Selling Time: Swatch Group and the Global Watch Industry
Abstract
This illustrative case analyzes and evaluates Swatch Group and its core competencies and global strategies in the changing and highly segmented watch industry. Originating from Switzerland, the Group is a major watch manufacturer in the world with a unique brand portfolio that includes low priced as well as luxury watches such as Breguet, Blancpain, Longines, Rado, Omega, and the like. Swatch Group, formerly known as Socitéde Microélectronique et d'Horlogerie (SMH), sells its products through 500 Swatch watch shops, uses 15,000 retailers and 1,000 shop-in-shops, and over 140 kiosks in global markets. The Group is vertically integrated and supplies virtually all the components and parts for its line of watches. In 2009, Swatch Group's sales stood at $5.37 billion and the company continues to be an entrepreneurial entity with efficient research and development (R&D), creating many technological breakthroughs and marketing campaigns. Swatch Group is expected to grow in the coming years although the 2008 financial crisis, competition, and changing markets remain some of the major hurdles for the company. The article ends with selected developments and future changes that may impact the company in the coming years. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
“Time was when a king's ransom was the price of a quality mechanical clock or watch. These objects were responsible not only for regulating daily life. After the invention of the chronometer in the 18th century increased accuracy, timepieces became essential for protecting lives, economic prosperity and scientific research, keeping ship, aircraft and scientist on course during the past 250 years.”
Selling Time in the Fast-Paced World
We would not like to be without our mechanical watches—even in these modern times, or may be even as an antidote to the digital overkill that poses a daily threat in the workplace and in our everyday life. The mechanical watch invites us to view it not just as a tool, but as a work of art, and to pause a little whilst we do so.
He leaves behind a lasting legacy in the watch industry. Hayek will forever be remembered for saving the industry through his intuition and visionary leadership.
Fewer than 25 years ago, the Swiss mechanical watch industry was in crisis as quartz technology threatened to consign clock work to the scrapheap. Ironically, however, it was the success of one particular quartz watch—the Swatch—that is certified with providing the means for the traditional brands to be revived.
Swatch Group's Evolutionary Growth and Major Developments (1930–2010) Source: Swatch Group (2009, 2010); Wikipedia (2010).
Swatch Group's Vertical Integration in the Watch Industry (2009) Source: Swatch Group (2009). *starting year/acquired.
The case is divided into five sections. Section one briefly introduces the company. Section two analyzes the global watch industry and its changing issues. Section three is about the history of Swatch Group. Section four evaluates the Group's core competencies and global strategies. Section five looks at the forthcoming industry-specific developments and corporate changes that are critical in the coming years followed by concluding comments and other observations.
The Changing Global Watch Industry
Industries in global business often display unique evolutionary characteristics in their growth phases and are always on the move because of technological developments and efficiencies in value chains. The global watch industry is no exception and carries a fascinating history, technological innovations, and competitive players. The industry finds its roots in Germany in the year 1500 when early watches functioned about 15 to 16 hours each day. In the last 400 years, the global watch industry has seen a multitude of innovations that came in the forms of new technologies, quality standards, and hundreds of brands and styles. Some of the early watches included Breguet, Omega, Tissot, Movado, Zenith, and Minerava (see Tables 2 and 3) (see Barnett, 1998; Bruton, 2002; Ensign, 1948; Glasmeier, 1994, 2000; Landes, 2000; Murphy, 1966; Rossum, 1996). From an outsider's perspective, the global watch industry looks distinctly homogenous. A closer look at the industry reveals that it is highly segmented, displaying a multitude of segments and niche companies that sell watches ranging from $20 to over $100,000. In the past 25 years, the industry has witnessed changes that took the forms of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), restructuring, rationalizations, and technological breakthroughs (see Martin and Dowling, 1995; Meichtry, 2007; Murphy, 1966; Nagaraj, 2004; Numagami, 1996; Proctor, 1998; Simonian, 2009c).
