Why the United States failed to contain COVID-19
At the time of writing this article, there have been more than 4.7 million confirmed cases of the novel coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome (SAR)S-CoV-2, and approximately 315,000 deaths globally. The World Health Organization declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020.1
Before and since that announcement as well as other warnings, the health care response in the United States was insufficient so as to avoid eventually accounting for 28% of all coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) deaths, despite comprising only 4.25% of the world population.
There is nothing about the biology of Americans that made this inevitable. Rather, systemic readiness and our real-time responses have been major contributors to this outcome. Here we discuss some of the logistical and cognitive failures that, if understood and addressed by present and future policymakers, can be improved upon in the future.
1 LACK OF A RECENT HISTORICAL PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Although outbreaks of dangerous viruses such as Zika, Ebola, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and SARS have occurred in recent years, the effects have been remarkably limited in the United States. In the case of MERS and SARS, no mortalities occurred in the United States.2, 3 A collective sense of being “immune” to problems appearing in other nations likely contributed to complacency and an underappreciation of the true severity of the outbreak.
Further, the perceived distance between other nations and the United States may have been a contributor to the cognitive errors made here. The full implications of today's truly global economy appear not to have been sufficiently apparent.
One modifiable consequence of this was our failure to produce an adequate supply of testing kits for SARS-CoV-2 despite the availability of the virus’ genomic sequence since January 11, 2020.4 This left us less able to detect outbreaks in many regions; strict guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) early in the outbreak created a high bar for “persons under investigation,” and many patients who met revised PUI definitions were not initially tested. A second modifiable action relates to insufficient supplies of personal protective equipment for health care workers. Although the morbidity and mortality of this unreadiness are difficult to quantify, we do note that for the first time in modern American history, the CDC was compelled to release guidance on recycling of personal protective equipment, including the use of bandanas by health care professionals when other personal protective equipment was not available.5
2 THE VARYING REPORTS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISEASE
The true number of cases from China and other early affected countries is likely far higher than reported. Until recently, asymptomatic transmission was underappreciated and mild cases were frequently undocumented.6 First, the overall contagiousness of this disease has been initially understated.7, 8 As a result, the need to enact strict shelter-in-place strategies, as achieved in China, South Korea, and elsewhere, may not have been adequately appreciated as necessary.
Suboptimal testing strategies could have contributed to an underestimation of the number of cases, include a failure to account for known rates of false-negative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests for SARS-CoV-2,9, 10 low rates of testing of patients with mild symptoms, and, in some places, even the underreporting of known cases and deaths by governments.11
Second, the higher calculated case fatality rates cited by the World Health Organization early in the outbreak may have contributed to a sense that a disease with a high case fatality rate might behave more like MERS and SARS, which were geographically contained, and less like pathogens with lower case fatality rates that may seem more “realistic.” For example, the previous SARS and Ebola outbreaks had case fatality rates (CFRs) of 9.6% and between 25% and 90%, respectively.12, 13 It appears that the worse the disease, the less Americans believe it will affect them. This error, known as normalcy bias, dictates that “because it has not happened here before, it cannot happen now.”
Moreover, improper comparisons to seasonal influenza may have contributed to an undue sense of safety. Some used lower CFR estimates of COVID-19 seen in some areas (under 1%), to justify comparisons between the seasonal flu (a relatively known pathogen), with SARS-CoV-2 (an unknown one). Although the true CFR of SARS-CoV-2 is likely to be lower than initial reports, that fact should not have been used by public officials to make unwise and inappropriate comparisons.
3 THE PRESUMPTION THAT ONLY THE ELDERLY AND PATIENTS WITH COMORBIDITIES ARE AT RISK
Elderly patients and those with underlying comorbidities and SARS-CoV-2 in China were reported to have a higher fatality rate (14.8% in those 80 years or older) than the younger population (0.6% fatality in patients under 60 years old).14 In the United States, this observation may have led younger persons to feel protected, as seen by the public gatherings even after officials warned against it.15 Although such risks assessments are up to the individuals, again we reemphasize that the rate of asymptomatic spread was underappreciated. Therefore, the spread from the young and healthy to the old and otherwise vulnerable may have occurred and contributed to morbidity and mortality, especially within health care facilities.16 In addition, if we compare this lower fatality rate in patients under 60, it would still be multiple magnitudes higher than that for the seasonal influenza.17 Thus, the notion that COVID-19 is a disease of the elderly is also false.
4 FEAR OF ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
The fear of the economic impact of a panic caused by a communicable disease epidemic may have slowed lawmakers and government officials to respond to the emergence of the COVID-19 threat. Such an impact was seen earlier in the Asian economic markets because of COVID-19.18 Perhaps in an effort to contain this fear to prevent similar impact on the US economy, appropriate information on how to prepare for the eventual epidemic in the United States was not disseminated to the public, businesses, and industries. In hindsight, it is all too easy for us to conclude that any and all aggressive proactive measures required to contain the outbreak and eventual spread of the disease in the United States would have been less costly.
5 CONCLUSION
An unusual synergy of viral characteristics (contagiousness, asymptomatic transmission, varying fatality rates, variable time between infection and contagion) and geopolitical beliefs (the false assumption that the current outbreak would behave like previous well-known ones) has led to multiple catastrophic drawbacks in the United States’ response to SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19.
Although the uncertainties during a pandemic response always render “perfect responses” impossible to achieve, there is much to be learned from the current experience. In the future, most robust international cooperation on surveillance in particular, especially the early sharing of data, will likely prove beneficial. In addition, early and vigorous testing strategies are likely to significantly aid in the development of proportionate responses in future outbreaks. On the other hand, future outbreaks are also likely to incite panic sooner than in the past, stemming from understandable fears of “the next COVID-19.” Governmental officials, international organizations, and other key experts will have to balance such competing concerns so that robust early responses are enacted, while preventing global economies from prematurely grinding to a halt at the first sign of trouble. There will be another highly contagious respiratory illness in the future. The question of when it is going to happen is difficult to answer, but we now know that it is going to happen. We need to rethink our strategies for production and supply of protective equipment, ventilators, and medical supplies, and early contact tracing and isolation.19 We could increase the size of the supplies in the national stockpile considerably and accommodate for a future pandemic at this scale. We also need to have strategies in place for the potential rapid production of essential medical supplies and personal protective equipment inside the country, in case we lose our chain of supply in similar circumstances.
