Volume 62, Issue 5 pp. 707-715
Radiation Oncology—Original Article

Failure mode and effects analysis in a paperless radiotherapy department

Helen Frewen

Corresponding Author

Helen Frewen

Discipline of Radiation Therapy, School of Medicine, Trinity College Dublin, Trinity Centre for Health Sciences, St James's Hospital, Dublin 8, Ireland

Radiation Oncology Department, Princess Alexandra Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

Correspondence

Ms Helen Frewen, Radiation Oncology Department, Princess Alexandra Hospital, Metro South Health, 199 Ipswich Road, Woolloongabba, Qld 4102, Australia.

Email: [email protected]

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Elizabeth Brown

Elizabeth Brown

Radiation Oncology Department, Princess Alexandra Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

School of Clinical Science, Faculty of Health, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

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Michael Jenkins

Michael Jenkins

Radiation Oncology Department, Princess Alexandra Hospital, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

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Anita O'Donovan

Anita O'Donovan

Discipline of Radiation Therapy, School of Medicine, Trinity College Dublin, Trinity Centre for Health Sciences, St James's Hospital, Dublin 8, Ireland

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First published: 27 July 2018
Citations: 23
H Frewen MSc; E Brown PhD; M Jenkins Dip; A O’Donovan BSc.
Conflict of interest: None declared.

Abstract

Introduction

The international move towards digital healthcare record keeping has seen an increase in the number of radiotherapy departments moving towards a paperless framework. With the recent transition to a paperless radiation oncology framework at the Princess Alexandra Hospital Brisbane, it was crucial to perform a prospective risk assessment to quantify the most significant sources of risk in the electronic environment.

Methods

A failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) was performed using a web-based three-round Delphi technique. Participants included Radiation Therapists and Radiation Oncologists. A detailed process map was created of all process steps and their sub-processes from patient booking to treatment. The first round was an open qualitative round to identify failure modes. The subsequent rounds were used to score all failure modes using the risk priority number (RPN) scoring method, based on the product of occurrence, severity and detectability scoring. The final round was also used to identify risk mitigation strategies.

Results

The process map consisted of 60 process steps and 141 sub-processes. A list of 83 failure modes was identified and consensus was achieved regarding the risk scoring for a prioritised list of 20. Four of the top five failure modes were related to communication errors. Eighteen feasible solutions were recommended for incorporating into clinical practice to increase patient safety.

Conclusion

The FMEA proved a valuable systematic method of prospectively identifying vulnerabilities in a paperless radiotherapy department. In particular, this FMEA identified numerous failure modes concerning communication and documentation, highlighting the need for sustained vigilance when performing all electronic processes.

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