1 INTRODUCTION

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the consistencies and inconsistencies that have historically and contemporarily been shown by South Africa's foreign policy towards Israel. In doing so, the article sought to explain the realities and myths surrounding the position of South Africa concerning the ongoing Middle East conflict that involves Israel and Palestine. There is considerable literature on the state of South Africa-Israel relations since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948. This is particularly the time when South Africa was still under apartheid. The article, therefore, shows that Israel had enjoyed good relations with apartheid South Africa until the latter adopted democracy in 1994. Then the relations of South Africa and Israel became unstable as Former South African President Nelson Mandela envisioned a new South Africa that endorsed democracy and human rights together with the preservation of respect and justice for international law. The same principles had guided the administration of former South African President Thabo Mbeki's relations with Israel. Tense relations blossomed when Former South African President Jacob Zuma's administration decided that the South African embassy in Israel would be downgraded and the ambassador recalled, showing that the African National Congress (ANC) led government had now adopted a stronger position that denounced all the illegal activities of Israel in Palestine. A research problem that has been identified before the undertaking of this study relates to the ongoing uncertainties of the current South African President Cyril Ramaphosa administration which still engages with Israel economically and politically. This means that the ANC led government still lacks a clear foreign policy stance when it comes to the denunciation of the Israeli apartheid activities in Palestine. Based on these uncertainties, the author sought to address what is the root causes of these uncertainties and also engage in possible scholarly debate of possible recommendations on how to best shape the foreign policy stance of the ANC led government on Israel.

2 METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS

Methodologically, this article has relied on document analysis and/or secondary data, composing of various academic and policy documents. The documents analysed were mostly those of the books, journal articles, website reports, periodical articles. The total combination numbered up to 62 documents. The documents were analysed thematically using Thematic Content Analysis. The article has also made sure that a data triangulation method is adopted for the analysis provided in the article to be credible, dependable, and reliable.

Theoretically, the article has relied on Afrocentricity best accredited to Molefi Kete Asante (1990, 2003). Including other influential and prominent Afrocentric scholars such as Rapanyane (2018), Rapanyane (2019), Rapanyane and Shai (2020), and Rapanyane and Sethole (2021). The article has adopted the utility of this theory because of its ability to furnish scholars with a brand-new perspective that is based on the views of Africans on any scholarly topic. Asante (2003) reminds us that this theory is the study of any scholarly subject from the stand-point of Africans, rather than as victims. Thus, the adoption of this theory in this article has been solely driven by the desire to show the immense interest in this Africa-centred theory that uses African principles of knowing in any knowledge accumulation and production (Rapanyane, 2018). Amongst the other reasons why a theory of this kind has been adopted was because of its analytic tenets of grounding, orientation and perspective best explained by Modupe (2003) which are often, scholarly adopted to ensure that Africans are at the centre of the knowledge production, especially in scholarly topics which emanate from Africa. Bearing that in mind, the article added that the author's positionality in relation to the current research article has had a considerable impact on adopting this theory as the author's location allows for the use of the theory to be at the centre of the analysis of the subject under review. The next section of the research article explored the institutional framework of foreign policy implementation to try and understand how foreign policy stance is made in South Africa.

3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN POLICY

About who determines the foreign policy of South Africa, it is important to take into account that in South Africa, the president is the head of state as well as the head of government (Rapanyane, 2018). The head of state possesses real executive powers and has an important role in the determination of South Africa's foreign policy. This is more like the heads of governments of countries like France, the United States of America (USA) and others who have near similar types of government systems. In short, their role is decisive, therefore, the head of government whether a President, Prime Minister or a dictator is the key figure in all foreign policy decisions (Clarke & White, 1989:61). In South Africa for example, the president decides on foreign policy almost entirely alone since only the head of government officially articulate on behalf of the state in international relations.

There are other influential institutions or people in foreign policy decisions such as the Minister of DIRCO who enjoys the confidence of the head of government and works in close conjunction with. Others include the legislative authority or Members of Parliament (MPs), DIRCO which is the main institution responsible for foreign affairs through providing continuity, expertise, knowledge, advice, machinery for extensive and detailed foreign action and interstate negotiations (Clarke & White, 1989). In this research article, the invocation of the execution of foreign policy as “foreign affairs” does not necessarily imply that this form of policy is exclusively delinked from the macro-domestic policy framework of the state that formulates and implement it (Shai, 2016). There are also other influential departments and groups such as the Department of Defence (DoD), Finance and Economic Development in foreign policy decisions (Clarke & White, 1989). For this study, the article looked into the role played by the ANC president and his government ministers inclusive of the legislative authority. This was done based on the lack of data and/or information accumulated regarding the positions articulated by other departments (Defence and National Treasury), both during the Mbeki and Zuma era (Rapanyane, 2018).

4 HISTORICAL ACCOUNT IN FOREIGN POLICY CHANGES: SOUTH AFRICA–ISRAEL RELATIONS (1948–1994)

To be able to understand historical changes in international relations between the two states, one has to take into account the fact that South Africa is considered one of the countries to have acknowledged the existence of Israel as a sovereign country at the United Nations (UN) in 1948. Thus, it then established diplomatic ties with Israel in 1949. Dadoo (1997) further outlines that South Africa's diplomatic representation in Israel only started in 1972 through a relationship of accessibility, the alliance of interests and ideologies. It could also be said that this move was also motivated highly by the Jewish interests in South Africa which fostered diplomatic links between these countries (Israel link, 2017; Dadoo, 1997: 174–175).

After, 1972, there was an acceleration of the relationship clearly outlined by Sooliman (2014) and Tennyson (2015), when they indicate that D. F Malan who by then was the prime minister of South Africa, for the first time visited Israel, opening the country to the Jews. It is for this reason that most Jews did not challenge the apartheid system which resembled the discrimination against them in Germany in the period before the Holocaust (Rapanyane, 2018). Even though the Jewish community did not outrightly endorse apartheid, others came out against it by fully endorsing the opposition United Party (UP), with others becoming members of the liberation struggle. But others settled in and enjoyed the benefits of the system. Many South African Jews supported Zionism to the extent that by 1950, almost half of South Africa's Jews were members of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) (Dadoo & Osman, 2013; Sooliman, 2014).

Norton (2015) demonstrates that in November 1975, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution 3379 which declared Zionism a form of racial subjugation. Whilst this was the case, Sooliman (2014) believes that this resolution reflected the idea of the 1950 UNGA resolution that was adopted, based on the doctrines of racial discrimination. In addition, Stein (2012) also believes that Resolution 3379 specifically intended for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and referred to Resolution 3377 adopted in Kampala (1975) by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU (Fayez, 1976; Norton, 2015; Stein, 2012).

The latter resolution stated that the regimes in occupied Palestine, Zimbabwe and South Africa were racist and that they had a common imperialistic origin, whose policies were structured to suppress the inherent dignity and integrity of human beings (Sooliman, 2014). This is also sustained by the scholarly works of both Chazan (1983: 175) and Bishku (2017) when they indicated that the South African government at that time had also loosened currency export laws and allowed the Jews to dispatch significant remittances and benefactions to Israel, more money per capita; more than any Jewish society globally.

Equally important are the views of Posel (2001: 52) who argues that the racist policies pursued by the Malan government certainly “eroded the inherent dignity and integrity of South Africa's indigenous people”. This was done in addition to promoting a viewpoint of the “Swart Gevaar1” propaganda against the Soviet Union's socialistic vision for future South Africa. In addition, Posel (2001) also indicated that Malan, being aware of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)’s support for the ANC, envisioned South Africa to be part of the Western world, sharing western values, civilization and fears. It can also be seen from the above analysis that the two states also shared the ideology of “minority survivalism” (Dadoo & Osman, 2013). This sentiment expressed in the quotation embodies the view that South Africa and Israel comprised outposts of civilisations of Europe that were indeed being engendered by the so-called Africans and Arabs who were displaying barbarian personalities. In short, because of local policies of racism, both countries slowly became pariah states in the eyes of the international community (Dadoo & Osman, 2013).

