Volume 103, Issue 1 pp. 66-93
ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Bureaucratic redundancy and administrative burden: Evidence from public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China

Wei Xiong

Wei Xiong

School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China

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Feng Wang

Corresponding Author

Feng Wang

China Public Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China

Correspondence

Feng Wang, China Public Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Fenghuang Bldg., 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, China.

Email: [email protected]

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Tom Christensen

Tom Christensen

Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

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Carter B. Casady

Carter B. Casady

Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA

Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, USA

Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction, University College London (UCL), London, UK

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First published: 13 May 2024
Citations: 1
[Correction added on 21 September 2024, after first online publication: Funding information has been updated.]

Abstract

en

Administrative burden is experienced by both individuals and businesses when dealing with government entities. While previous literature suggests administrative burden arises from the deliberate choices of political actors, this study highlights how bureaucratic redundancies also lead to administrative burden. Using a dataset of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in China, this study explored the influence of bureaucratic redundancy on administrative burden, in particular contractors' compliance costs caused by PPP regulations. The analysis found that bureaucratic redundancy has a positive and curvilinear relationship with compliance costs, which in turn has a positive relationship with the likelihood of PPP contract termination. These results hold even after controlling for political and economic factors. Nevertheless, such effects can be mitigated through government reforms, such as jurisdictional reduction and legislative centralization.

摘要

zh

随着服务型政府的理念日益深入人心,民众开始关注政务服务中繁杂的行政负担体验。行政负担也因此成为了公共行政的重要议题,但已有文献局限在政民互动中民众的行政负担。本研究将该议题拓展到了政企互动中,构建了企业行政负担的度量、成因、后果与应对的理论体系,并通过中国基础设施行业PPP项目的数据实证检验相关理论假设。研究发现,地方政府广泛存在“因人设岗”的现象,即地方官僚机构冗余会导致其设置更多的行政审批,从而增加了其辖区内企业的行政负担;其次,本研究还发现官僚机构冗余与企业行政负担之间存在非线性的相关性,即官僚机构冗余程度存在一个最优规模,只有超过该规模才会增加企业行政负担。另外,本研究发现企业行政负担会导致PPP项目提前终止的概率显著提高,因此在一定程度上解释了中国PPP项目大规模提前终止的现象。最后,对于官僚机构冗余引致的企业行政负担,可以通过调整地方政府的行政区划和立法权限等改革措施进行有效应对。

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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