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Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

Walter Bossert

Dept. of Economics and CIREQ, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Downtown, Montreal QC H3C 3J7, Canada; [email protected]

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Yves Sprumont,

Yves Sprumont

Dept. of Economics and CIREQ, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Downtown, Montreal QC H3C 3J7, Canada; [email protected]

We thank Sean Horan, Indrajit Ray, a co-editor, and three referees for useful discussions and comments. Financial support from the Fonds de Recherche sur la Société et la Culture of Québec and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.

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Walter Bossert,

Walter Bossert

Dept. of Economics and CIREQ, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Downtown, Montreal QC H3C 3J7, Canada; [email protected]

Search for more papers by this author

Yves Sprumont,

Yves Sprumont

Dept. of Economics and CIREQ, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Downtown, Montreal QC H3C 3J7, Canada; [email protected]

Search for more papers by this author

First published: 13 November 2013

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11419

Citations: 16

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Abstract

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset. We prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable.

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Volume81, Issue6

November 2013

Pages 2521-2534

Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

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Every Choice Function Is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

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