The term pariah state had been coined to refer to a state that is deviant in its conduct because it “violated accepted standards and norms of behaviour” in the international system. Other scholars opted for terms such as outcast or isolated states which also alluded to a non-conformance with international norms and values (Anne, 2011; Geldenhuys, 2006: 2). In this manner, Pariah states are “punished through the severing of international or diplomatic ties. Such punitive measures often isolate them from normal interactions with the conforming body of states in the international system”. It is also important to note that these types of states share certain similar traits which include “an authoritarian right-wing government, systematic abuse of human rights” like South Africa and Israel by then which shared a fierce anti-communist orientation and the belief that they were valuable allies of the Western world and deserved to be recognised as thus (Geldenhuys, 2006: 3). Another significant aspect of this relationship was seen in the 1970s when Israel experienced an isolation period more like that of South Africa simply because African states condemned the Arab-Israeli war in 1973. Just as this period saw oil embargoes being imposed on South Africa, other measures included 1968's United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issue of Jerusalem and Israel's intention to transform the lawful status of the city and in 1976, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa deemed Israel guilty of war crimes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (Geldenhuys, 1984: 74).

These actions are similar to those instigated in 1977 when the European Council concluded that it was inadmissible for Israel to acquire territory by force demanding that Israel recognise “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” (Geldenhuys, 1984: 74). It should be noted, however, that condemnation of Israel by the UNSC was less harsh in tone and substance than that of the UNGA. For example, between 1972 and 1985, the USA vetoed 16 resolutions which if adopted would have resulted in punitive measures against Israel. In this way, Geldenhuys (1984: 75) concluded that the behaviour of the USA amounted to consistent protection of Israeli apartheid practices. Despite this, UNGA resolutions delegitimised the South African government and condemned it to pariah status because of South Africa's racist policies which contravened the UN Charter and the fundamental standards of international law. Further important development of this time to be considered was when Eschel Rhoodie was appointed as the Secretary of Information in 1972. Subsequently, he visited Israel 14 times in 2 years, fostering diplomatic ties with Israel. In this way, Rhoodie's bridge-building efforts initiated the invite from Prime Minister Rabin to Vorster (Geldenhuys, 1984: 116). Therefore, during the period of isolation, the two pariah states began to cooperate and share economic and military strengths (Dadoo & Osman, 2013). Accordingly, the influence of the Israeli military and naval intelligence on South Africa was evident in 1975 when the Israel-South Africa Agreement (ISAA) was signed which focused on areas of defence cooperation (Maguire, 1991).

In 1975, UNGA approved resolutions demanding socio-economic and political sanctions against South Africa. Despite this, 1976 saw Rabin inviting Vorster to make a state visit to Israel to which Vorster agreed (Chazan, 1983: 175). In the same year, Israel absented itself from anti-apartheid votes at the UN meetings (Chazan, 1983: 175). By means of no surpirse, Vorster's official visit to Israel was considered a diplomatic coup for South Africa (Geldenhuys, 1984). The support “of Zionism was a cheap price to pay for Jewish silence on Apartheid” timeously (Bishku, 2017: 155). It is for this rationality that the South African Jewish leadership celebrated this occasion by hosting a banquet2 in honour of Vorster on his return from Israel (Dadoo & Osman, 2013).

According to Dadoo and Osman (2013), the banquet was done irrespective of the obvious fact that Vorster was one of the main architects of apartheid and a former Nazi sympathiser. At this point, it is necessary to stress out that although the Jewish leadership in South Africa proposed non-involvement in political issues of the Middle East, it pursued a strategy that sought to build good ties with the apartheid government whilst maintaining a low profile politically (Dadoo & Osman, 2013; Sooliman, 2014). In response to Menachem's takeover of power in 1977, South Africa's Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, paid a visit to Israel to further engage with Israel to strengthen the military relations between both countries (Blumenthal, 2010). During the mid-1980s when many western governments were disinvesting from South Africa, the country remained one of Israel's three largest customers in terms of arms purchases (Hunter, 1986: 55). It is for this reason that in 1984, UNGA passed Resolution 3972 on relations between Israel and South Africa which condemned Israel for its continued support of and partnership with South Africa in the military and nuclear spheres (Hunter, 1986: 55).

