Stability and Change in Corporate Governance
Social Institutions
Complex Organizations and Bureaucracies
Gerald F. Davis,
Johan S. G. Chu,
Gerald F. Davis
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Search for more papers by this authorJohan S. G. Chu
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Search for more papers by this authorGerald F. Davis,
Johan S. G. Chu,
Gerald F. Davis
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Search for more papers by this authorJohan S. G. Chu
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
Search for more papers by this authorFirst published: 15 May 2015
Abstract
Corporate governance describes the process that allocates power and resources within organizations and the societal institutions that shape how they look, how they make decisions, and how the proceeds from their activities are divided. Research and theory traditionally focused on the institutions that overcome the separation of ownership and control created by dispersed shareholdings. Critics noted that this problem was distinctively American, and that corporate governance is shaped by history, culture, and power. We describe several domains for productive future research that is comparative, historical, and attentive to power dynamics.
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