Natural Resources and Development
Kevin M. Morrison
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Search for more papers by this authorKevin M. Morrison
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
The idea that there is a “resource curse”—that countries with more natural resources tend to do poorly economically and politically—has gained widespread currency in the popular press and elsewhere. Despite the paradoxical nature of the hypothesis, in some ways it seems intuitive because one can look around the world and see many resource-rich countries that are authoritarian or seem to have squandered their wealth. Nevertheless, recent research has cast doubts on whether there is actually a relationship between natural resources and economic growth or democracy, once one has controlled for other factors. And an alternative line of research argues that natural resources do affect these economic and political outcomes, but whether they do so in a positive or negative way depends on the institutions a country has in place. That is, countries with poor economic and political institutions will suffer a “curse,” but countries with better institutions will not. In this entry, I review the foundational works on natural resources and development as well as these more recent responses, analyzing the trajectory of the literature and key issues for future research. Despite two decades of intensive research, we still have much to learn about whether developing countries will suffer or benefit in an era of increasing commodity prices and resource exploration.
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