In 1985, the apartheid regime of South Africa became desperate because of economic sanctions, amongst others, and turned to Israel to channel their exports to other countries. Therefore, Israel agreed to act as a pass-through point for South Africa. Consequently, this led to Israel finding itself segregated as the only apprised country that still approved the apartheid regime by September 1987. It was sooner than later when Israel then began instituting “a series of measures to limit economic, sports and cultural ties with South Africa” (Hunter, 1986: 55; Sooliman, 2014). According to Beit-Hallahm (1988), the collaboration of South Africa and Israel was grossly under-reported during the post-1987 until 1994. This premise should be understood within the context that Israel had played a vital role in maintaining the apartheid regime. The general observation from this is that South Africa and Israel shared more than an anti-communist agenda against the ANC and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) respectively. Just as specified by the award-winning author and journalist Max Blumenthal, the leaders from these two states discussed their alliance specifically through the so-called holy war fought against those of a skin that is dark and considered hordes (Blumenthal, 2010).

5 CONSIDERABLE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: MANDELA ADMINISTRATION (1994–1999)

For the late Nelson Mandela (First democratically elected President of South Africa), the moment and setting post-1990 needed attention on democracy and human rights simply because the country's new dawn as part of the formation of an intimidating human rights campaign that had been promoted by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), governments and representatives in the Third World (Mandela, 1993). The argument, therefore, is that at the centre of Mandela's foreign policy vision was the endorsement of democracy and human rights, preservation of respect and justice for international law, blossoming of peace and the furtherance of global and regional economic cooperation (Mandela, 1993). Bishku (2017:155) interjects that following his release from prison in 1990, Mandela indicated that: “Almost every country in the world—except Israel had invited him to visit.” Indeed, it eventually took Israel 4 years to extend the invitation. From the outset, Mandela had taken into consideration the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and across this, was his acknowledgement of the embassy of Palestine opened in Pretoria in the year 1995 (Mandela, 1997). As a result, Mandela spoke of the need for a solution which is just to deal with the Palestinian people's struggle. Mandela's vision amongst others included having South Africa negotiate a peaceful settlement amongst the two states and his suggestion to Israel was that, it had to stop all expansionist occupational projects in Palestine and go back to the 1967 borders to give Palestinians a viable state. Mandela espoused a vision of peaceful co-existence (Mandela, 1997; Sooliman, 2014).

Nonetheless, Mandela also acknowledged Israel's right to exist but was outspoken and critical of the occupation and ongoing settlement construction in the OPT. In his 1997 speech at the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (IDSPP), Mandela reflected that the freedom of the South Africans was inextricably linked with the freedom of the Palestinians. In addition, Mandela reaffirmed that the 1977 UN resolution which inaugurated the IDSPP was a recognition that injustice and gross human rights violations were being perpetrated in Palestine (Mandela, 1997; WikiLeaks, 2010).

Although Mandela reached out in a reconciliatory manner to the Israelites, it did not signify a complete forgetfulness of the past. Mandela was forward-looking but ultimately had to be pragmatic (Vickers, 2002). Mandela often stressed the freedom of the Palestinians from occupation as an important foreign policy issue for South Africans taking into account also that in 1995, South Africa signed an agreement with the PLO establishing a Joint Commission of Cooperation (O'Malley, 1995). In this manner, the concepts of freedom and human dignity were significant to Mandela's virtuous foreign policy stance (SAHO, 2014; Shraeder, 2001). Therefore, to emphasise these values, Mandela equated the freedom of South Africans with the freedom of the Palestinians. Sooliman (2014) believes that for Mandela, the acknowledgement of the innate dignity of all individuals was needed for peace. The Israelites treated the Palestinians as inhuman in the way that apartheid South Africa desensitised the Africans. This continued behaviour would serve as a barrier to peace and at a time revoking the humiliation that black South Africans endured during the apartheid years. It is in this regard that the historical experiences of South Africa's new leaders would influence how they interpreted the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Raphael, 2013). This also influenced the foreign policy stance of Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki (Former President of South Africa) who interpreted the freedom of Palestinians as equal to the freedom of Africans from the unjust cruel apartheid system.

6 A NEW FOREIGN POLICY VISION: MBEKI'S ADMINISTRATION (1999–2008)

In 1994, Thabo Mbeki signalled South Africa's new foreign policy goal at UN “as its commitment to being a good citizen of the world, the concept of being a Good International Citizen (GIC) had been floating on the international seas since 1989” (Graham, 2008:87). Hence, it is important to note that “the main proponent of this concept is the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans” (Graham, 2008: 87). This new term became known immediately post-Cold War era when the merging of beliefs and norms in the international community gave rise to the notion of universal morality or a global moral community. According to Graham (2008), a GIC seems to be a country that can put the global community's interests ahead of its own. Therefore, it can never disregard its national objectives but should excite in its tracking of these objectives, “by the higher ideals of promoting world order, encouraging reform on a global scale and honouring its duties to humanity” (Graham, 2008: 88).