Switzerland is the largest exporter of luxury watches in monetary value. In 2009, Swiss watch exports surpassed 13.22 billion Swiss Franc (SES, 2010). On the other hand, manufacturers from Japan, Hong Kong, and the United States dominate the mass market. Swiss companies continue to target niche and ultra luxury segments of the industry that encompass mechanical as well as quartz models. Swiss watchmakers are well known for their “reputation, precision, reliability and innovation” (Tajeddini & Trueman, 2008, p. 169). Because of their interdependence, operations, and efficient value chains, the Swiss watch industry operates in clusters that help manufacturers to be located closer to suppliers and other businesses in the value chain. No wonder cluster-based businesses play an important role in those industries where competition and collaborations go side-by-side (Linde, 2003). Most of the Swiss watchmakers are centered around the Jura region and have been manufacturing mechanical and quartz watches for many years. As stated earlier, the industry is well structured and is the largest exporter of luxury watches in the world.
In the 1980s, the Swiss watchmakers had a tough time dealing with some of the structural changes of the industry. Competition from East Asia that arrived in the forms of quartz movement technology and low prices disrupted the industry and led to bankruptcies and failures. During the same period, many watchmakers closed their operations or were acquired by other firms. The Jura region was no exception and gradually lost its clout in the global market. The current resurgence of the Swiss watch industry reveals that it still carries a clout in luxury segments and niche markets. The industry has recovered in its own unique way “from disintegration to integration” and sought “integrated capability” and created “vertically co-specialized chains” (Jacobides & Winter, 2005, pp. 408–409). The watchmakers also injected long-term investments that brought Swiss firms back into business. According to the Federation of Swiss Watch Industry, most of the luxury watches are exported to North America, Europe, East Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and China), and the Middle-East (United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) (Gelnar, 2008; Jewelers Circular Keystone, 2006; SES, 2009). The 2008 global financial crisis did put a dent in the industry but recovery is expected in the coming years (Simonian, 2010b,c).
In many industries, companies' successes are the result of their dynamic capabilities (Shamsie, Martin, & Miller, 2009) and complementarities between subsidiaries which are built in-house or through M&As. Acquisitions reflect firms' competitive strategies as well as future growth (Wan & Yiu, 2009). Serial and multiple acquisitions and organizational learning (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Laamanen & Keil, 2008) are necessary to achieve these goals. At the same time, flexibility and speed are the main prerequisites for maintaining a good competitive advantage (Sinha & Noble, 2008). Applying the above multifaceted issues to the global watch industry, we observe a business sector that has gone through many ups and downs and other disruptions. Today's watchmakers (mostly luxury brands) are niche-oriented firms that marvel at their products because of technological and luxury attributes and brand differentiations. New innovations in mechanical watches, unique brands, space-age alloys, tourbullions, and other technologies are the norm. By mid-2000, 1.34 billion watches were sold in the world. Of course, the Swiss watchmakers have maintained their competitive edge in mechanical and luxury segments of the industry (Buchanan, 2009). This is attributed to the watchmakers' quality standards, value chain efficiencies, and distribution networks.
Swatch Group's Unique History in the Watch Industry
Based in Biel/Bienne, Switzerland, Swatch Group is the second largest watch manufacturer in the world. Formerly known as Société Suisse de Microélectronique et d'Horlogerie (SMH), the company sells 19 basic and high-end luxury brands. Swatch Group's watches are available through 15,000 retailers worldwide as well as 500 Swatch stores and 1,000 plus shops and kiosks. The Group's early history is impressive yet haphazard from the perspectives of organizational configurations, evolutionary growth, business models, and global expansion. Swatch Group came out of two financially bankrupt companies, SSIH (1930) and ASUAG (1931) (see Figure 1). In the 1970s, SSIH went out of business because of the arrival of low price quartz watches from East Asia. This made banks take control of the Group in 1981. In 1982, SSIH and ASUAG merged to form ASUAG-SSIH. In 1985, CEO Hayek renamed the company SMH and in 1985 again changed its name to Swatch. After various acquisitions and consistent growth, the company was finally renamed Swatch Group in 1998 (Glasmeier, 2000; Hoovers.com, 2009; Simonian, 2009a; Swatch Group, 2009; Taylor, 1993). As of 2010, the Group has a diverse portfolio and subsidiaries and is arguably one of most competitive watch companies.
