Volume 41, Issue 4 pp. 1036-1060
ARTICLE

The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia

Natalie A. Pifer

Natalie A. Pifer

Natalie A. Pifer: ([email protected]) is a PhD student in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California, Irvine. She is grateful to her mentors Elliott Currie, Mona Lynch, and Keramet Reiter for their advice and careful readings throughout this project. Philip Goodman also provided especially helpful comments on an earlier version of this article, which was presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. Finally, she thanks the three anonymous reviewers whose thoughtful comments helped strengthen this article.

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First published: 11 November 2015
Citations: 4

Abstract

Atkins v. Virginia (2002) categorically exempts intellectually disabled defendants from execution, yet some constitutionally suspect punishments suggest a gap between law and practice. This article moves beyond critiquing Atkins’ formal implementation to provide a decentered analysis of the Atkins gap focused on the category of intellectual disability. It explores how drawing boundaries around intellectual disability in capital cases requires law to grapple with fluid scientific and social constructs through a study of how courts operationalize intellectual disability in capital cases. It draws from literatures considering the construction of intellectual disability and law's relationship to the scientific and the social and finds that this intersection first enables a conceptual disconnect between scientific and legal constructions of intellectual disability and, second, invites the use of stereotypes to inform the category. These processes undermine Atkins’—and other categorical exemptions’—ability to functionally limit extreme punishments and also reveal law as mutually constitutive.

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