1
E. H. Chamberlin, “Monopolistic Competition Revisited”, Economica, November, 1951.
2
E. H. Chamberlin. loc. cit., p. 362.
3
N. Kaldor, “Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (1938), p. 526.
4
N. Kaldor, Review of Triffin, Economica, November, 1942.
5
E. H, Chamberlin, loc. cit., p. 362n.
6
E. H. Chamberlin, Loc. Cit., p. 355.
7
R. Triffin, Monopolistic competition and General Equilibrium Theory (1941.
8
op. cit., p. 104.
9
Mr. Triffin points out that the values O are to be conceived only as limiting cases; hence, correctly specking, the coefficient will only approach these values.
10
R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 193.
11
R. Triffin, op. cit., lp. 140.
12
r. Triffin, op. cit., p. 39.
13
R. Triffin, op. cit., p. 100.
14
Cf., for example, “For some purposes it may be best to regard Chinese and Indian teas, or even Souchong and Pekoe teas, as different commodities; and to have a separate demand schedule for each of them. While for other purpose it may be best to group together commodities as distinct as beef and mutton, or even as tea and coffee, and to have a single list to represent the demand for the two combined …“, Marshail, Principles, 8th Ed., p. 100n.
15
“Professor Chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect competition”, loc. cit., p. 526.
16
R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch, “Price Theory and Business Behaviour”, Oxford Economic Papers, No. 2 (1939).
17
R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch, loc. cit., p. 16.
18
We put the coefficient in this form for expository reasons, for now both elements of the ratio refer to the distribution of preferences of the same set of customers, viz., the marginal customers of i. However, in virtue of our symmetry assumptions, this ratio is no different from X11/x11.
19
But see the generalization of this statement in the last paragraph of this Section.
20
It need hardly be pointed out that cross-elasticities necessarily define numbers exclusive of Firm i.
21
If. instead of considering a given price differential δ we take a range of values for δ we may broaden this criterion. Our condition then requires that then preferences of buyers should be specific or Ordered, that is to say, there must be no group of competing products between which L significant number of customers are indifferent. A customer in indifferent as between two products if he is not prepared to pay more for the one alternative than for the other.
22
The Xij must be relatively small to rule out oligopoly effects.
23
The Marshallian “single seller” depends upon the existence of a gap in the chain of substitutes. Clearly, the degees of “singleness” is relative.
24
N. Kaldor, “Professor chamberlin on Monopolistic and Imperfect competition”, loc. cit., p. 526.
25
It is, I believe, from attempts such as have become quite general in recent theory to define oligopoly in terms of one cross-elasticity that has arisen the wide divergency of opinion about oligopoly, for one economist it is the exception, for another it is the rule.
26
Cross-elasticities can, of course, only be summed in this simple fashion in virtue of our symmetry assumption that the q1= q1.
27
Perhaps it is the nature of this curve which explains one of the large paradoxes of the monopolistic competition debate. On the one hand, Mr. Kaldor has told us that monopolistic and imperfect competition amount to the same thing. some there is no monopoly in either. On the other hand. it would seem, if I understand him correctly, that Mr. Andrews' complaint is that there is no competition in either.
28
One of the least satisfactory features of Professor Chamberlin's latest position is his treatment of pure competition. Thus. “the individual seller in this latter instance [large numbers] is again correctly described an ‘isolated’, even in the special case of pure competition”, loc. cit. p. 362: my italics. This is surely a contradiction in terms.
29
I am indebted to Maurice Dobb for this point. See Political Economy and Capitalism (1937), p. 196n.
30
R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch. loc. cit.
31
C. W. Efroymaon, “Note on Kinked Demand Curves”, American Economic Review, March, 1943.
32
R. F. Kahn. “Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism”, Economic Journal, March, 1952. p. 122.
33
C. W. Efroymson, loc. cit., p. 98.
34 loc. cit., p. 98.
35
F. Mechlup. “Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research”, American Economic Review, September, 1946, P. 621.
36
Cf. “The main issue raised by the full cost principle … is that of a price determined on the one hand by cost including a margin of profit defined by custom, convention or what is thought just or ‘reasonable’ (as opposed to a maximum). or on the other hand by maximum profits”. Economic Journal, June, 1955. p. 319.
37
See my “Degree of Monopoly Power”, Economic Record, May, 1952.
38
R. F. Kahn. loc. cit., p. 122.
39
R. L. Hall and C. J. Hitch, loc. cit., “… the typical use in that of monopolistic competition with an admixture, which is usually large, of oligopoly.”
40
R. F. Kahn. loc. cit., p. 123.
41
C. W. Efroymson, loc. cit., p. 106.
42
This is. as I understand it, the main burden of Mr. Andrews's position. See Manufacturing Business (1949).
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