Because of its large operations and diverse product portfolio, Swatch Group is vertically integrated and supplies almost all the components to its manufacturing facilities (see Table 1). Under the leadership of Hayek, Swatch Group acquired the Breguet brand which is a well known luxury brand in the watch industry. Since acquiring Breguet, the company has successfully repositioned itself and made major inroads in the luxury segments (Thompson, 2007). In R&D, the Group has Asulab, EM Microelectronic-Marin, and Oscilloquartz SA. In production of mechanisms, Swatch Group has acquired ETA, Valjoux, and F. Piguet. In the production of watches, the Group owns Comadur and also runs Dress Your Body (DYB) and a jewelry store. The Hayek family controls about 37 percent of the company. In recent years, Swatch Group has sought multiple acquisitions and created a well diversified product portfolio that aims at niche markets as well as mass consumption (see Figure 3) (Swatch Group, 2009). Right from its inception, the “Swatch phenomenon” became so popular that by 1985, the company had sold 3.5 million watches in the United States alone. This was a major marketing success story in the watch industry. Since then, sales have been going up and the Swatch brand continues to be a household name in the world (Simonian, 2010b,c).
Product Portfolio of Swatch Group (watches, jewelry and boutique; 2009) Source: Swatch Group (2009).
Since company specific-capabilities go through evolutionary stages and “co-evolve with transaction costs,” it is common for firms to seek growth through vertical integration and product specializations. In this process, companies reduce their transaction cost and increase profit in the value chain (Jacobides & Winter, 2005, p. 395). Applying the same principles to Swatch Group, we observe a watchmaker that built its company-specific capabilities by creating an impressive array of product portfolio (19 brands) in luxury and low-end watches as well as selling parts and watch movements (see Figure 3). The company definitely carries low transaction cost because of its capability and vertical integration.
Core Competencies and Global Strategies of Swatch Group
In today's competitive world, designing a company's core competency and global strategy is an arduous task and can take many years of careful planning and execution because of the forces of globalization, uncertainties, and disruptive technologies (Anand & Girotra, 2007; Anwar, 2007, 2008). Mainstream core competencies may include intellectual and knowledge assets, brand portfolios, research and development (R&D), quality standards, and market operations. Firms' core competencies are always in a flux of change because of competition and technology diffusions (Anwar, 2008). Market entry methods such as exporting, licensing, franchising, joint ventures, alliances, and wholly owned subsidiaries can impact companies' global strategies. In cross-border M&As and foreign direct investment (FDI) initiatives, two areas seem to provide the most benefits to companies: (1) readily available proprietary assets and infrastructural resources; and (2) access to the needed markets. A mainstream global strategy of a company encompasses three major areas: (1) formulating the core strategy; (2) internationalizing the core strategy based on global expansion; and (3) globalizing the international strategy by combining and streamlining operations in global markets (Yip, 2003). Interestingly, philosophical disagreements and discipline-specific squabbles run high in the debate of global strategy versus regional strategy and their geocentric and regiocentric approaches. The two schools of thought are further demarcated into distinct divisions and academic opinions (for example, see Ghemawat, 2007; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2004; Inkpen & Ramaswamy, 2006; Peng, 2009; Rugman, 2001; Yip, 2003). Swatch Group is no exception and tends to have a mainstream global strategy but seeks product policy and operational adaptations in those countries where markets demand regional or local strategies because of branding issues, unique local environments, and distinctive consumption patterns. These may take the forms of building country-specific distribution channels, promotional policies, pricing, and value chains.
