatzhanova (Eds.) (2010). Forecasting nuclear proliferation in the 21st century. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies/Stanford University Press.
- Sagan, S. D. (2011). The causes of nuclear weapons proliferation. Annual Review of Political Science, 14(1), 225–244.
- Solingen, E. (2007). Nuclear logics: Contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Citing Literature
Browse other articles of this reference work: