Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
Michaela Mattes
University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorMichaela Mattes
University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, California, USA
Search for more papers by this authorAbstract
Military alliances are one of the most important tools states can use to counter international threats, exert influence over other countries, and accomplish broad foreign policy goals, including peace and stability in the international system. Alliance scholarship can provide valuable insights to policy-makers by answering questions such as which states are likely to ally, when alliances will be upheld, and whether they will be effective. Traditional alliance research focused on international considerations rather than domestic politics as drivers of alliance politics. More recently, however, scholars have shifted their attention to uncovering the ways in which domestic political institutions affect alliance behavior. The main questions underlying this research include: Are states with similar regime types, especially democracies, more likely to ally? Are democracies more reliable alliance partners? Do wartime coalitions involving democracies have a higher chance of victory? Do domestic institutional changes affect alliance maintenance? While the literature has provided conclusive answers to some of these questions, others are characterized by mixed findings. Recently published work has taken on unresolved issues and provided new and original insights. Future research should take these efforts further by unpacking the concepts of “domestic politics” and “alliance politics”.
References
- Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
- Bennett, D. S. (1997). Testing alternative models of alliance duration, 1816–1984. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 846–878.
-
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Lalman, D. (1992). War and reason: Domestic and international imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
10.2307/j.ctt1bh4dhm Google Scholar
- Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice, 144(1–2), 67–101. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9491-2
- Choi, A. (2004). Democratic synergy and victory in war, 1816–1992. International Studies Quarterly, 48(3), 663–682. doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00319.x
- Chyzh, O. (2014). Can you trust a dictator: A strategic model of authoritarian regimes' signing and compliance with international treaties. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(1), 3–17. doi:10.1177/0738894213501132
- Cowhey, P. F. (1993). Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States. International Organization, 47(2), 299–326. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027958
- De Tocqueville, A. [1835] (1994). Democracy in America. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
- Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.
- Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 775–795.
- Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic states and commitment in international relations. International Organization, 50(1), 109–139. doi:10.1017/S0020818300001685
- Geddes, B., J. Wright and E. Frantz. (2012). Authoritarian regimes: A new data set. Manuscript. Retrieved from http://dictators.la.psu.edu/.
- Gibler, D. M., & Sarkees, M. R. (2004). Measuring alliances: The correlates of war formal interstate alliance dataset, 1816–2000. Journal of Peace Research, 41(2), 211–222. doi:10.1177/0022343304041061
- Gibler, D. M., & Sewell, J. A. (2006). External threat and democracy: The role of NATO revisited. Journal of Peace Research, 43(4), 413–431. doi:10.1177/0022343306065115
- Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
- Goemans, H. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Chiozza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A data set of political leaders. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), 269–283. doi:10.1177/0022343308100719
- Kimball, A. L. (2010). Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation. Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 407–419. doi:10.1177/0022343310368346
- Kreps, S. (2010). Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Analysis, 6(3), 191–215. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2010.00108
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. (2001). The rational design of institutions. International Organization, 55(4), 761–799.
- Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/0022002700044002003
- Lai, B., & Slater, D. (2006). Institutions on the offensive: Domestic sources of dispute initiation in authoritarian regimes, 1950–1992. American Journal of Political Science, 50(1), 113–126. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00173.x
- Leeds, B. A. (1999). Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. American Journal of Political Science, 43(4), 979–1002.
- Leeds, B. A. (2003). Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. International Organization, 57, 801–827. doi:10.1017/S0020818303574057
- Leeds, B. A., Long, A. G., & Mitchell, S. M. (2000). Reevaluating alliance reliability: Specific threats, specific promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5), 686–699. doi:10.1177/0022002700044005006
- Leeds, B. A., & Mattes, M. (2007). Alliance politics during the cold war: Aberration, new world order, or continuation of history? Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(3), 183–199. doi:10.1080/07388940701473054
- Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
- Leeds, B. A., Ritter, J. M., Mitchell, S. M., & Long, A. G. (2002). Alliance treaty obligations and provisions, 1815–1944. International Interactions, 28, 237–260. doi:10.1080/03050620213653
- Leeds, B. A., & Savun, B. (2007). Terminating alliances: Why do states abrogate agreements? Journal of Politics, 69(4), 1118–1132. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00612.x
- Lipson, C. (2003). Reliable partners. How democracies have made a separate peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Marshall, M.G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2013). Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2012. Data Users' Manual. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf
- Mattes, M. (2012a). Democratic reliability, precommitment of successor governments, and the choice of alliance commitment. International Organization, 66(1), 153–172. doi:10.1017/S0020818311000336
- Mattes, M. (2012b). Reputation, symmetry, and alliance design. International Organization, 66(4), 679–707. doi:10.1017/S002081831200029X
- Mattes, M., & Rodiguez, M. (2014). Autocracies and international cooperation. International Studies Quarterly, 58(3), 527–538.