Mbeki's foreign policy on Israel was highly informed by the fundamental human rights of which Israel lacked and did not have respect for. His first tenure (1999–2004) as President of South Africa has been coupled with efforts of trying to bring long-lasting peace to the Middle East through conducting peace dialogues and also endorsing some of the UN resolutions meant to compel and fast track the withdrawal of Israel troops from Gaza and West Bank (Sooliman, 2014). Brand and Fabricius (2000) and BBC News (2014) demonstrate that in 2002, during his first term, Mbeki blamed Israel for the ongoing violence in the Middle East and asked for South Africa's hand in supporting Palestine's legitimate struggle for freedom. Brand and Fabricius (2000) argued that in a very committed assertion to open the IDSPP; Mbeki explained how the Israeli-Palestinian struggle would not by any chance be settled unless the global community compelled Israel to leave the OPT with immediate effect.

BBC News (2014) also affirm that Mbeki further called on the UN-led observer missions to be placed in the occupied territories. Brand and Fabricius (2000) pronounce that Mbeki did this to strengthen his denouncement and disapproval of Israel apartheid practices. Mbeki also reaffirmed his stance by stating that Israel had no rightful jurisdiction in the area (BBC News, 2014). Mbeki accused Israel of illegal measures of collective punishment against the Palestinian people and called for an end to the blockade of the territories. In agreement with Brand and Fabricius (2000), the Oslo peace process (1993 Oslo I Accord and 1995 Oslo II Accord) as stated by Mbeki had not brought the peace that Palestinians were promised. This was the case even though the then Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat who served as President of Palestine from 1994 to 2004, had appealed for calm, but Israel's Ehud Barak who served as Israeli Foreign Minister (1995–1996) and Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 had failed to stick to his side of the agreement.

Based on Brand and Fabricius (2000), Mbeki knew that there was a continued embarrassment happening daily of succumbing to the roadblocks of Israel and its unstoppable arrogant activities in Palestine. Later, in 2007, Mbeki envisaged how the global states ought to have done better in stopping the violent confrontation between the two by enforcing the resolutions of the UN which endorsed the Israeli withdrawal of forces from the territories it occupied after the war of 1967. Mbeki articulated this at the IDSPP (Division for Palestinian Rights, 2007). At the same event, Mbeki appealed to his Palestinian brothers and sisters, by reiterating that their struggle was for a rightful and lawful cause. Mbeki as a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and South Africa, also maintained his stance to revitalise the backup for the solidarity of Palestine's rightful war for liberation and equality as an independent member of the family of states (Division for Palestinian Rights, 2007). Umrabulo (2004) attests that back in 2002, Mbeki once projected the view that the leaders of Israel were duplicating the costly wrongs fabricated by the captains of apartheid in South Africa.

Several efforts were adopted by Mbeki in dealing with apartheid Israel. These include initiatives such as the: 2002 Spier Presidential Peace Retreat (failed peace negotiations between the two states at the Spier Wine Estate in Stellenbosch, South Africa), Mbeki also submitted an affidavit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that sought to indicate that the apartheid wall and the Jewish-only settlements were “illegal and a violation of international law” (Sooliman, 2014: 29). The Mbeki administration also endorsed several UN resolutions which castigated all Israel apartheid activities in Palestine. These include Resolutions 1322, 1397, 1402, 1403, 1405, 1435, and 1544. All were adopted from the year 2000 to the year 2004 (Sooliman, 2014).

7 SOUTH AFRICA'S ANTI-ISRAELI APARTHEID ACTIVITIES IN PALESTINE: ZUMA ADMINISTRATION (2009–2017)

Based on Zuma (2009), his (Jacob Zuma: Former South African President) new administration from the year 2009, was poised to adopt a national interest foreign policy stance that was going to also challenge and deal with racial discrimination both in the national and intercontinental borders. Therefore, it was not a surprising thing that Zuma had mentioned Palestine during his first 2009 SONA in line with African problems, although Palestine is not situated in Africa. Of greater importance, Zuma had linked South Africa's new foreign policy vision to the priority of the continuity in the assistance to the “reconstruction and development of the African continent in the post-conflict situations” (Rapanyane, 2018: 33). Zuma then called out for the long-lasting and non-violent peaceful co-existence to the situation in the Middle East to be found on the two-state resolution. The country's central focus on both racial discrimination and racism in general about the Palestinian-Israel struggle begun showing clear strong signs in the year 2008 (Rapanyane, 2018). This is particularly the time when more than 12 South African government ministers condemned the apartheid policies displayed by Israel in its relations with Palestine which include: theft of Palestinian resources, racial discrimination, and the creation of the Bantustans in the OPT (Rapanyane, 2019). These unexpected changes highlighted by Zuma included a central focus on the government's foreign policy approach that encompassed core national interests of challenging racial prejudice, supremacist ideologies and racism wherever they exist and/or existed. It then became clear that Zuma had interpreted Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the analytic tools of “settler colonialism, racial prejudice and white supremacy” (Smith, 2012: 67).

During his time as the president, Zuma had managed to endorse a few of the UN resolutions on Israel. Amongst those endorsed include the 2009 resolution 1860 which called for the fast-tracked, imperishable, and complete truth, to be followed by unconditional Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip (DIRCO, 2012). The same resolution also called for global humanitarian assistance to Palestine (particularly in Gaza) including fuel, food parcels and medical provisions (DIRCO, 2012). The latter 2016 landmark resolution 2334 called for the Israelites to pull out of all the settler occupied areas in Palestine. Then the second resolution was also welcomed by the Zuma administration with both hands for endorsement (Times Live, 2016). During the endorsement of this resolution, Maite Nkoana Mashabane (then Minister of Department of International Relations and Cooperation [DIRCO]) said that it was for the first-ever time that the UNSC had been able to adopt a resolution on the Middle East conflict. The observation follows several attempted failures on UNSC condemnation of Israel due to the unprecedented vetoes of the USA in 2011 (Rapanyane, 2019).

Raphael (2017) tells us that the ANC press statement which dated 20th December 2017 immediately after the national conference that took place at NASREC Johannesburg, indicated that South Africa will be wholeheartedly and instantly withdraw its embassy in Israel to a liaison office. This followed the ANC's full support for the human rights and Palestinian Solidarity movement. The ultimate change in the policy stance of the ANC could have ensued after Donald Trump (Former USA President) had recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital city (Phakgadi, 2017). The concurrence of the ANC with the leadership of the PLO on the downgrading of the embassy could have meant to send a clear message to Israel that there were consequences of its continued mass human rights violations and disrespect of international law (BDS, 2017). Others have come out in castigation of Trump's support for Israel and have blamed him for increasing the ongoing violent confrontation between Palestine and Israel (BDS, 2017; Phakgadi, 2017). The ANC also joined these castigations of Trump and have uttered that he lacked leadership and capacity in responding to the issues in the hostile region (Phakgadi, 2017). Mahlangu (2017) had argued that even if the ANC had communicated a withdraw of the embassy from Israel, this meant something, and did not make any significant change as the ANC did not consider imposing full economic sanctions on Israel.

8 THE EMERGENCE OF UNCERTAINTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICY ON ISRAEL: RAMAPHOSA ADMINISTRATION (2018–2020)

It is a well-considered view of Mokgatlhe (2018) that South Africa's office is still operating in Israel and the Israeli embassy in Pretoria is fully functional. The latter means that the withdrawal of the ambassador did not quite actually play any significant role in trying to bring about peace between Palestinians and Israelites. The ANC's NASREC decision is now understood as one that was imposed on the country without consulting citizens first. Times live (2018) reported in September 2018, immediately after Sisa Ngombane (South Africa's ambassador to Israel) went to Tel Aviv; Mandla Mandela became critical of his trip and accused the government of attempting to resume peaceful ties with Israel after the failure of the ANC's 54th National General Council resolution which called for downgrading of South Africa's embassy in Israel. In response to this, South Africa's government reiterated that it had not changed its position on the Israeli issue; meaning that the conditions that prompted the recall of its ambassador have not been met (Mokgatlhe, 2018). Up to so far, the ANC government has been repeatedly deliberating that any change in the status quo of the diplomatic relations with Israel will be attended to by DIRCO after consultations with the current President of South Africa (Rapanyane, 2019).

9 CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTY LINKS HINDER A CLEAR GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY STANCE

The role of certain groups within the South African Jewry in supporting the apartheid style practises of Israel in the current political context needs to be elaborated as they constitute the domestic constraints that seek to influence foreign policy implementation. As previously mentioned, many South African Jews supported or condoned the erstwhile white-minority National Party's rule in South Africa either through silence and complacency or through active participation. This trajectory thus links and defines the historical behaviour of these groups with their existing behaviour and support for the racist and apartheid-style policies of Israel whilst trying to influence South African foreign policy in favour of Israel is truly unacceptable.

On the other side, we have South Africa which has endorsed the Palestinian demands; the country's military engagements with Israel has declined at the expense of surveillance and security exchange which increased (Rapanyane, 2019). This shows the ability of Israel to tap into the political and economic clout of its global hegemonic allies such as the USA to advance pressure towards South Africa to conduct itself in a particular way when it comes to its treatment of the Middle East conflict. As a result, South Africa's continued economic links with Israel raises doubts about the state's ability to be more than a “barking dog” especially considering Israel's historical relations. An earlier case point in February 2014, reported in the South African media houses such as South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and eNCA revealed that Nathan Kirsch who is the director and owner of Israel's Magal Security systems was the main funder to both the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Agang South Africa (AGANG) (Rapanyane, 2018). Kirsch's company had secured 80% of the tenders in Israel to instal security systems along the ‘apartheid wall’ in the OPT. The article is of the view that as a Director of Magal Security Systems, he would be directly and/or indirectly complicit in criminal activities that are rooted in racist ideologies. His role as the main financial contributor to these two political parties can best be seen as a manoeuvre to ensure that the South African government maintains a pro-Israeli agenda (Rapanyane, 2018; Shanti, 2014). This back-door approach is done either through the funding of political parties as indicated above or through coordinated media attacks on anyone, any organisation or any group that speaks out against Israel.

As a result, it is necessary to acknowledge the dissenting voices in the South African Jewish community and pay attention to their call for sanctions as a means of making the occupation unprofitable (Rapanyane, 2019). Complete political and economic isolation is necessary. In this regard, Israel will not rescind its occupation until it is politically crippled (Jordaan, 2008). This is due to states balancing moral and ethical choices with national and economic interests. Even entailing sacrificing one value for another value or interest and usually, human rights are compromised at the expense of economic gain or political expediency (Raphael, 2013). Flowing from the above, it is important to be aware that in the past, the South African government had been subjected to a position that implies and/or implied a zero-sum game but mix-outcome non-zero-sum alternative- in the process compromising human rights. Hence, even if this is the case, the ANC as a political party has to fully and unconditionally adopt Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS), and ultimately align its foreign policy with the interpretations of the Palestine lobby; to effectively act in line with the demands of the Palestinians.

10 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research article has explored consistencies and inconsistencies depicted by South Africa's foreign policy stance on Israel within the context of the Palestinian question. In doing so, the article has traced the historical relations between South Africa and Israel dating back to 1948, when South Africa was still under apartheid. This Afrocentric research article shows that apartheid South Africa enjoyed diplomatic relations with Israel. Up until when South Africa became democratic, and Mandela declared that respect for human rights and international law would top South Africa's new foreign policy vision. Meaning that Israel which did not do any of the two mentioned was considered an outcast in the new ANC led government. The research article has also shown how the administrations of Mbeki and Zuma castigated Israel and even endorsed the UN resolutions which sought to condemn the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. The most unprecedented and surprising move by the ANC led government was when they resolved to downgrade their embassy in Israel to a liaison office. Realistically, in the Ramaphosa-era, this move meant nothing. First, scholars and the community of academics (both including in political science and International Relations [IR] intellectuals and practitioners) at large have to understand that downgrading the status of an embassy in Israel to a liaison officer did not mean that all the economic ties between the two countries would be cut off. Second, the move was not accompanied by a clear international strong call for economic sanctions on Israel. Up to today, South Africa is still trading with Israel either military or economically. Even some of our political parties are still receiving continued back door financial support from their Israel counterparts to push for a pro-Israeli lobby in the country.