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Well-balanced brand portfolio. Swatch Group is the second largest watch company in the world in sales and sells 19 brands from basic watches to luxury brands targeting “all price and market categories” (Datamonitor, 2009, p. 5). The company's brand portfolio includes Breguet, Blancpain, Glashutte, Jaquet Droz, Omega, Rado, Longines, Tissot, Mido, Swatch, and Flik Flak. In luxury segments, Swatch Group's Omega brand is the third best selling brand after Rolex and Cartier (see Figure 2). This brings a unique brand prowess and worldwide visibility to the Group. Since Swatch Group is well established, the company has long-term plans for future expansion in emerging markets (Datamonitor, 2009).
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Critical mass in research and development. Swatch Group maintains R&D that is based on market trends and consumer fashions. Apart from its luxury brands, the regular Swatch watches originate out of efficient R&D activities and proprietary knowledge. The company employs over 24,000 workers mostly in Switzerland, Asia, the United States, and other European countries, and its major core competencies are visible in competitive technologies, attractive designs, and colors. Also important are Swatch Group's subsidiaries that develop movements and watch components in Switzerland, Malaysia, China, Thailand, Italy, Germany, France, and the United States. This makes the company a major player in the watch industry (Novelguide.com, 2010).
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Leadership position in the watch industry. As Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly (2009, p. 457) comment: “managerial ability affects resource productivity” which means that “valuable and rare resources” must be acquired and kept in the company for growth and survival. In addition, technological capabilities should be exploited by expanding into new markets when current segments become saturated (Figueiredo & Silverman, 2007). These statements perfectly apply to Swatch Group as we observe the company moving into new segments and markets. Swatch Group's former Chairman Hayek was responsible for designing the company's growth and expansion plans. As a well known business executive in the watch industry, Hayek was often praised for his vast experience and marketing skills. Taylor (1993, p. 99) in a well publicized interview in the Harvard Business Review comments about Hayek:
Nicholas G. Hayek is a rare phenomenon in Europe—a genuine business celebrity. He and his colleagues at the Swiss Corporation for Microelectronics and Watchmaking (SMH) have engineered one of the most spectacular industrial comebacks in the world—the revitalization of the Swiss watch industry.
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Issues of internationalization. In the area of internationalization, Swatch Group has been exceptionally global in its corporate philosophy, brand portfolio, geographic coverage, and efficient supply chain areas. The Group maintains distribution offices and subsidiaries worldwide (Buchanan, 2007). Swatch Group can also be categorized as a born-global firm since the Group's internationalization process skipped the traditional market entry methods.
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Mechanical/quartz movements and other high-tech components. Swatch Group has been active in the development and marketing of electronic components. The company sells engineering products (mechanical and electronic modules) and alternative motors to auto manufacturers. Other products manufactured by the Group are medical applications, computers electronics, and data handling and timekeeping services at the Olympic venues and in international sports (Datamonitor, 2009; Swatch Group, 2009). This shows that Swatch Group is a well-diversified company in its product lines, global operations, and noncore assets.
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Issues of vertical integration. In addition to diversification and marketing other product lines, Swatch Group is vertically integrated in watches that bring economies of scale, control, and supply efficiencies. The area of vertical integration is related to transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975) and can help firms deal with their “make or buy decisions” (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986, p. 347). Other benefits of vertical integration may encompass company-wide integration, dealing with organizational resources and competencies, prices, and performance and quality standards (see Acemoglu, Johnson, & Mitton, 2009; Anwar, 2005; Díez-Vial, 2007; Forbes, 2010; Gulbrandsen, Sandvik, & Haugland, 2009; Lafontaine & Slade, 2007). Also included are areas of closer interaction with customers (Mejtoft, 2010), erecting entry barriers (Rothaermel, Hitt, & Jobe, 1996), reducing transaction costs (Fetz & Filippini, 2010), and putting pressure on “rivals” costs (Normann, 2009, p. 461). The same applies to Swatch Group where the company clearly benefits from its vertical integration within the areas of economies of scale (low cost; quality standards), control (dealing with resources and specific investments), and supply chain efficiencies (see Figure 2). The company sells movements and parts to other watchmakers to keep its competitive edge. As of 2010, there are other watchmakers that partially or fully manufacture their movements and include Audemars Piguet, Patek Philippe, Rolex, Jaeger-LeCoultre, Girard-Perregaux, and others. This helps in quality control, supply chain efficiencies, and long-term market share.