- Morrow, J. D. (1991). Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative to the capability aggregation model of alliances. American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 904–933.
- Morrow, J. D. (1993). Arms vs. allies: Trade-offs in the search of security. International Organization, 47(2), 207–233. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027922
- Narizny, K. (2003). The political economy of alignment: Britain's commitment to Europe, 1905–1939. International Security, 27(4), 184–219.
- Peceny, M., Beer, C. C., & Sanchez-Terry, S. (2002). Dictatorial Peace? American Political Science Review, 96(1), 15–26. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004203
- Pilster, U. (2011). Are democracies the better allies? The impact of regime type on military coalition operations. International Interactions, 37, 55–85. doi:10.1080/03050629.2011.546259
- Poast, P. (2010). (Mis)Using dyadic data to analyze multilateral events. Political Analysis, 18(4), 403–425. doi:10.1093/pan/mpq024
- Powell, E. J. (2010). Negotiating military alliances: Legal systems and alliance formation. International Interactions, 36, 28–59. doi:10.1080/03050620903553855
- Reed, W. (1997). Alliance duration and democracy: An extension and cross-validation of ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations’. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 1072–1078.
-
Reiter, D., & Stam, A. C. (2002). Democracies at war. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
10.1515/9781400824458 Google Scholar
- Schroeder, P. W. (1976). Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of power and tools of management. In K. Knorr (Ed.), Historical dimensions of national security problems (pp. 227–262). Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Simon, M. W., & Gartzke, E. (1996). Political system similarity and the choice of allies. Do democracies flock together, or do opposites attract? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4). doi:10.1177/0022002796040004005
- Siverson, R. M., & Emmons, J. (1991). Birds of a feather. Democratic political systems and alliance choices in the twentieth century. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(2), 285–306. doi:10.1177/0022002791035002007
- Siverson, R., & Starr, H. (1994). Regime change and the restructuring of alliances. American Journal of Political Sciences, 38(1), 145–161.
- Smith, A. (1996). To intervene or not to intervene: A biased decision. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(1), 16–40.
- Svolik, M. W. (2012). The politics of authoritarian rule. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Tago, A. (2009). When are democratic friends unreliable? The unilateral withdrawal of troops from the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Journal of Peace Research, 46(2), 219–234. doi:10.1177/0022343308100716
- Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
- Weeks, J. L. (2008). Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization, 62(1), 35–64. doi:10.1017/S0020818308080028
- Weeks, J. L. (2012). Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. American Political Science Review, 106(2), 326–346. doi:10.1017/S0003055412000111
- Weitsman, P. A. (2004). Dangerous alliances: Proponents of peace, weapons of war. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Werner, S., & Lemke, D. (1997). Opposites do not attract: The impact of domestic institutions, power, and prior commitments on alignment choices. International Studies Quarterly, 41(3), 529–546. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00055
Further Reading
- Barnett, M. N., & Levy, J. S. (1991). Domestic sources of alliances and alignments: The case of Egypt, 1962–1973. International Organization, 45(3), 369–395.
- Gartzke, E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2004). Regime type and commitment: Why democracies are actually less reliable allies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 775–795.
- Gibler, D. M., & Wolford, S. (2006). Alliances, then democracy. An examination of the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(1), 129–153. doi:10.1177/0022002705281360
- Lai, B., & Reiter, D. (2000). Democracy, political similarity, and international alliances, 1816–1992. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 203–227. doi:10.1177/0022002700044002003
- Leeds, B. A., Mattes, M., & Vogel, J. S. (2009). Interests, institutions, and the reliability of international commitments. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 461–476. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x
Browse other articles of this reference work: