A Logical Multidemand Bargaining Model with Integrity Constraints
Xiaoxin Jing
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
Department of Philosophy, College of Political Science and Law, Capital Normal University, Beijing, 100048 People's Republic of China
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorDongmo Zhang
Intelligent System Lab, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics, University of Western Sydney, Penrith, NSW 2751 Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Xudong Luo
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed; e-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJieyu Zhan
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorXiaoxin Jing
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
Department of Philosophy, College of Political Science and Law, Capital Normal University, Beijing, 100048 People's Republic of China
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorDongmo Zhang
Intelligent System Lab, School of Computing, Engineering and Mathematics, University of Western Sydney, Penrith, NSW 2751 Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorCorresponding Author
Xudong Luo
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed; e-mail: [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJieyu Zhan
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, 510275 People's Republic of China
e-mail: [email protected]
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
This paper proposes a logical model of multi-demand bargaining with integrity constraints. We also construct a simultaneous concession solution to bargaining games of this kind and show that the solution is uniquely characterized by a set of logical properties. Moreover, we prove that the solution also satisfies the most fundamental game theoretic properties such as symmetry and Pareto optimality. In addition, by lots of simulation experiments we study how the number of conflicting demands, bargainers' risk attitude, and bargainer number influence the bargaining success rate and efficiency as well as the agreement quality.
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