What Lies Ahead for Swatch Group?
The global watch industry is an interesting industry that encompasses diverse watchmakers selling millions of watches where prices may range from $20 to $100,000. As of 2010 and in the post-2008 financial crisis period, the industry is definitely on the recovery path because of market conditions, changing demographics, and consumption patterns in the Western world and emerging markets. The industry data and prevailing conditions corroborate these trends (Simonian, 2010a–c). Switzerland remains the largest exporter of luxury watches in the world with hundreds of niche and specialized companies (SES, 2009; Simonian, 2010c). The changing trends and availability of luxury segments support the growing consumption in the watch industry. In the coming years, the following threats, opportunities, and strategic choices may impact Swatch Group and the global watch industry (see Table 4).
Threats
Company-Specific Weaknesses
According to Datamonitor (2009), Swatch Group's major weaknesses are its weak asset turnover (deploying firm's assets profitably), exchange rate risk, and employee productivity (revenue per employee). These factors impact the company in its operational efficiencies, long-term planning, and future growth. These weaknesses also are the results of the size of Swatch Group, fast-paced innovations, shorter life cycles, and multiple acquisitions (see Figure 3).
Future Threats in Global Markets
In the area of threats, Swatch Groups will continue to face the risk of counterfeit products, piracy problems, and parallel distribution and gray products in those markets where intellectual property rights are weak and rules of law are ill enforced. Other threats may include surge in raw material prices such as iron ore/steel, plastic, and crude oil. In addition, competition in the luxury segments has been heightened because of the 2008 financial crisis and distressed markets (Binkley, 2008, 2009; Datamonitor, 2009; Foulkes, 2009). At the same time, established luxury watchmakers have fared well after the financial downturn because of product differentiation and luxury attributes (Simonian, 2009b).
Opportunities
Capitalizing on Company-Specific Strengths
Marketing performance and capabilities help firms seek superior operations (Morgan, Vorhies, & Mason, 2009) and are important in corporate survival. In the areas of corporate performance and marketing capabilities, Swatch Group is an exceptional company with a distinct product portfolio and brand visibility. Over its short history, the Group accumulated a multitude of strengths that helped the company to start the “Swatch phenomenon” and reinvigorate the Swiss watch industry. Applying the “induced strategy process” (for exploiting core business opportunities) as well as the “autonomous strategy process” (for exploring new growth opportunities) (Burgelman & Grove, 2007, p. 965) to Swatch Group, we observe a company that was able to galvanize its operational efficiencies by exploiting core areas and expanding in global markets. The Group's major strengths are its well established product portfolio (19 brands), financial prowess, quality standards, R&D, and worldwide marketing operations. Under the present circumstances, Swatch Group is expected to maintain its market share and will continue to expand in emerging markets and other countries. The Group's 2008–2009 financial data corroborate these statements (see Table 5).
Alliances and Collaborative Activities
Swatch Group's future opportunities encompass alliances with watchmakers and retailers and diversification in core and non-core areas. In 2009, the Group created a strategic alliance with Tiffany & Company and its future acquisitions may lie in core and noncore assets. Other opportunities are seen in emerging markets (China, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, Singapore, Turkey, etc.) because of rising income levels and strong desire for luxury goods. The company is a major player regarding providing timekeeping and data management activities at the past and future Olympics and other high-profile sports events.
