Chapter 6
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Performance
Sanjai Bhagat,
Brian Bolton, Roberta Romano,
Sanjai Bhagat
Professor of Finance, University of Colorado at Boulder
Search for more papers by this authorRoberta Romano
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School, NBER and ECGI
Search for more papers by this authorSanjai Bhagat,
Brian Bolton, Roberta Romano,
Sanjai Bhagat
Professor of Finance, University of Colorado at Boulder
Search for more papers by this authorRoberta Romano
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law, Yale Law School, NBER and ECGI
Search for more papers by this authorBook Editor(s):H. Kent Baker,
Ronald Anderson,
H. Kent Baker
Search for more papers by this authorRonald Anderson
Search for more papers by this authorSummary
This chapter contains sections titled:
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Introduction
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Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance
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Aggregated Measures of Corporate Governance: Governance Indexes
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Is There a Relationship Between Governance Quality and Performance?
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Corporate Governance and Disciplinary Management Turnover After Poor Performance
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Summary and Conclusions
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Discussion Questions
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About the Authors
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