Dealing with Niche Companies
In the past 15 years, many watchmakers have become niche companies and sell unique and novel products. This is attributed to changing demand and lifestyles in global markets. In addition to large companies, the industry is made up of hundreds of small firms selling ultra luxury watches in smaller segments and often fetching prices of over $20,000 per watch (see Tables 1 and 3). At the global level, very few watchmakers are vertically integrated because of cost, technology hurdles, and long-term commitments. Bringing new designs and technologies to the market are the norm in the industry but require financial resources, strong R&D capabilities, and specialized skills.
Harnessing Knowledge Assets
There is no dearth of knowledge assets and entrepreneurial initiatives in the global watch industry. To seek growth and new technologies, Swatch Group is well positioned to capitalize on its intra-company knowledge assets and established brands. It is evident that the Group and other watchmakers (Richemont and LVMH) are well endowed with financial resources, competitive products, efficient R&D, and trained manpower. This helps in strategic alliances, new products, and marketing programs in the industry.
Capitalizing on Luxury Segments
In luxury segments, most of the well-known watchmakers are located in Switzerland (see Table 3). The Swiss watch manufacturing clusters remain unique and immensely productive because of their rich history, quality control, collaborations, and luxury brands (Watch Time, 2007). This brings advantages as well as disadvantages regarding maintaining performance standards, core competencies, and retaining specialized staff. Like other watch companies, Swatch Group faces the same problems.
Strategic Choices
Alliances, M&As, and Internationalization Issues
Since 1995, watchmakers have been actively seeking alliances and M&As. The top three groups (Swatch, Richemont, and LVMH) have sought multiple acquisitions to consolidate their branding portfolios (see Table 3). Within the current market conditions, Swatch Group is able to seek strategic acquisitions mostly in the European markets for future expansion.
Globalization Drivers
Except in low price watches, the global watch industry is not a commodity business and operates in an intense competitive environment. The pace of competition is fierce yet luxury segments are lucrative enough to justify large-scale R&D and promotional budgets. This demands niche players with established product portfolios to spend money on their marketing programs. Small companies have a hard time keeping up with new technologies and large budgets. Swatch Group is in a better position because of its financial soundness, product portfolio, and worldwide brand visibility.
Adapting the Business Model and Seeking Diversification
Swatch Group's competitors are catching up in new technologies, product offerings, and marketing campaigns. Although the watch industry remains a niche-oriented business, competitive forces are difficult to deal with regarding market shares and new technologies. In the coming years, Swatch Group may diversify its business model and enter into new complementary industries and non-core assets. In 2005, the Group opened a watchmaking school in New Jersey to deal with the shortage of specialized staff and technicians (Shuster, 2005). In components and watch movements, Swatch Group is well positioned because of its vertical integration, and the company supplies over 60 percent of parts to the watch industry (Watch Time, 2007).
Global Trends and Consumption Patterns
In the next decade, the world population is expected to grow at an annual rate of 1.2 percent, bringing in over 700 million additional consumers mostly in the emerging markets and developing countries (Buchanan, 2007). In 2011, the world population reached seven billion people (Kunzig, 2011). Interestingly, this phenomenon may drive growth for many industries and products. Considering this population growth in emerging markets and other countries, watchmakers will find good opportunities and prospects. Of course, competition is expected to heat up in those markets where watchmakers have easy access to the markets and technologies (see Table 4).
Branding Issues
“Brand bonanza” is a major development in the global watch industry that encompasses hundreds of unique and luxury brands available in the industry. Price wars are fierce in those luxury markets where niche segments are abundant and consumer demand is stable. Some watchmakers have paid exorbitant money to acquire luxury brands. For example, in 1999, LVMH acquired TAG Heuer for $750 million. In 2000, Vendome bought three luxury brands: Jaeger-LeCoultre, IWC Schaffhausen, and A. Lange & Sohne for $1.7 billion (Buchanan, 2009). There are other acquisitions ranging from $30 million to $300 million. In the face of a healthy future economy, the watch industry is bound to recover and will witness additional M&As based on established brands, technologies, and value chains. This could alter the industry profile, leading to price wars and market dominance by a few watch companies (see Table 4).
Issues of ETA SA Manufacture Horlogère Suisse
ETA is a subsidiary of Swatch Group and a major manufacturer of mechanical and quartz watch movements in the industry (see Figure 2). A few years back, ETA stopped delivering mechanical movements to non-SMH brands. This was a bold move on the part of ETA because of supply constraints, vertical integration, and quality standards. In addition, this has forced established watchmakers to seek vertical integration and manufacture their own watch movements. These strategic moves and other decisions were aimed at differentiating the Swiss watch industry and its long-term efficiencies. Very few companies were able to emulate these strategies because of their quality standards and limited supply chain efficiencies. No wonder a handful of large watchmakers have become more vertically integrated and competitive in the watch industry. In the coming years, this development could create proprietary technologies and change the landscape of the watch industry. Of course Swatch Group is well integrated to benefit from their proprietary technology, market dominance, and visibility (Simonian, 2010a–d; Wikipedia, 2010).
Concluding Comments
As of 2010, Swatch Group's sales are up and the company continues to expand its currents and future markets (Simonian, 2010c,d). The Group is particularly strong in its colorful design of watches and unique online and traditional advertising campaigns (Answers.com, 2009). Swatch Group is expected to reap rewards from its earlier successes and subsidiary networks. In the coming years, the company may explore the possibility of additional acquisitions and could even enter into the precision instruments and other noncore areas. Under the leadership of Hayek, the Group was never short of new ideas and marketing campaigns to introduce new designs and styles. However, in many industries, shake-outs are common because of changes in core technologies (Sinha & Noble, 2008). Interestingly, Swatch Group has capitalized on the watch industry's shakeouts in a timely manner with vertical integration, acquisitions, and marketing campaigns. Hayek and his corporate team's role had been critical in turning the Group around in the industry. Because of its size and financial prowess, analysts believe that Swatch Group is in a better position to expand in those markets where demand for basic and luxury watches is growing. Of course, other watchmakers are equally capable and financially resourceful regarding acquiring established brands as well as introducing new technologies.
Swatch Group has been particularly upbeat, building on the resolute stand it maintained through the crisis. … Pointing to the relative resilience of sales, Mr. Hayek noted the Swatch Group had been gaining market share, although he stopped short of saying which brands had lost ground at its expense.
Now Ms Hayek, 59, has to fill her father's shoes, leading a quoted group whose 19 brands include horological legends such as Omega and Breguet, not to mention the ubiquitous Swatch.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this work benefited from the Southwest Case Research Association's 2007 Conference participants and anonymous reviewers in Houston, Texas (March 5–6). The author would also like to thank Alex Sharland and Suresh Gopalan for their helpful comments at the meeting. The author is also thankful to two reviewers of TIBR for their timely comments and detailed suggestions.
Biographical Information
Syed Tariq Anwar is a professor of marketing and international business in the College of Business at West Texas A&M University. He received his MA in public administration from the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan, and his MBA and DBA degrees from US International University. Anwar has published in journals such as Thunderbird International Business Review, Journal of International Management, Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, Journal of World Trade, World Competition, Journal of World Investment & Trade, and others. He has published review articles in the Journal of International Business Studies and Journal of Marketing. Anwar has presented various executive seminars and conference papers in the United States, Australia, Austria, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, UAE, and the United Kingdom. Anwar served as president and chapter chair of the Academy of International Business, US Southwest Chapter, in 1998–2002. He also is the author of a well-known meta index (Marketing & International Business Links; http://wtfaculty.wtamu.edu/∼sanwar.bus/otherlinks.htm), which was launched in 1997 and has been one of the top ranked sites on Google Search under the search term international marketing.
